In Re Hamm

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

In the Matter of ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. SB-04-0079-M
JAMES JOSEPH HAMM, )
) O P I N I O N
___________________ Applicant.)

APPLICATION DENIED
_________________________________________________________________
JAMES JOSEPH HAMM Tempe
In Propria Persona

MONROE & McDONOUGH, P.C. Tucson
By Lawrence McDonough
And
JUAN PEREZ-MEDRANO, Chair Phoenix
Attorneys for the Committee on Character & Fitness

CHARLES W. WIRKEN, President Phoenix
HELEN PERRY GRIMWOOD, President-elect Phoenix
JIM D. SMITH, First Vice President Phoenix
DANIEL J. McAULIFFE, Second Vice President Phoenix
EDWARD F. NOVAK, Secretary-Treasurer Phoenix
ROBERT B. VAN WYCK, Chief Bar Counsel Phoenix
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State Bar of Arizona

MICHAEL D. KIMERER Phoenix
MARTY LIEBERMAN Phoenix
AMY L. NGUYEN Phoenix
CARLA RYAN Tucson
ANDREW SILVERMAN Tucson
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix
By Andrew P. Thomas
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Attorney’s Office
_________________________________________________________________

M c G R E G O R, Chief Justice

¶1 James Hamm petitioned this Court, pursuant to Arizona
Supreme Court Rule 36(g), 17A A.R.S.,1 to review the

recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness (the

Committee) that his application for admission to the State Bar

of Arizona (the Bar) be denied. Having reviewed the record and

the Committee’s report, we conclude that James Hamm has failed

to establish the good moral character necessary to be admitted

to the practice of law in Arizona and deny his application.

I.

¶2 In September 1974, James Hamm was twenty-six years old

and living on the streets of Tucson. Although he previously had

attended divinity school and worked as a part-time pastor, Hamm

describes his life in 1974 as reflecting a series of personal and

social failures. In 1973, he had separated from his wife, with

whom he had a son. Although he had no criminal record, he

supported himself by selling small quantities of marijuana and,

again according to Hamm, he used marijuana and other drugs and

abused alcohol.

¶3 On September 6, 1974, Hamm met two young men who

identified themselves as college students from Missouri. The

two, Willard Morley and Zane Staples, came to Tucson to buy

twenty pounds of marijuana. Hamm agreed to sell it to them, but

apparently was unable to acquire that quantity of marijuana.

1
References in this opinion to “Rule ___” are to the Rules
of the Arizona Supreme Court.

2
Rather than call off the transaction, Hamm and two accomplices,

Garland Wells and Bill Reeser, agreed to rob Staples and Morley

of the money intended for the purchase. On September 7, Wells

gave Hamm a gun to use during the robbery. Later that day, Wells

and Hamm directed Morley and Staples to drive to the outskirts of

Tucson, purportedly to complete the drug transaction; Reeser

followed in another vehicle. Both Wells and Hamm carried guns;

Morley and Staples were unarmed. Hamm sat behind Morley, the

driver, and Wells sat behind Staples. At some point, Hamm

detected that Staples was becoming suspicious. As Morley stopped

the car, and without making any demand on the victims for money,

Hamm shot Morley in the back of the head, killing him. At the

same time, Wells shot Staples. Hamm then shot Staples in the

back as he tried to escape and shot Morley once again. Wells

also shot Morley, then pursued Staples, whom he ultimately killed

outside of the car. Hamm and Wells took $1400.00 from the glove

compartment, fled the scene in the van driven by Reeser, and left

the bodies of Morley and Staples lying in the desert.

¶4 Hamm took his share of the money and visited his sister

in California. At the hearing held to consider his application

to the Bar, he told the Committee that he “was compelled to come

back to Tucson,” despite knowing he probably would be caught.

Police officers arrested Hamm shortly after his return. While in

custody, he told the police that Morley and Staples were killed

3
in a gun battle during the drug deal. Initially charged with two

counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery,

Hamm pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and was

sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole for

twenty-five years.

