Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Miami Copper Co. v. Strohl, 130 P. 605.

36 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Andres Sanchez 537 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
State of Arizona v. Andres Sanchez 537 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
-67 (1964) ( superseded by statute as stated in Hays, 95 Ariz. at 265-67)); (no jurisdiction when appeal taken from “verdict of conviction” but not “judgment” or denial of motion for new trial).
Rourk v. State 821 P.2d 273 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Rourk v. State 821 P.2d 273 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
130 P. 605 (1913) (both interpreting a former statute, Rev.Code 1928 § 3660).
Union Interchange, Inc. v. Benton 410 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1966
Union Interchange, Inc. v. Benton 410 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1966
red to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.” This Court in the past has stated that “[a]n application for security for costs, being dilatory, is looked upon with disfavor by the courts.” , 130 P. 605 (1913).
Kimball v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 289 P.2d 193 Ariz. 1955
Kimball v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 289 P.2d 193 Ariz. 1955
In Miami Copper Co. v. Strohl, 1913, , 130 *325 P. 605, 610, the motion for security for costs was not made until one trial of the cause was had.
Yerger v. Bross 201 P.2d 121 Ariz. 1948
Yerger v. Bross 201 P.2d 121 Ariz. 1948
“The appellate is charged with the duty of taking his appeal and presenting his case for review in the manner provided by law, and error in this regard affects the jurisdiction of this court.” , 130 P. 605, 608 .
Richfield Oil Corp. v. Laprade 105 P.2d 1115 Ariz. 1940
Richfield Oil Corp. v. Laprade 105 P.2d 1115 Ariz. 1940
Beavers v. Beavers 99 P.2d 95 Ariz. 1940
Beavers v. Beavers 99 P.2d 95 Ariz. 1940
Sullivan v. Cashion 300 P. 193 Ariz. 1931
Sullivan v. Cashion 300 P. 193 Ariz. 1931
Burmister v. City of Prescott 297 P. 443 Ariz. 1931
Burmister v. City of Prescott 297 P. 443 Ariz. 1931
598 , 114 S. W. 987 ; , 130 Pac.
Sawyer v. Ellis 286 P. 189 Ariz. 1930
Sawyer v. Ellis 286 P. 189 Ariz. 1930
Ritter v. Arizona Cattle Co. 271 P. 25 Ariz. 1928
Ritter v. Arizona Cattle Co. 271 P. 25 Ariz. 1928
United Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones 249 P. 747 Ariz. 1926
United Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones 249 P. 747 Ariz. 1926
Hallgren v. Sunset Paint Co. 236 P. 689 Ariz. 1925
Hallgren v. Sunset Paint Co. 236 P. 689 Ariz. 1925
“Intermediate order,” as employed in paragraph 1230 of the Civil Code, has been defined as “any [nonappealable] intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.” , 130 Pac.
Timmons v. McKinzie 189 P. 627 Ariz. 1920
Timmons v. McKinzie 189 P. 627 Ariz. 1920
Landers v. Joerger 140 P. 209 Ariz. 1914
Landers v. Joerger 140 P. 209 Ariz. 1914
While, under the law as it formerly stood, , 130 Pac.
Hoeye v. Willis 138 P. 15 Ariz. 1914
Hoeye v. Willis 138 P. 15 Ariz. 1914
Gila Valley Copper Co. v. Gilpin 133 P. 98 Ariz. 1913
Thomas v. Bartleson 131 P. 973 Ariz. 1913
Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co. 132 P. 94 Ariz. 1913
Steinfeld v. Nielsen 139 P. 879 Ariz. 1913