Cited by

¶¶ 12-13 (2000) (will contests); Chaplin, 220 Ariz. at 419-20, ¶ 24 (malicious prosecution).

Probable cause in this context is “the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful.” ¶ 12 (2000) (quoting and adopting Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt.

Probable cause is “the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful.” ¶ 12 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt.

¶20 “The law favors testamentary disposition of property.” ¶ 7 (2000).

Probable cause means “the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful.” ¶ 12 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt.

¶ 12 (2000) (quoting Restatement § 9.1 cmt.

In the course of our de novo review, however, we defer to the court’s underlying factual findings, ¶ 7 (App. 2015) ( ¶ 9 (2000)), unless they are clearly erroneous, ¶ 5 (App. 2000) (citing Ariz. R. Civ.

§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).2 Forfeiture of Interest ¶3 The trial court found that “the Petition in this case is an attack on the validity of a disposition under the Trust in violation of [the no-contest] provision,” but also found the forfeiture of interest provision unenforceable under P.3d 1062 (2000).

¶ 23 , ¶ 9 , vacated in part on other grounds

In determining probable cause for contesting a will, the supreme court has adopted the test that there be a "substantial likelihood of success.” -28 , mi 12-13, -67 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt.

The trial court instead relied on the supreme court’s more recent decision in P.3d 1062 (2000), and instructed the jury as follows: If Chris Mullin Jr. and/or Dr. David Mullon had a confidential relationship with Ralph Mullin; was/were active in procuring the execution of the 1995 will; and was/were a principal beneficiary under

" ¶ 9 , (alteration in original) ( , ), vacated in part on other grounds