¶5 Once in prison, Hamm began taking steps toward

rehabilitation and became a model prisoner. After spending one

year in maximum security, he applied for and received a job in a

computer training program that allowed him to be transferred to

medium security. Once in medium security, Hamm apparently took

advantage of any and every educational opportunity the prison

system had to offer. He completed certificates in yoga and

meditation and, on his own, studied Jungian psychology. He

helped fellow inmates learn to read and write and to take

responsibility for their actions. He obtained a bachelor’s

degree in applied sociology, summa cum laude, from Northern

Arizona University through a prison study program.

¶6 After Hamm completed six years in medium security,

prison officials transferred him to minimum security, where he

worked on paint and construction crews. He received a

significant degree of freedom, which allowed him to live in a

dormitory rather than in a cell and occasionally to drive

unaccompanied to nearby towns. He testified that he was the only

inmate permitted to head a work crew. Hamm reported to the

4
Committee that he played an instrumental role on various prison

committees, particularly the committee that developed a new

grievance procedure within the Department of Corrections. In

addition, he wrote grant proposals for libraries, for handicapped

prisoners, and for obtaining greater legal assistance for

prisoners.

¶7 While in prison, he met and married Donna Leone. She

and Hamm founded Middle Ground Prison Reform (Middle Ground), a

prisoner and prisoner family advocacy organization involved in

lobbying for laws related to the criminal justice system and

prisons. Middle Ground also provides public education about

those topics.

¶8 In 1989, the Governor, acting on the recommendation of

the Arizona Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board), commuted

Hamm’s sentence. When he had served nearly seventeen years, in

July 1992, the Board released Hamm on parole, conditioned upon no

use of alcohol or drugs, drug and alcohol testing, and fifteen

hours of community service each month. In December 2001, the

Arizona Board of Executive Clemency2 granted Hamm’s third

application for absolute discharge.

¶9 Between his release in August 1992 and his absolute

discharge in December 2001, Hamm performed thousands of hours of

2
The Board of Pardons and Paroles is now the Arizona Board
of Executive Clemency. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 64.

5
community service. He advocated for prisoners’ rights in various

forums by writing position papers, appearing on radio programs,

testifying in legislative hearings, and speaking at churches,

schools, and civic organizations. He also appeared in a public

service video encouraging children not to do drugs or join gangs.

Hamm now works as the Director of Advocacy Services at Middle

Ground Prison Reform.

¶10 While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State

University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the Arizona

bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness

Report with the Committee.

II.

¶11 The Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona establish the

process through which the Committee and this Court evaluate

applications for admission to the Bar, and prior case law

clarifies the burden an applicant must satisfy to establish good

moral character. We begin with a review of the rules.

A.

¶12 Rules 34 through 37 define the requirements for

admission to the Bar.3 The Committee may recommend an applicant

for admission only if that applicant, in addition to meeting

3
Amendments to Rules 32 through 40 became effective December
1, 2005. Order Amending Rules 32-40, 46, 62, 64 & 65, Rules of
Supreme Ct., Ariz. Sup. Ct. No. R-04-0032 (June 9, 2005). In

6
other requirements, satisfies the Committee that he or she is of

good moral character. Rule 34(a). The applicant bears the

burden of establishing his or her good moral character. In re

Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 292, 614 P.2d 832, 834 (1980) (citing

In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964)). In determining

whether an applicant’s prior conduct indicates a lack of good

moral character, the Committee must consider the following non-

exhaustive list of factors:

A. The applicant’s age, experience and general
level of sophistication at the time of the
conduct
B. The recency of the conduct
C. The reliability of the information concerning
the conduct
D. The seriousness of the conduct
E. Consideration given by the applicant to relevant
laws, rules and responsibilities at the time of
the conduct
F. The factors underlying the conduct
G. The cumulative effect of the conduct
H. The evidence of rehabilitation
I. The applicant’s positive social contributions
since the conduct
J. The applicant’s candor in the admissions process
K. The materiality of any omissions or
misrepresentations by the applicant.

Rule 36(a)3.

¶13 When prior conduct involves the commission of a violent

crime, the Committee must, at a minimum, hold an informal

hearing. Rule 36(a)4.E. If three or more Committee members who

attended the hearing or who have read the entire record do not

________________________
this opinion, we refer to the Rules effective when Hamm filed his

7
recommend admission of an applicant, the Committee must hold a

formal hearing to consider whether to recommend the applicant for

admission to the Bar. Id.

