Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Conwell, 190 P. 88.

68 citing documents.

Estate of Reinen v. Northern Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd. 9 P.3d 314 Ariz. 2000
Estate of Reinen v. Northern Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd. 9 P.3d 314 Ariz. 2000
-87 , 190 P. 88, 90-91 (1920).
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 861 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 861 P.2d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
Rosen v. Knaub 842 P.2d 1317 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Rosen v. Knaub 842 P.2d 1317 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
190 P. 88 (1920); Winchester v. Palko, 18 Ariz.App.
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co. 737 P.2d 376 Ariz. 1987
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co. 737 P.2d 376 Ariz. 1987
Freight System, Inc., , -87 , 190 P. 88, 90-91 (1920) (jury is sole and conclusive arbiter of question of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk).
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc. 717 P.2d 434 Ariz. 1986
indicates that the power or duty to finally and conclusively settle the question of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is, by its terms, transferred from the court to the jury.” , 190 P. 88, 94 (1920).
Mason v. Arizona Public Service Co. 622 P.2d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Mason v. Arizona Public Service Co. 622 P.2d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Heimke v. Munoz 470 P.2d 107 Ariz. 1970
Heimke v. Munoz 470 P.2d 107 Ariz. 1970
by its nature into a matter of fact, Holmes replied that the material element in the Oklahoma constitutional enactment “ * * * is not that it called contributory negligence fact but that it left it wholly to the jury.” , 190 P. 88 (1920): “There is nothing, however, in the Constitution of the United States or its Amendments that requires a State to maintain the line with which we are familiar between the functions of the jury and those of the Court.
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Arizona State Highway Department v. Bechtold 460 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1969
Arizona State Highway Department v. Bechtold 460 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1969
Quintero v. Continental Rent-A-Car System, Inc. 453 P.2d 999 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Quintero v. Continental Rent-A-Car System, Inc. 453 P.2d 999 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
provides: “(t)he defense of contributory negligence * * * shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.” , 190 P. 88 (1920) our Supreme Court stated that: .
McDowell v. Davis 448 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1968
McDowell v. Davis 448 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1968
e Trucking Co., , ; , ; , ; , ; Salt River Valley Water Users’ , ; , ; , 190 P. 88 .
Layton v. Rocha 368 P.2d 444 Ariz. 1962
Vickers v. Gercke 340 P.2d 987 Ariz. 1959
Vickers v. Gercke 340 P.2d 987 Ariz. 1959
190 P. 88, 90 , which is cited by plaintiffs, we said: “As to the assumption of risk, it must be admitted that the uncontradicted evidence proves that Conwell, for some time prior to the accident, had actual and positive knowledge of the bad condition of the track, and understood and appreciated the danger aris
Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. 272 P.2d 352 Ariz. 1954
Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co. 272 P.2d 352 Ariz. 1954
The problem of proximate causation has received consideration by this court in many cases, , 190 P. 88 ; , 190 P. 573 ; Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Cornum, , ; , ; , .
Nichols v. City of Phoenix 202 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1949
Nichols v. City of Phoenix 202 P.2d 201 Ariz. 1949
Kauffroath v. Wilbur 185 P.2d 522 Ariz. 1947
Kauffroath v. Wilbur 185 P.2d 522 Ariz. 1947
190 P. 88 ; , .” See also Pearson & , .
City of Phoenix v. Mullen 174 P.2d 422 Ariz. 1946
City of Phoenix v. Mullen 174 P.2d 422 Ariz. 1946
Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, Inc. 166 P.2d 816 Ariz. 1946
Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, Inc. 166 P.2d 816 Ariz. 1946
Therein appears the following: “ , 190 P. 88 , we held that although the uncontradicted evidence showed plaintiff had assumed the risk, the *109 language quoted above clearly indicated that the power or duty finally and conclusively to settle the question of contributory negligence was transferred from the court to the jury as ‘the sole arbiter of th
Pearson & Dickerson Contractors, Inc. v. Harrington 137 P.2d 381 Ariz. 1943
Pearson & Dickerson Contractors, Inc. v. Harrington 137 P.2d 381 Ariz. 1943
’ ’ Of this provision, , 190 Pac.
Olson v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Co. 5 N.W.2d 492 Minn. 1942
Campbell v. English 110 P.2d 219 Ariz. 1941
Campbell v. English 110 P.2d 219 Ariz. 1941
Western Truck Lines, Ltd. v. Berry 78 P.2d 997 Ariz. 1938
Western Truck Lines, Ltd. v. Berry 78 P.2d 997 Ariz. 1938
Copper Co. v. Conwell, supra [ , 190 Pac.
Herzberg v. White 66 P.2d 253 Ariz. 1937
Herzberg v. White 66 P.2d 253 Ariz. 1937
City of Phoenix v. Mayfield 20 P.2d 296 Ariz. 1933
City of Phoenix v. Mayfield 20 P.2d 296 Ariz. 1933
Dennis v. Stukey 294 P. 276 Ariz. 1930
Dennis v. Stukey 294 P. 276 Ariz. 1930
Section 5 of article 18 of such instrument reads: “The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall at all times, be left to the jury.” , 190 Pac.
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Berry 250 P. 356 Ariz. 1926
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Berry 250 P. 356 Ariz. 1926