Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Work v. United Globe Mines, 100 P. 813.

30 citing documents.

Dominguez v. Dominguez 567 P.3d 81 Ariz. 2025
Dominguez v. Dominguez 567 P.3d 81 Ariz. 2025
See id.; (addressing what is now § 12-525 and stating the general rule that a deed that is void for reasons not appearing on its face is “sufficient upon which to base title by adverse possession”); –27 (1906) (to same effect).
State v. Az Regents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Az Regents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 105 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2005
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 105 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2005
See Cummings, 12 Ariz. at 329-32 , 100 P. at 813 (holding that the time between the passage of a new statute of limitations and its effective date was an adequate period); -46 , 100 P. 813, 815 (1909) (same).
Henderson v. Tejada 549 P.2d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Henderson v. Tejada 549 P.2d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
See also, , 100 P. 813 (1909); Goldman v. Sotelo, supra.
River Farms, Inc. v. Fountain 520 P.2d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
River Farms, Inc. v. Fountain 520 P.2d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
State of Michigan v. First National Bank of Arizona 495 P.2d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
State of Michigan v. First National Bank of Arizona 495 P.2d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
100 P. 813 (1909); Western Coal & , Restate *50 ment (second) of Conflict of Laws § 142 (1) (1969).
Nicholas v. Giles 426 P.2d 398 Ariz. 1967
Nicholas v. Giles 426 P.2d 398 Ariz. 1967
100 P. 813 : “As the deed relied upon * * * was not void upon its face * * * it was nevertheless, * * * sufficient upon which to base title by adverse possession under the five year statute.” In State v. Harmon, 57 W.Va.
Ross v. Ross 393 P.2d 933 Ariz. 1964
Ross v. Ross 393 P.2d 933 Ariz. 1964
100 P. 813 , that our statutes of limitation run against a nonresident.
State Tax Commission v. Murray Co. of Texas, Inc. 350 P.2d 674 Ariz. 1960
State Tax Commission v. Murray Co. of Texas, Inc. 350 P.2d 674 Ariz. 1960
Gilliland v. Rodriquez 268 P.2d 334 Ariz. 1954
Gilliland v. Rodriquez 268 P.2d 334 Ariz. 1954
Fontes v. Porter, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 956 ; , 100 P. 813 .
Manor v. Stevens 152 P.2d 133 Ariz. 1944
Manor v. Stevens 152 P.2d 133 Ariz. 1944
This decision is not in point here for, , 100 Pac.
In Re the Estate Lawrence v. Lawrence 85 P.2d 45 Ariz. 1938
In Re the Estate Lawrence v. Lawrence 85 P.2d 45 Ariz. 1938
John W. Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co. 68 P.2d 679 Ariz. 1937
John W. Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co. 68 P.2d 679 Ariz. 1937
Steinfeld v. Marteny 10 P.2d 367 Ariz. 1932
Steinfeld v. Marteny 10 P.2d 367 Ariz. 1932
Sparks v. Douglas 166 P. 285 Ariz. 1917
Sparks v. Douglas 166 P. 285 Ariz. 1917
onstituent elements established, “he [the disseisor] has an indefeasible title which can only be divested by his conveyance of the land to another, or by a subsequent disseisin for the statutory limitation period.” When one acquired such a title or right it may be used either as a weapon or as a shield just as his necessities may demand, or, , 100 Pac.