Cited by

Those cases suggest that when an “intentional” act is the cause, it is the “unusual” or “unexpected” result that justifies the classification of the injury as an “accident.” , (unexpected death as a result of ordinary work activities constitutes accident covered by statute); , 452-53, (unexpected result — poisoning and resultant death — constitutes accident).

The seminal accidental injury case, , is consistent with this analysis.

See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, , , Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Comm’n

See Mead v. American Smelting & Refining Company, , , , Enyart v. Industrial Commission, 10 Ariz.App.

See Reilly v. Industrial Commission, supra (repeated continuous exposure to lint, resulting in emphysema); , (pneumonia developed as the result of inhaling fumes from a cracked exhaust pipe); , (inhalation of fumes over a period of time); , (inhalation of carbon tetrachloride fumes).

The Carrier would have the Court go further and hold that the statutory revision of 1973, supra, somehow weakened the authority of cases such as: , , , , et al., which treated as compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act disabilities ca

In , we said that an occupational disease is not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and see also

Eventually the definition of accident was liberalized to the extent that an injury would be found within the meaning of the Act even though it developed slowly over a period of time; , , Reilly v. Industrial Commission, 1 Ariz.App.

However, the case of In re Mitchell, supra, [ , ] later liberalized this restrictive rule and held that although accidental injury usually involved a sudden happening caused by some violent or external means such as traumatic injury, an industrial accident need not be an instantaneous happening and violence is not a prerequisite of the right to compe

Enyart v. Industrial Commission, 10 Ariz.App.

See Reilly v. Industrial Commission, supra (repeated continuous exposure to lint, resulting in emphysema); , (pneumonia developed as the result of inhaling fumes from a cracked exhaust pipe); , (inhalation of fumes over a period of time) ; , (inhalation of carbon tetrachloride fumes).

Com., above cited; where a diabetic workman rubbed a blister on his foot which became infected, thereby necessitating amputation, , ; where petitioner died as-a result of carbon tetrachloride poisoning which was inhaled over a period in excess of 2 and Yi months , 437, and from the inhalation of nitric oxide and sulphur dioxide fumes

3 Eleven years after Pierce an award of death benefits to the widow of a telephone company repairman who died of carbon tetrachloride poisoning was sustained in

or death does not result from the disease alone, progressing naturally, as it would have done under ordinary conditions, but the injury aggravates and accelerates its progress, materially contributes to hasten its culmination in disability or death, there may be an award under the Compensation Acts.” , , overruled in , .

tting go with an obvious sudden organic or structural change in the body the injury is accidental.” The commission in its brief concedes this court has “long since departed from the strict interpretation of the Act that a definite and distinct accident must precede injury in order to constitute a compensable case * * Recognition is taken, no doubt, of our holdings in cases such as , , , , was expressly overthrown; , ; , ; Vukovich v. Industrial Commission, 7

This court receded from the restrictive interpretation of the Pierce case in our case of In re Mitchell, 1944, , , which presented a *153 ■unique situation, wherein the deceased deliberately and intentionally and in the usual manner applied carbon tetrachloride in cleaning contact points on a telephone switchboard relay, the chemical used being highly volatile liberated deadly gases in the poorly ventilated s

The rule laid down in , , in which the decedent met his death by inhaling carbon tetrachloride as it evaporated from use in cleaning contacts or terminals in switchboard relays of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company by whom he was employed, occurred when he was engaged in the routine performance of his duties a

in which deceased met his death by inhaling carbon tetrachloride as it evaporated from use in cleaning contacts or terminals in switch board relays of the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. by whom he was employed, Justice Udall, writing the opinion for this court, held in substance that “a

Co. v. Industrial Commission, 1944, , ; Melendez v. Johns, 1938, , .

Goodyear Aircraft Corp., , ; , .

However, when we consider the wording of the statutes, the nature of this disease and the purpose of this remedial legislation (it being deserving as is the Workmen’s Compensation Law, , , of a liberal interpretation) we are impelled to adopt a realistic and practical view and hold that the legislature must have intended that intermittent exposure for any appreciable period of time to harmful quantities of such dust throughout the work shift would constitute sufficient exposure so as to

In this case there is sufficient evidence to sustain the commission’s finding that claimant suffered an accident as this term has been defined by this court in the following cases: , ; , ; , .

We have held that “This court is not bound by its former decisions, unless the declarations of principles in such former adjudicated cases commend themselves by their essential soundness.” , .

ns limits compensation to cases where the employee has sustained an ‘injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.’ ” , ; Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines, Inc., , ; , ; , ; , .

252 P. 512 ; , 267 P. 203 ; , .

On the other hand, respondent, in its brief, contends that the Pierce case in effect was overruled by , 150 Pac.

In a late decision, , 150 Pac.