Cited by

We have previously explained that “article 18, [section] 6 is an ‘open court’ guarantee intended to constitutionalize the right to obtain access to courts.” ¶ 35 (1999) (citation modified).

Physicians Healthcare, ¶ 34 (2013) (internal quotation mark omitted) ( ¶ 35 (1999)).

of operative effect.” ¶ 22 (2021) (concluding that if statutory text conflicts with a 36 PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. KRISTIN MAYES/HAZELRIGG VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, Dissenting statement of purpose or intent, “the text must prevail”); ¶ 30 (1999) (“The preamble [stating legislative purpose and intent] is devoid of operative effect.”); (stating that the policy section of an act would be controlling only “if we were called upon to interpret an operative portion of the

Comm’n, ¶ 36 (2022) (construing workers’ compensation rights for accidents and injuries as those recognized when the Arizona Constitution was adopted); ¶ 37 (1999) (rejecting anti-abrogation clause protection for a wrongful discharge claim that “neither existed in 1912 when statehood was achieved, nor [evolved] from common law antecedents”); see also A.R.S.

To arrive at this conclusion, the court read our most recent decisions interpreting the clause, and Dickey ex rel.

See White v. AKDHC, LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1061 (D. Ariz. 2009) ( Taylor v. Graham Cnty.

.”); ¶ 35 (1999) (“[A]rticle 18, § 6 prevents abrogation of all common law actions for negligence, intentional torts, strict liability, defamation, and other actions in tort which trace origins to the common law.”); see also Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 31 (“No law shall be enacted in this state limiting the amount of damag

at 420, ¶ 22; ¶ 37 (1999) (A tort claim alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act did not exist at common law when Arizona became a state, did not evolve from common-law antecedents, and was therefore not protected by the anti-abrogation clause.).

See Enact, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “enact” as meaning “[t]o make into law by authoritative act; to pass”); ¶ 28 (1999) (acknowledging that “the legislature has the authority to enact laws”).

and must be regarded by the judges [] as fundamental law.”) (quoting The Federalist No. 78); ¶¶ 30–32 (1999) (asserting the judiciary’s constitutional role in interpreting the law); Antonin Scalia & Bryan G. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 243 (2012) (“In the American system of separate and coequal powers, authoritative interpretation of the laws is the assigned role of the courts.

.” (emphasis added)); (“[T]he legislature has the authority to enact laws.”).

either existed at common law or evolved from rights recognized at common law.” –39, ¶¶ 35, 39 (1999) (citations omitted); Dickey, 205 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9 (to be protected by the anti-abrogation provision of the Arizona Constitution, “[a] right of action for simple negligence .

See Ariz. Const., art. 3 (three branches of government; separation of powers); -38, ¶¶ 26-32 (1999) (stating courts have the constitutional authority to “develop, modify, or expand the common law” as well as “participate in the development of public policy”); see also Ariz. Const., art. 18, § 6 (anti-abrogation clause); Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, ¶ 36 (App. 2014) (stating

a; –41 ¶¶ 44–46, –41 (1999) (discussing that the anti-abrogation clause limits the legislature’s ability to abrogate a common-law claim but allows the legislature to regulate common-law claims).

-35, ¶ 32, –68 (App. 1998) (finding the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act did not unconstitutionally abrogate an action to recover damages for injuries); ¶ 34, (“We have held that article 18, § 6 precludes abrogation, but not regulation.”); Jimenez v. Sears Roebuck & Co., (“We long ago held that our constitution permits regulations effectively reducing a plaintiff’s recovery.”).

“[t]he right of action to recover damages for 18 injuries shall never be abrogated.” It prohibits “abrogation of all common law actions for negligence, intentional torts, strict liability, defamation, and other actions in tort which trace origins to the common law.” ¶ 35

¶ 2, (citing such factors in accepting jurisdiction of special action from a trial court ruling).

¶ 35 We take additional guidance, however, from our supreme court’s , which held that a tort claim for wrongful termination was not protected by the anti-abrogation clause.

-70 , -15 (1985) (supreme court accepted special action from superior court when several pending cases presented same issue and question presented was one of law and statewide importance); , (noting direct filing in supreme court exceptional, but accepting special action when issue of law and statewide significance).

¶¶ 30, 32, (concluding that, although the preamble to the Employment Protection Act (EPA) unconstitutionally “manifest[ed] the legislature’s intent to usurp judicial authority in violation of th

-38, ¶¶ 25-32 , -38 (1999).

a statute and apply it on a retroactive basis, the Murray court stated that “ ‘any attempt by the Arizona Legislature to adjudicate pending cases by defining existing law and applying it to fact is prohibited.’ ” ¶¶ 8, 9 , 982 P.2d at 1289 (emphasis added), , ¶¶ 26, 30 , 238 (1999) (finding preamble to Employment Protection Act, which purported to invalidate supreme court’s , “devoid of operative effect” because “it manifested] the legislature’s intent to usurp

¶¶ 29-30 , (“To the contrary, the constitutionality of the EPA is not dependent on the preamble because the preamble is not statutory text....