¶14 If the applicant fails to convince the Committee of his

or her good moral character, the Committee has a duty not to

recommend that person to this Court. In re Klahr, 102 Ariz. 529,

531, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (1967); Levine, 97 Ariz. at 91, 397 P.2d

at 207 (“If the proof of good moral character falls short of

convincing the Committee on Examinations and Admissions, it is

its duty not to recommend admission.”); In re Courtney, 83 Ariz.

231, 233, 319 P.2d 991, 993 (1957) (“In this it has no

discretion; if the members entertain any reservations whatsoever

as to the applicant’s good moral character, it should not make a

favorable recommendation to this court.”). After the Committee

submits its report, an aggrieved applicant may petition this

Court for review. Rule 36(g).

B.

¶15 This Court then independently determines whether the

applicant possesses good moral character and, based upon that

determination, grants or denies the candidate’s application.

Although we give serious consideration to the facts as found by

and the recommendation of the Committee, “[t]he ultimate decision

in this difficult matter rests with the Supreme Court.” In re

________________________
application for admission to the practice of law.

8
Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327, 487 P.2d 393, 394 (1971) (holding

applicant possessed good moral character); see also Levine, 97

Ariz. at 92, 397 P.2d at 207 (holding the Court must, “using our

independent judgment, de novo determine whether the necessary

qualifications have been shown”). We do not limit our

independent review to matters of law; we have “the ultimate

responsibility for determination of fact and law.” In re Ronwin,

139 Ariz. 576, 579, 680 P.2d 107, 110 (1983); see also In re

Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 137, 539 P.2d 891, 894 (1975) (making a

finding regarding the credibility of testimony, although in

agreement with the Committee).

¶16 The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether

the applicant has established good moral character, a concept

with which we have wrestled as we have attempted to define its

boundaries. Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834. As

Hamm asserts, the rules and standards governing admission to the

practice of law in Arizona include no per se disqualifications.

Instead, we consider each case on its own merits. Id. In

Walker, we described the principles on which we rely as follows:

‘Upright character’ * * * is something more than an
absence of bad character. * * * It means that he [an
applicant for admission] must have conducted himself as
a man of upright character ordinarily would, should, or
does. Such character expresses itself not in negatives
nor in following the line of least resistance, but
quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if
it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong.

9
112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895 (alteration in original)

(quoting In re Farmer, 131 S.E. 661, 663 (N.C. 1926)).

¶17 We also agree with Hamm that, under the Rule applicable

to Hamm’s application, our concern must be with the applicant’s

present moral character. In Greenberg, we explained that “it is

[the applicant’s] moral character as of now with which we are

concerned.” 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834; see also Rule

36(a)3. Past misconduct, however, is not irrelevant. Rather,

this Court must determine what past bad acts reveal about an

applicant’s current character.

III.

¶18 In compliance with Rule 36(a)4.E, the Committee

conducted a formal hearing to consider Hamm’s application. The

Committee heard testimony on May 20 and June 2, 2004. Hamm,

representing himself, and his wife presented extensive testimony.

In addition, the Committee heard from three licensed attorneys

who had worked with Hamm and who recommended his admission and

also considered letters from those opposed to and in support of

Hamm’s application. In detailed findings, the Committee

specifically considered the various factors set out in Rule 36(a)

to determine Hamm’s character and fitness to be admitted to the

Bar. In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its

conclusions, it considered the following:

10
 1) Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which included the
commission of two violent “execution style”
murders and his testimony as to the facts
surrounding the murders.
2) Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his
testimony in explaining his failure to disclose
all required information.
3) Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities
and/or violation of a longstanding child support
court order and his testimony as to his failure
to comply with the court order.
4) Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing
his ability to perform the functions of an
attorney including his testimony as to any
diagnosis and treatment.4

¶19 After reviewing all these factors, the Committee

concluded that Hamm had not met his burden of establishing that

he possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to

the Bar and accordingly recommended that his application be

denied. We now consider the Committee’s findings, together with

pertinent facts.

A.

