Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Lundy v. Lundy, 202 P. 809.

27 citing documents.

Estate of Garcia v. Industrial Commission 749 P.2d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Estate of Garcia v. Industrial Commission 749 P.2d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Further, the “abandoning or deserting party must ‘intend to break off all marital relations and disavow their obligations and duties without justification.’ ” Putvain, 140 Ariz. at 141 , 680 P.2d at 1202 , , 202 P. 809, 813 (1922) (emphasis added).
Putvain v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZ. 680 P.2d 1199 Ariz. 1984
Putvain v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZ. 680 P.2d 1199 Ariz. 1984
The abandoning or deserting party must intend “to break off all marital relations and disavow their obligations and duties without justification.” , 202 P. 809, 813 (1922) (emphasis added).
Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229 Ariz. 1975
Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229 Ariz. 1975
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez 513 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez 513 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
Since the testimony of the party seeking the divorce can be corroborated by the admissions of the other party (the wife herein), , 202 P. 809 (1922); , 259 P. 401 (1927), there was sufficient evidence to justify granting the divorce.
Acheson v. Acheson 485 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1971
Acheson v. Acheson 485 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1971
Clark v. Industrial Commission 460 P.2d 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Clark v. Industrial Commission 460 P.2d 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
128 P. 813 (1912); , 202 P. 809 (1922); , 243 P. 413 (1926); , 262 P. 614 (1928).
Bialac v. Bialac 386 P.2d 852 Ariz. 1963
Bialac v. Bialac 386 P.2d 852 Ariz. 1963
Lawson v. Lawson 356 P.2d 701 Ariz. 1960
Lawson v. Lawson 356 P.2d 701 Ariz. 1960
Williams v. Williams 344 P.2d 161 Ariz. 1959
Williams v. Williams 344 P.2d 161 Ariz. 1959
§ 25-317' (B), which provides that “Either party maybe a witness, but no divorce shall be granted upon the testimony or admissions of a party unless they are corroborated by other evidence.” , 202 P. 809 , that the reason for the rule stated in our statute is to guard against collusion between the parties to the marriage contract to have the contract dissolved; and since that is the purpose, if the case is contested and there appears to be no collusion, only slight corroboration is necessary.
Hemphill v. Hemphill 324 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1958
Hemphill v. Hemphill 324 P.2d 225 Ariz. 1958
202 P. 809 ; and see annotations, 15 A.L.R.2d 170 , 65 A.L.R.
Chester v. Chester 210 P.2d 331 Ariz. 1949
Chester v. Chester 210 P.2d 331 Ariz. 1949
1939, providing that “In an action for divorce the defendant shall not be compelled to answer upon oath, nor shall the complaint be taken as confessed for want of an answer * * , 202 P. 809 , , 259 P. 401 .
Frankel v. Frankel 18 P.2d 911 Ariz. 1933
Frankel v. Frankel 18 P.2d 911 Ariz. 1933
Graml v. Graml 238 N.W. 683 Minn. 1931
Stark v. Stark 259 P. 401 Ariz. 1927
Stark v. Stark 259 P. 401 Ariz. 1927