Cited by

As the opinion explains, our supreme court instructs that “[t]he primary purpose in construing a voter initiative is to effectuate the intent of the electorate that adopted it.” ¶ 9 (2020) (quotation marks omitted); ¶ 10 (1999).

paign media spending.” However, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on their proposed interpretation—that this requirement “applies to donors who ‘opted out’ from campaign media spending under [§] 16-972(B).” ¶36 Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute “is to effectuate the intent of those who framed” it—for an initiative, “the intent of the electorate that adopted it.” ¶ 10 (1999) (citation omitted).

Bejarano, 219 Ariz. at 520, ¶ 2; ¶ 10 (1999) (if statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other means of statutory construction).

When a statute’s meaning cannot be found from its language alone, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statute as a whole, and consider the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” ¶ 16 (1999) (quoting Aros v. Beneficial Arizona, Inc., ).

-20 (1994) (recognizing the value of “a publicity pamphlet to apprise the voters of the purpose and intent behind the [ballot proposition]” in ascertaining its intended effect); ¶ 16 (1999)

§ 13-104 ("the provisions [of the criminal code] must be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law"); see also Calik v. Kongable , , ¶ 10, ("With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction.").

If statutory language is ambiguous, we determine legislative intent by “considering the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” MCCCDB, 242 Ariz. at 338, ¶ 39 ( ¶ 16 (1999)).

See, -01, ¶¶ 17-19 (1999); -48 (1984).

“When the language [of the initiative] is ‘clear and unambiguous,’ and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning, we [construe it] by applying the language without using other means of statutory construction.” Id.

When a statute’s meaning cannot be discerned from its language alone, “we attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statute as a whole, and consider ‘the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’” , 500 ¶ 16, (quoting Aros v. Beneficial Arizona, Inc., , ).

¶ 10 , (“With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction.”); , (explaining that “if the sense of a word is not to be taken in i

¶ 10 , (recognizing that initiative measures are construed to effectuate the intent of the electorate).

¶ 20 , (“Courts should avoid hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 , 76 S.Ct.

¶ 20 , (“Courts should avoid ‘hypertechnieal constructions that frustrate legislative intent.’”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, if the statute‟s language is unambiguous, we apply that language without using other means of statutory construction, id., unless that interpretation would lead to an absurd result