¶20 The serious nature of Hamm’s past criminal conduct is

beyond dispute. Hamm acknowledges that no more serious criminal

conduct exists than committing first-degree murder. Our society

reserves its harshest punishment for those convicted of such

conduct. See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Rubiaz, 21 Ariz. 221,

231, 187 P. 568, 572 (1920) (describing murder as “the most

4
The Committee was divided as to the significance of
complaints made concerning Hamm’s alleged unauthorized practice
of law. This Court’s decision does not rely upon those
allegations.

11
serious crime known to the law”).

¶21 Hamm’s past criminal conduct and the serious nature of

that conduct affect the burden he must meet to establish good

moral character. He must first establish rehabilitation from

prior criminal conduct, a requirement that adds to his burden of

showing current good moral character. See In re Adams, 540

S.E.2d 609, 610 (Ga. 2001) (“Where an applicant for admission to

the bar has a criminal record, his or her burden of establishing

present good moral character takes on the added weight of proving

full and complete rehabilitation subsequent to

conviction . . . .”); In re Allan S., 387 A.2d 271, 275 (Md.

1978) (“Although a prior conviction is not conclusive of a lack

of present good moral character, . . . it adds to his burden of

establishing present good character by requiring convincing proof

of his full and complete rehabilitation.”).

¶22 The added burden becomes greater as past unlawful

conduct becomes more serious. In In re Arrotta, we considered an

application for reinstatement from an attorney who, eight years

earlier, pled guilty to mail fraud and bribery. 208 Ariz. 509,

96 P.3d 213 (2004). We noted there that “the more serious the

misconduct that led to disbarment, the more difficult is the

applicant’s task in showing rehabilitation.” Id. at 512 ¶ 12, 96

P.3d at 216. An applicant for initial admission to the Bar who

is attempting to overcome the negative implications of a serious

12
felony on his current moral character likewise must overcome a

greater burden for more serious crimes. We agree with the New

Jersey Supreme Court, which recognized that “in the case of

extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation

may be virtually impossible to make.” In re Matthews, 462 A.2d

165, 176 (N.J. 1983). Indeed, we are aware of no instance in

which a person convicted of first-degree murder has been admitted

to the practice of law.

¶23 To show rehabilitation, Hamm must show that he has

accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. Hamm fully

recognizes his need to make this showing. Indeed, he states that

his rehabilitation could not have proceeded absent such

acceptance. We recognize the Committee’s concern that Hamm has

not yet fully accepted responsibility for the two murders. Hamm

says he has done so, repeatedly and strongly, but some of his

other statements indicate to the contrary. The inconsistencies

among his various statements related to accepting responsibility

are most evident when he discusses Staples’ murder. Although he

told the Committee that he accepts responsibility for Staples’

murder, in fact he consistently assigns that responsibility to

his accomplice. His testimony revealed almost no attention to

the commission or aftermath of Staples’ murder. Hamm concedes

that he has focused on his role in Morley’s murder rather than on

his role in Staples’ murder. The difference in approach, he

13
explains, resulted from one postcard written to him by Morley’s

grandmother and his decision to use his connection to Morley to

provide motivation to overcome difficulties. We have no reason

to doubt that Hamm’s focus on Morley’s murder aided him, using

his words, in “accomplishing things that people have been telling

me I can’t do and we’re [Hamm and Morley] still doing it today.”

That fact, however, does nothing to assure us that Hamm has taken

responsibility for Staples’ murder, as he must if he is to

establish rehabilitation.

¶24 We also give serious consideration to the Committee’s

finding that Hamm was not completely forthright in his testimony

about the murders.5 Hamm has insisted in his filings with this

Court that he did not intend to kill, but only to rob, his

victims. The agreed facts, however, lead directly to the

inference that Hamm intended to kill. He conspired with his

accomplices to rob the victims; he accepted the gun provided by

Wells and took it with him in the car with the victims; he

testified that, although he did not intend to kill the victims,

he was “afraid” they would be killed when he got in the car; he

shot Morley without ever attempting a robbery and shot him a

second time to make certain he was dead; and he also shot Staples

5
Hamm’s lack of candor on this question also impacts our
analysis of whether he met his burden of showing present good
moral character. See Section III, subsections B through E,
infra.

