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“A person of unsound mind is one who ‘is unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities.’” ¶ 22 (1998).

¶31 Arizona courts have recognized equitable exceptions, including equitable estoppel, to statutes of limitations “when necessary to prevent injustice.” ¶ 13 (1998).

¶ 28 (App. 1998) (stating affidavits that "provide mere conclusory statements" are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment); ("[A]ffidavits that only set forth ultimate facts or conclusions of law can neither support nor defeat a motion for summary judgm

–80, ¶¶ 13–14 (1998) (a defendant who induces plaintiff to delay filing suit cannot then rely on a statute of limitations “as a shield for inequity”).

A court can also grant relief from a statute of limitations for excusable neglect, Cox, and can estop a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations if he “engaged in conduct that induced a plaintiff to forego litigation by leading the plaintiff to believe his claim would be settled without the necessity of litigation,”

¶ 13 (1998) (equitable tolling is a recognized exception to the application of a statute of limitations “when necessary to prevent injustice”); (“The equitable tolling doctrine is rooted in a number of common law exceptions to statutes of limitations .

See Nolde v. Frankie , , ¶ 18, (for equitable tolling to apply, party must have reasonably foregone action due to other party's conduct); see also John C. Lincoln Hosp.

-81, ¶¶ 16-19 (1998); accord McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., ¶ 23 (App. 2011).

¶ 12, (discussing equitable tolling); –81 ¶ 16–20, –82 (1998) (discussing equitable estoppel).

¶¶ 16–19, (citations omitted).

ents by the defendant that prevented the plaintiff from filing suit,” (2) show “defendant’s promises, threats or representations actually induced the plaintiff to forbear filing suit,” (3) show “defendant’s conduct reasonably caused the plaintiff to forbear filing a timely action,” and (4) “file suit within a reasonable time after termination of the conduct warranting estoppel.” ¶¶ 16-19

¶ 28, (“[A]ffidavits that only set forth ultimate facts or conclusions of law can neither support nor defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

P.2d 477 (1998), Appellants responded that Quarles & Brady was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.

¶ 20 , our supreme court addressed equitable estoppel in the context McBride attempts to use it here — to prevent a defendant from raising a statute of limitations defense: In determining whether a defendant is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense based o

(trial court determines whether equitable estoppel applies).1 And, because both equitable estoppel and equitable tolling by definition sound in equity, the trial court is the fact-finder.

310 , ¶ 22, 44 P .3d 990, 99 6 (2002) (f or limitation pe riod to commence, “it is not enough that a plaintiff comprehends a ‘what’; there must also be reason to connect the ‘wha t’ to a particular ‘who’ in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury might resu lt from fau lt”); Nolde v. F rankie, 964 P .2d 477, 48 4 (1998) (“ [A] cau se of action based on sexual abuse accrues when th e plaintiff be comes aw are of the ‘w hat’ and the ‘who’ elements o