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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Pickett v. Boykin, 576 P.2d 120.

43 citing documents.

  • State v. Alvarez Bojorquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Alvarez Bojorquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    A grant of probation is not a sentence but the suspension of sentence, and so the imposition of a prison term in lieu of probation does not constitute the aggravation of a sentence, -57, ¶¶ 5, 10 (App. 2013) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to court’s decision to impose prison sentence instead of granting probation and noting th
  • State v. Yug 501 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Yug 501 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    (“Probation is not a sentence but rather a feature of the suspension of imposition of sentence.”).
  • State v. Watson 459 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Watson 459 P.3d 120 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State of Arizona v. Joel Agustin Lopez 282 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
  • State of Arizona v. Joel Agustin Lopez 282 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
    -42, -29 (App. 1989), and it is not clear whether the imposition of probation would constitute a “sentence” as contemplated by § 13-4032(5), compare Pickett v. Boykin, 118 (“Probation is not a sentence but rather a feature of the suspension of imposition of sentence.”) (trial court’s termination of Proposition 200 probation “illegal sentence” permitting appellate court to address issue sua sponte) with
  • Metro Collections v. Meggers 886 P.2d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Metro Collections v. Meggers 886 P.2d 649 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    section 31-144(A) held to be no more than a , ).
  • State v. Richardson 833 P.2d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • State v. Richardson 833 P.2d 714 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
    overruled on other grounds, , Richardson argues that A.R.S.
  • Gila County Juvenile Action No. DEL-6325 v. Duber 816 P.2d 944 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
  • Gila County Juvenile Action No. DEL-6325 v. Duber 816 P.2d 944 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
    § 8-241(A)(3)(b) provides that the court may place an incorrigible child on probation “subject to such conditions as the court may impose,” confinement in a county detention center is “permissible.” As support for this argument, , in which our supreme court stated that when incarceration is required as a condition of probation it is not a sentence of confinement.
  • State v. Mathieu 795 P.2d 1303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
  • State v. Mathieu 795 P.2d 1303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
    (probation with condition of jail time is not sentence); , (probation does not constitute a “sentence” for purposes of consecutive sentencing provision).
  • State v. Lucero 778 P.2d 1362 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • State v. Lucero 778 P.2d 1362 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
  • Application of Webb 723 P.2d 642 Ariz. 1986
  • Application of Webb 723 P.2d 642 Ariz. 1986
    § 31-144(A) was no more than a
  • State v. Davis 712 P.2d 975 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
  • State v. Davis 712 P.2d 975 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
    See also, , (habeas corpus was not proper remedy to require a sheriff to allow petitioner two-for-one time, but court would treat the petition as one asking for relief by special action).
  • State v. LaBar 715 P.2d 775 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
  • State v. LaBar 715 P.2d 775 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
    The appellant is certainly correct in arguing that, generally speaking, a suspended sentence resulting in probation does not constitute a “sentence.”
  • State v. Barksdale 694 P.2d 295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
  • State v. Barksdale 694 P.2d 295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
    our supreme court held “probation is not a sentence, but a feature of imposition of sentence.”
  • McCormick v. Wawrzaszek 651 P.2d 1211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
  • McCormick v. Wawrzaszek 651 P.2d 1211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
    Our supreme court has treated pro se habeas corpus petitions as petitions for special actions both in proceedings originating in that court, , , and on appeal from denial of habeas corpus in superior court
  • Peru v. Raines 633 P.2d 453 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • Peru v. Raines 633 P.2d 453 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1981
  • State v. Williams 639 P.2d 1043 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
  • Pima County Juvenile Action No. 18635 v. Fisher 610 P.2d 64 Ariz. 1980
  • Pima County Juvenile Action No. 18635 v. Fisher 610 P.2d 64 Ariz. 1980
  • State v. Brodie 618 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • State v. Brodie 618 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
  • State v. Harris 596 P.2d 731 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
  • State v. Harris 596 P.2d 731 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
  • State v. Mendivil 592 P.2d 1256 Ariz. 1979
  • State v. Mendivil 592 P.2d 1256 Ariz. 1979
    Although the offense had occurred prior to the 1977 amendment of § 13-1657, Division Two held that the amended version of § 13-1657 could be used because “probation is not a sentence,” , , for that proposition.
  • State v. Cutler 590 P.2d 444 Ariz. 1979
  • State v. Cutler 590 P.2d 444 Ariz. 1979
    The state contends, however, that a condition of probation is not a sentence, , and, therefore, falls without the parameters of rule 17.2.
  • State v. Levasseur 578 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
  • State v. Levasseur 578 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
    31 , our Supreme Court has recently stated in State v. Risher, Ariz., : “Except for the purpose of commencing the time within which a person must appeal, probation is not a sentence and is granted only after the imposition of sentence is suspended.” (Emphasis ours) Accord: Pickett v. Boykin, Ariz.