Cited by

As support for this argument, the Legislature cites Higgins’ but that case does not stand for the proposition that the current legislature is not subject to statutes enacted by a prior legislature.

See Higgins’ , 252 P. 515, 519-20 (1926).

See Higgins’ 252 P. 515, 519 (1926) (recognizing that “an attempt by one [l]egislature to limit or bind the acts of a future one” is unconstitutional); accord Wash.

The statute establishes a “rule of statutory construction to the effect that the mere repeal of a statute without any further action by the Legislature does not terminate any accrued right conferred by the statute,” and provides “a general method of enforcing such rights.” Higgins’ , 252 P. 515, 520 (1926) (arising under a predecessor statute).

See Higgins’ , 252 P. 515 (1926); see also 82 C.J.S.

Higgins’ , 252 P. 515 (1926), does not aid the County.

(2d) 644 ; Higgins’ , 252 Pac.

A necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of an intention that one contrary to that which is imputed to the party using the language cannot be supposed.” ’ ” The other rule was laid down in Higgins’ , 252 Pac.

In re Hubbs , , 252 P. 515 .

f persons whose estate shall be subject to the payment of any tax imposed by this act.” The tax on the property in question, however, had accrued more than two years prior to the passage of this act, and under the provisions of paragraphs 5554 and 5560, Civil Code, 1913, the repeal of the old law did not “affect any right, then already existing or accrued at the time of such repeal.” , 252 Pac.