14
to prevent his escape. The Committee observed Hamm testify and

was able to judge the credibility of his testimony in light of

uncontested facts. We agree that the record shows that Hamm,

despite his current protestations to the contrary, intended to

kill the victims. His failure to confront the fact that these

murders were intentional undermines his statements that he fully

accepts responsibility for his actions.

¶25 As did the Committee, we give substantial weight to

Hamm’s attempts at rehabilitation. In Section I, supra, we

described in some detail the activities Hamm has undertaken, both

while in and since his release from prison. We are impressed

with the sincerity and fervor of those who testified or submitted

letters on Hamm’s behalf. Were rehabilitation the only showing

Hamm must make to establish good moral character, we would weigh

those factors tending to show rehabilitation against those

tending to show a lack thereof. Under the facts of this case,

however, we need not decide whether the facts of record establish

rehabilitation.

¶26 When an applicant has committed first-degree murder, a

crime that demonstrates an extreme lack of good moral character,

that applicant must make an extraordinary showing of present good

moral character to establish that he or she is qualified to be

admitted to the practice of law. Even assuming that Hamm has

established rehabilitation, showing rehabilitation from criminal

15
conduct does not, in itself, establish good moral character.

Rehabilitation is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient of

good moral character. An applicant must establish his current

good moral character, independent of and in addition to, evidence

of rehabilitation. We conclude that Hamm failed to make that

showing.

B.

¶27 We share the Committee’s deep concern about Hamm’s

longstanding failure to fulfill, or even address, his child

support obligation to his son, born in 1969, four years before

Hamm and his first wife separated. Not until he prepared his

application for admission to the Bar in 2004 did Hamm make any

effort to meet his responsibility to provide support for his son.

During the Committee hearing, Hamm advanced several explanations

for his failure to do so. Like the Committee, we find none of

his explanations credible.

¶28 Although Hamm attempts to excuse his failure to pay

child support by pointing out that he never received a copy of a

final divorce decree, Hamm scarcely can claim that he lacked

awareness of his obligation. A few months after he and his wife

separated in 1973, Hamm was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of

failing to pay child support. On May 6, 1974, James and Karen

Hamm’s divorce decree set Hamm’s child support payments at $75.00

a month. Hamm made no effort to learn the extent of his

16
financial obligation to his son from 1974, when Hamm was twenty-

six years old, until 2004, when he was fifty-five. During those

nearly thirty years, he gained sophistication and attended law

school. He must have known, and certainly should have known,

that he had long avoided a basic parental obligation.6

¶29 Hamm also attempted to excuse his inattention to his

obligation by explaining that he learned, first from a private

investigator hired by his wife in 1988, and later from his son,

that his former wife’s new husband had adopted his son. His

reliance on the private investigator’s 1988 report to excuse his

failure is surprising, given the fact that his son was only

months from the age of majority when Hamm learned of the report;

he provides no explanation for his lack of concern prior to that

date.

¶30 Hamm further explained that only when he applied for

admission to the Bar in 2004 did he discover that his son had not

been adopted and then “calculated the child support payment [due]

over the years.” Hamm determined that he owed $10,000.00 and,

even though the statute of limitations barred an action to

6
Hamm also cannot attribute his failure to pay child support
to the absence of funds. Even while in prison, Hamm earned
“somewhere around a hundred dollars a month probably,” but used
no portion of those earnings to discharge his obligation.

17
recover past amounts due,7 contacted his son and set up a

repayment schedule.

¶31 “Behavior of such long duration cannot be considered as

a temporary aberration . . . .” Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539

P.2d at 895; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis,

426 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 1981) (holding that even when an attorney made

belated restitution for funds taken from clients, because “[s]uch

actions cannot be said to be consistent with high ethical

standards of the profession, with a lawyer's fiduciary

responsibility to his client, with a character that is beyond

reproach, or with truth, candor and honesty,” the attorney could

7
When asked if he had taken steps to formalize his agreement
with his son to pay back child support, Hamm replied, “No. No.
I simply acknowledged the debt regardless whether it is a legal
debt or not and whether it’s an enforceable debt or not.” In its
findings, the Committee noted that Hamm “has since taken it upon
himself to attempt to comply with his child support obligations,”
but expressed concern that he made no admission of a legal
obligation to pay. Whether an action to enforce Hamm’s
obligation to his son is in fact time-barred is unclear. In Huff
v. Huff, the Texas Supreme Court held that a ten-year statute of
limitations under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5532, since
repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 9(1), eff. Sept. 1,
1985, applied to violations of child support orders. 648 S.W.2d
286, 287–88 (Tex. 1983) (allowing a claim based on a 1973 divorce
decree). Because Hamm’s son turned eighteen in 1987, the ten-
year statute of limitations expired in 1997. In 2002, however,
the Texas Supreme Court held that an administrative writ, created
by constitutional amendment in 1997, could be used to enforce a
divorce decree issued in 1974, for which no order was obtained,
because the administrative writ is a “new and improved
enforcement mechanism.” In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.
2002). We need not resolve this question of Texas law, but share
the Committee’s concern over Hamm’s failure to formally
investigate his legal obligations to his son.

18
not continue to practice law). Hamm’s failure to meet his

parental obligation for nearly thirty years makes it more

difficult for him to make the required extraordinary showing that

he “has conducted himself as a man ordinarily would, should, or

does.” Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895.

¶32 We also agree with the Committee that Hamm did not

display honesty and candor in discussing his failure to pay child

support with the Committee. Hamm testified both that his son

told him personally that he had been adopted and that his son

“adamantly refused” to accept interest payments on the unpaid

child support.

¶33 Hamm’s son testified, however, that he had never been

adopted, that prior to his contact with Hamm he had changed his

name himself, and that he had not told Hamm he had been adopted.

Hamm’s son also did not report adamantly refusing interest

payments. In response to a question from the Committee about

interest payments, he said:

Discussions about interest? Seems like whenever we
were talking about it, you know, he said it was a large
amount, and it seems like the subject of interest did
come up. I can’t remember exactly, you know, what we
said about it. But, you know, I didn’t push the issue
or anything, say, well, you know, you’re going to pay
me interest for this or what, or is there any interest.
It wasn’t really an issue or important to me.

¶34 We discern no reason that Hamm’s son would have been

other than forthright about these matters, while Hamm had every

19
reason to present himself in the best possible light.8 Like the

Committee, we find the testimony of his son to be more credible.

C.

¶35 We further conclude that Hamm did not adequately

explain his failure to disclose an incident involving him and his

current wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the

Committee.

¶36 In 1996, Hamm and Donna engaged in a physical

altercation outside a convenience store. Donna “yelled the word

‘kidnap’ out of the window” of the vehicle Hamm was driving,

causing him to pull over and leave the vehicle. During their

tussle, Donna tore Hamm’s shirt. Both called the police, who

arrested neither Hamm nor Donna. The incident and what Donna

describes as her “embellishments” caused such great concern to

the Hamms, particularly because Hamm was on parole, that Donna

submitted to a polygraph administered by a private company to

demonstrate that Hamm had not kidnapped her. The two also

underwent marital counseling.

¶37 Nonetheless, when filling out his Character and Fitness

8
Rather than acknowledge any inconsistencies between his
testimony and that of his son, Hamm lashed out at the Committee’s
refusal to agree with Hamm’s argument, which the Committee could
accept only if it accepted Hamm’s testimony on this issue as
credible. Hamm accused the Committee of “totally ignor[ing] the
content of [Hamm’s Petition] to which it supposedly was
responding.”

20
Report, Hamm failed to disclose the incident to the Committee.

Question 25 on the report asks specifically whether the

applicant, among other things, has been “questioned” concerning

any felony or misdemeanor.9 Hamm told the Committee that, in

reading the application, he missed the word “questioned” in the

list of encounters with law enforcement that Question 25 directs

an applicant to report.

¶38 Hamm’s explanation strains credulity. In Walker, this

Court inferred that the son of an Army officer would understand

the requirement to register for the draft. 112 Ariz. at 138, 539

P.2d at 895. Likewise, we infer from Hamm’s knowledge of the law

and his efforts in 1996 to document a defense for the domestic

incident that he fully understood its importance and must have

known that the incident would be of interest to the Committee.

