Cited by

(“Arizona has a substantial population of elderly people, and the legislature was concerned about elder abuse.” ()).

¶19 In interpreting a statute, we “look first to the statute’s words,” (), and “when the language of the statute is clear, we follow its direction without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation,“ Pinal Vista Prop., 208 Ariz. at 190, ¶ 10; (explaining that we “leav[e] any deficiencies or inequities to be

(), and “adhere to the plain language of the statute, leaving any deficiencies or inequities to be corrected by the legislature,”

“[W]hen there is conflict between two statutes, the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.” ¶ 16 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, ).

(), and “adhere to the plain language of the statute, leaving any deficiencies or inequities to be corrected by the legislature,”

§ 46-455(P); In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, (holding that under APSA, representatives of vulnerable adult abuse victims “may recover damages for the pain and suffering endured by the victims, notwithstanding death of the victim”).

(“The legislature's intent and the policy behind the elder abuse statute are clear.

Ct., (noting the legislature’s intent and the 12 NEWMAN v. SELECT et al. Opinion of the Court policy behind APSA are clear and holding damages for pain and suffering are recoverable under the statute).

In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton

See In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, , (“[W]hen there is conflict between two statutes, ‘the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.’ ”) (quotation omitted).

that the legislative purpose behind APSA was protection of Arizona’s elderly population from abuse, the court found it “clear from the text of the statute, the conditions prevalent in this state, and the sparse legislative history that the statute was intended to increase the reme

See In re Guardianship/ , (explaining that under rules of statutory construction, newer, specific statutes govern older, general statutes).

In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton

However, “where an issue is one of first impression of a purely legal question, is of statewide importance, and is likely to arise again, special action jurisdiction may be warranted.” , see also In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, , (accepting special action jurisdiction as the issue was “one of first impression in Arizona”; had “statewide significance,” affecting more than just the parties involved; and was “purely a question of law”); ¶ 3 , (ac

3 , 156, , 1287 (1997) (citing A.R.S.

In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton

§§ 46-455(B) and (E) (Supp.2007); In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, -56 , -87 (1997).

See In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, -57 , -88 (1997); ¶ 6 , (regarding increased remedies).

Arizona has a substantial population of elderly people, and the legislature was concerned about elder abuse.” In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, see also McGill, ¶ 6, 57 P.3d at 387 (“[T]he statute was intended to increase the remedies available to and for elderly people who had been harmed by their caregivers.”); Davis v. Zlatos, 211 Ariz. 519, ¶ 19, 123 P.3d

(potential for conflicting interpretations by trial judges militates in favor of accepting special action jurisdiction); In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, , (same).

Hosp., Inc., , 604 n. 15, , 705 n. 15 (1987) (‘Where medical malpractice results in the death of the patient, the cause of action for medical malpractice survives.”); In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, , (“[T]he plain wording of A.R.S.

(“The legislature’s intent and the policy behind the elder abuse statute are clear.

§ 13-707(A)(2), while § 8-234(E)(2) expressly limits the sanction to a jail term of “not more than thirty days.” When, as here, two statutes address the same subject matter and contain an irreconcilable conflict on a particular provision, “‘the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute.’” In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, see also Mead, Samuel & (more recent statute controls).

Family Care, , 154, , 1285 (1997)); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 19 Ariz.App.

We do not usually review pretrial rulings granting partial summary judgment but do so in the present case for the reasons described in our prior opinion dealing with APSA

Piner, , ; see also In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton

However, there are circumstances present in this case, , 154, , 1285 (1997), that militate in favor of our acceptance of special action jurisdiction.

Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton

In re Guardianship!Conservatorship of Denton