Cited by

¶21 Although this Court is not bound by federal appellate courts’ interpretations of federal constitutional provisions, ¶ 1 n.1 (2003), we may embrace them to “further predictability and stability of the law.” See Weatherford ex rel.

¶ 1, n.1 (2003) (“We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what the Constitution requires.”); n.2 (1989) (declining to follow a Ninth Circuit decision which held Arizona’s death penalty statute unconstitutional because that decision rested on “grounds on whi

Finally, Mixton reminds us we are not bound to follow the federal circuit cases, see State v. Montano , , n.1, but we are bound by Smith , which dictated the result in those cases.

¶ 14 (2003) (quotation omitted) ("[I]n cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established.").

¶ 58, supplemented, (Rule 403 cannot be basis for appeal where objection not raised in the superior court).

¶ 1, n.1 (2003) (“We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of what the Constitution requires.”); ¶ 4, n.2 (App. 2017).

However, this Court is not bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, n.1, ¶ 1 (2003), and the U.S. Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court have repeatedly held that "voluntariness of consent to a search must be 'determined from the totality of all the circumstances,'" Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227

¶ 43, supplemented by P.3d 1246 (2003).

n.1, n.1 (2003) (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court is not bound by federal circuit court’s interpretation of the federal constitution).

1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); ¶ 52 , , supplemented by

of Scottsdale v. Lake Mathews Mineral Props., Ltd., ¶ 22, n.1, ¶ 1, n.1 (2003).

¶ 22, n.1, ¶ 1, n.1 (2003).

State v. Montaño, n.1 ¶ 1, n.1 (2003).

State v. Montano, 206 Ariz. 296, n.1, n.1 (2003) (“We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what the Constitution requires.”).

See, , (declining to follow a Ninth Circuit decision that a trial judge's imposition of the death penalty in violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct.

In support of this proposition, he cites State v. Montaño, P.3d 1246 (2003), and State v. Cropper, 206 Ariz. 153

See, , 30 ¶ 50, State v. Montaño, , 297 ¶ 3, , 235 ¶ 5

See, ¶¶ 10, 11 , -80 (2004); , ¶¶ 5, 8 , -34 (2003).

Ct. App. 2004) (defendant’s statements at sentencing were facts admitted by him and were “exempt from the Apprendi/Blakely rule”); cf. State v. Montaño, P.3d 1246 (2003) (defendant’s introduction of mitigation evidence relating to prisoner status was admission of in-custody status for sentence aggravation).

¶ 7 , (reviewing for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling allowing admissibility of prior felony convictions); see also State v. Montaño, ¶ 66 , (it is within the trial court’s discretion to sanitize prior convictions), supplemented on different grounds by , ¶ 15 , (a defendant must testify at trial to preserve a challenge to the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes).