Cited by

(“The credibility of witnesses is an issue of fact to be resolved by the jury[.]”); (“[T]he credibility of witnesses when their stories conflict is a question of fact for the jury.”); ¶ 52 (2000) (noting the jury determines the credibility of testimony as an issue of fact).

¶ 52 (2000) (reiterating that credibility is a fact question for the jury); Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 12 (2000).

It is the jury’s function to determine accuracy, weight, or credibility.” ¶ 17 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 52 (2000)).

¶30 Challenges to “the accuracy and reliability of a witness’ factual basis, data, and methods go to the weight and credibility of the witness’ testimony and are questions of fact.” ¶ 52 (2000).

¶ 51 (2000); Webb v. Omni Block, Inc., ¶ 6 (App. 2007).

“The credibility of [any] witness’ testimony and the weight it should be given are issues particularly within the province of the jury.” Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 12 (2000) (citation omitted); ¶ 52 (2000) (“Questions about the accuracy and reliability of a witness’ factual basis, data, and methods go to the weight and credibility of the witness’ testimony and are questions of fact.”).

¶ 30, 485–86 ¶ 47, 490 ¶ 62 (2000).

¶ 52, (recognizing it is within the jury’s province to determine witnesses’ credibility), superseded in part on other grounds by amendment to Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 31, (holding that Frye applies only to expert testimony based on “novel scientific principles”).

It is the jury’s function to determine accuracy, weight, or credibility.’” Pipher, 212 P.3d at 96

In opposition, the State argued that because the expert testimony was based on the doctors’ individual training and experience as “medical doctors, pediatricians who specialize in children who have been abused,” P.3d 113 (2000), without the need for a Frye hearing.

247 , 400 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1991)); ¶ 104 , (McGregor, J., dissenting) (noting inquiry “focuses not on the credibility of a witness, but upon the scientific validity of the proffered evidence”) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 , 113 5.

Cir. 1923); ¶ 56, (retaining the Frye rule in Arizona).

Cir. 1923), P.3d 113 (2000).

“[T]he evidence must be relevant, the witness must be qualified, and the evidence must be the kind that will assist the jury.” *533 ¶ 57

3 ¶5 The respondent subsequently issued a lengthy minute entry order in which he agreed with the state that the statute “usurps the [Supreme] Court‟s rulemaking authority and violates the separation of powers doctrine.” Quoting our supreme court‟s the respondent found the statute unconstitutional for the additional reason that it “necessarily appoints the judge as the sole arbiter of credibility and therefore improperly „encroach[es] on the province and independence of the jury.‟” The respondent

474 n. 2, , 117 n. 2 (2000).

¶ 52 , (noting jury determines accuracy, weight, and credibility of testimony as an issue of fact).