Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Tomlinson v. Gibson, 99 P.2d 485.

14 citing documents.

Delmastro & Eells v. Taco Bell Corp. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
§ 1-211(B); Leeson v. 5 Bartol, R & M Oxford Constr., 3 In effect, this means a lien claimant must demonstrate substantial compliance with each statutory requirement consistent with its purpose.
Performance Funding, L.L.C. v. Arizona Pipe Trade Trust Funds 49 P.3d 293 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., , Leeson v. Bartol , United Metro Materials, Inc. v. Pena Blanca Properties, L.L.C., ¶ 26 , see also A.R.S.
Aesthetic Property Maintenance, Inc. v. Capitol Indemnity Corp. 900 P.2d 1210 Ariz. 1995
ent of disputed taxes because “spirit of the law” was satisfied); , (only substantial compliance with annexation statute required; “[ajbsolute and literal compliance with the statute would result in defeating the purpose of the statute in situations where no one has been or could be misled”); , (copy instead of duplicate copy allowed; to hold otherwise “defeats rather than preserves the law’s intent”).
Fields v. CAPITOL INDEMNITY CORPORATION 884 P.2d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
Columbia Group, Inc. v. Jackson 725 P.2d 1110 Ariz. 1986
Smith Pipe & , Kerr-McGee Oil Industries
Wooldridge Construction Co. v. First National Bank 634 P.2d 13 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
However, to the extent that this possibility exists, appellant’s work cannot be considered so inconsequential as to be “trifling”, particularly in view of the remedial nature of the mechanic’s lien laws, see, , Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc.
Gene McVety, Inc. v. Don Grady Homes, Inc. 581 P.2d 1132 Ariz. 1978
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries
Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc. 561 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries
Wahl v. Southwest Savings and Loan Association 476 P.2d 836 Ariz. 1970
Section 33-992 specifically provides that the liens are to be preferred “to all liens, mortgages and other encumbrances of which the lienholder had no actual or constructive notice at the time he commenced labor or commenced to furnish materials.” , , we held: “Lien laws are remedial and are to be liberally construed.” Under the facts of the instant case there was neither actual nor constructive notice.
Peterman-Donnelly Engineers & Contractors Corp. v. First National Bank 408 P.2d 841 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
§ 33-993 is to give the property owner an opportunity to protect himself and time to investigate the claim and determine whether it is a proper charge, , and the lien statutes, being remedial, are to he liberally construed.
Ranch House Supply Corporation v. Van Slyke 370 P.2d 661 Ariz. 1962
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc. v. McCray 361 P.2d 734 Ariz. 1961
Mower v. Street 288 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1955
Mower v. Street 288 P.2d 495 Ariz. 1955
Benefit Ass’n, , ; , ; 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, section 781, page 338.