Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d 283.

52 citing documents.

CENTER FOR AZ v. AZ SECRETARY OF STATE Ariz. 2026
¶ 47 (2017) (describing the state’s “broad police power” as protecting “life, liberty, and property” and preserving “the public peace and order” ()).
State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
Id.; see also Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 174 ¶ 10, 273 P.3d at 626 (“[A] home rale city deriving its powers from the Constitution is independent of the state Legislature as to all subjects of strictly local municipal concern.”) *599 (internal quotation marks omitted) (-9 , ); -43 , Clayton, 38 Ariz. at 144-46 , 297 P. 1037 ; id.
State v. Panos 366 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Panos 366 P.3d 1006 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
y is established “when the statute looks to broader application in the future, no matter how imminent the application might be, and allows ‘persons, places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics’ to enter and those that ‘no longer have those characteristics’ to leave the class.” Gallardo, 236 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 35 (quoting Republic Inv., 166 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 38 (App. 2002)).
Steve Gallardo v. State of Arizona 336 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2014
Steve Gallardo v. State of Arizona 336 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2014
166 Ariz. at 150, 800 P.2d at 1258; (elasticity met by statute that “contemplate[s] that cities in the future that attain the stipulated requisite conditions automatically come within the terms of the law”); Long, 203 Ariz. at 258 ¶ 38, 53 P.3d at 183 (“[A]ny county may seemingly enter the class upon
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
City of Tucson v. State 250 P.3d 251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Local versus Statewide Concern ¶ 12 The city preliminarily contends we should assess the state’s , , , which considers a city activity to be of statewide interest when the city acts as an agent of the state.
McMann v. City of Tucson 47 P.3d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
McMann v. City of Tucson 47 P.3d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
City of Tucson v. State 957 P.2d 341 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
City of Tucson v. State 957 P.2d 341 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 95 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
The court in Republic Investment Fund also stated: A statute is special or local if it is worded such that its scope is limited to a particular case and it “looks to no broader application in the future.” Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 558 , 637 P.2d at 1061
Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise 800 P.2d 1251 Ariz. 1990
Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise 800 P.2d 1251 Ariz. 1990
b. Elasticity of Classification A statute is special or local if it is worded such that its scope is limited to a particular case and it “looks to no broader application in the future.” 4 Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 558 , 637 P.2d at 1061
For Deannexation v. City of Goodyear 773 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
For Deannexation v. City of Goodyear 773 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
it is unconstitutional.” , quoting Bravin v. Mayor and Common Council.
State v. Christi 718 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
State v. Christi 718 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
State v. Loughran 693 P.2d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
State v. Loughran 693 P.2d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation 637 P.2d 1053 Ariz. 1981
Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation 637 P.2d 1053 Ariz. 1981
Levitz v. State 613 P.2d 1259 Ariz. 1980
Levitz v. State 613 P.2d 1259 Ariz. 1980
City of Scottsdale v. Scottsdale Associated Merchants, Inc. 583 P.2d 891 Ariz. 1978
City of Scottsdale v. Scottsdale Associated Merchants, Inc. 583 P.2d 891 Ariz. 1978
Rochlin v. State 540 P.2d 643 Ariz. 1975
Rochlin v. State 540 P.2d 643 Ariz. 1975
P.2d 283 (1938) aids appellant on this point.
Kelley v. Tims 440 P.2d 39 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Kelley v. Tims 440 P.2d 39 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
In our opinion, , , are not contrary to the foregoing holding.
Police Pension Board of City of Phoenix v. Warren 398 P.2d 892 Ariz. 1965
Barbee v. Holbrook 371 P.2d 886 Ariz. 1962
Barbee v. Holbrook 371 P.2d 886 Ariz. 1962
City of Prescott v. O’Sullivan, , ; Bravin v. Mayor, etc. of Tombstone, , 33 P. 589 .
City of St. Louis Park v. King 75 N.W.2d 487 Minn. 1956
City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co. 293 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1956
City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co. 293 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1956
Strode v. Sullivan 236 P.2d 48 Ariz. 1951
Strode v. Sullivan 236 P.2d 48 Ariz. 1951
Mayor Common Council of City of Prescott v. Randall 196 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1948
Mayor Common Council of City of Prescott v. Randall 196 P.2d 477 Ariz. 1948
American-La France, etc., , ; , ; Home Owners’ , ; , ; , ; , ; , ; , ; City of Tucson v. Arizona Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Inc.
City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club 164 P.2d 598 Ariz. 1945
City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club 164 P.2d 598 Ariz. 1945
The rule has been announced in Luhrs v. City of Phœnix, , , that if an activity is carried on by a municipality as the agent of the state it is of general or public concern, but it is of local concern if exercised by the city in its proprietary capacity: “* * * The courts differ as to what activities of the city are of local interest or concern and therefo
Shropshire v. Peery 141 P.2d 852 Ariz. 1943
Shropshire v. Peery 141 P.2d 852 Ariz. 1943
City of Tucson v. Walker 135 P.2d 223 Ariz. 1943
City of Tucson v. Walker 135 P.2d 223 Ariz. 1943
City of Tucson v. Judge 52 Ariz. 453 Ariz. 1938