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If it is, we will uphold it unless doing so would produce a result so irrational or absurd as to compel the conclusion that an informed electorate would not have adopted one portion without the other.” ¶ 15 (1999).

And our Supreme Court has found, in a different context, that “a set per diem rate, so long as it is reasonably related to actual expenses incurred, does not constitute a salary.” ¶ 11 (1999).

Jurisdiction ¶ 2 While our acceptance of special-action jurisdiction is highly discretionary, Randolph v. Groscost , , ¶ 6, Arizona courts "have held that 'a petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.'

See City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., ¶ 12 (App. 2001) (“We need not invalidate the entire Ordinance if the invalid portion 21 BRUSH & NIB, et al. v. PHOENIX Opinion of the Court can be severed from the remaining valid portions of the Ordinance.”) (-27, ¶ 13 (1999)).

Although “highly discretionary,” ¶ 6 (1999), “accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal,” Dep’t ¶ 6 (App. 2014).

¶ 13 (1999) (discussing the severability doctrine).

¶ 6 , ¶ 2 , Pool v. Superior Court In & For Pima Cnty.

¶ 5 Special action jurisdiction is “highly discretionary,” , 425 ¶ 6, and may be appropriate where petitioner has no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal,” Ariz. R.P.

Although “highly discretionary,” , 425 ¶ 6, accepting special action jurisdiction is particularly appropriate where the welfare of children is involved and the harm complained of can only be prevented by resolution before an appeal.

f the Arizona Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction over “mandamus, injunction and other extraordinary writs to State officers.” We exercise this jurisdiction through the special action procedure, but our decision to accept jurisdiction is “highly discretionary.” , 485 ¶¶ 10-11, , 425 ¶ 6

See Forty-Seventh Legislature, 213 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 11 , 143 P.3d at 1026 ; ¶ 6

at 17 , 422 P.2d at 747 ("Whether a contract is entire or severable is a question of the intention of the parties, to be ascertained from the language employed and the subject matter of the contract."); ¶ 15 , (establishing severability test for initiative measures: "We will first consider whether the valid portion, considered separately, can operate independently and is enforceable and workable.

423, and it clearly appears the legislature would have enacted the remainder without the unconstitutional portion.

¶¶ 13-14 , (setting forth test for severance of invalid statutory provision).

3 , in which we articulated a variation on the severability test for legislative measures that are begun by initiative.

Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 Yale L.J.