His failure to include it in his initial application further

affects his ability to make the needed extraordinary showing of

good moral character.

9
Question 25 asks:

Have you either as an adult or a juvenile, ever been
served with a criminal summons, questioned, arrested,
taken into custody, indicted, charged with, tried for,
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of, or ever been
the subject of an investigation concerning the
violation of, any felony or misdemeanor? (In answering
this question, include all incidents, no matter how
trivial or minor the infraction or whether guilty or
not, whether expunged or not, whether you believe or

21
 D.

¶39 Hamm’s actions during these proceedings also raise

questions about his fitness to practice law. The introduction to

Hamm’s petition before this Court begins:

The consequences of this case for Petitioner take it
out of the ordinary realm of civil cases. If the
Committee’s recommendation is followed, it will prevent
him from earning a living through practicing law. This
deprivation has consequences of the greatest import for
Petitioner, who has invested years of study and a great
deal of financial resources in preparing to be a lawyer
. . . .

This language repeats nearly verbatim the language of the United

States Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252

(1957), in which the Court wrote:

While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for
Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil
cases. The Committee's action prevents him from earning
a living by practicing law. This deprivation has grave
consequences for a man who has spent years of study and
a great deal of money in preparing to be a lawyer.

Id. at 257–58. If an attorney submits work to a court that is

not his own, his actions may violate the rules of professional

conduct. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.

Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2002) (“[P]lagiarism

constitute[s], among other things, a misrepresentation to the

court. An attorney may not engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”); see also Rule

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were advised that you need not disclose any such
instance.)

22
42, ER 8.4(c) (defining professional misconduct as including

“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation”). We are concerned about Hamm’s decision to

quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion without attribution and

are equally troubled by his failure to acknowledge his error.

When the Committee’s response pointed to Hamm’s failure to

attribute this language to Konigsberg, he avoided the serious

questions raised and refused to confront or apologize for his

improper actions, asserting instead: “From Petitioner’s

perspective, any eloquence that might be found in the Petition

does not derive from any prior case decided in any jurisdiction,

but rather from the gradual development of his own potential

through study, reflection, and devotion to the duty created by

his commission of murder.” Hamm apparently either does not

regard his actions as improper or simply refuses to take

responsibility. In either case, his actions here do not assist

him in making the requisite showing of good moral character.10

10
In addition to the matters discussed above, only four years
have passed since James Hamm was absolutely discharged. The fact
that Hamm has been free of supervision for this relatively short
time weighs against his admission to the practice of law.
Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 293, 614 P.2d at 835 (noting that
“[r]ehabilitation is seldom accomplished in an instantaneous
fashion” and holding that Greenberg had “not convinced [the
Court] that he as yet evidences the requisite good moral
character”)(emphasis added); see also In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346,
348 (D.C. 2004) (finding it “would be erosive of public
confidence in the legal profession and the administration of
justice were we to admit an applicant who is still on parole for

23
 E.

¶40 When Hamm committed first-degree murder in 1974, he

demonstrated his extreme lack of good moral character. Although

this Court has not adopted a per se rule excluding an applicant

whose past includes such serious criminal misconduct, we agree

with those jurisdictions that have held that an applicant with

such a background must make an extraordinary showing of

rehabilitation and present good moral character to be admitted to

the practice of law. Perhaps such a showing is, in practical

terms, a near impossibility. We need not decide that question

today, however, because Hamm’s lack of candor before the

Committee and this Court, his failure to accept full

responsibility for his serious criminal misconduct, and his

failure to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his parental

obligation of support for his son, all show that Hamm has not met

the stringent standard that applies to an applicant in his

position who seeks to show his present good moral character.

IV.

¶41 Hamm asserts that he was denied due process of law

because two members of the Committee may have prejudged the

merits of his application. Both members, however, left the

Committee proceedings when their potential bias came to light,

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crimes as serious as those committed by Dortch”). Because Hamm
otherwise failed to establish good moral character, however, we

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and neither played any role in the Committee’s findings and

recommendation.

¶42 Hamm, like all applicants for membership in the Bar, is

entitled to receive due process of law. “The fundamental

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Also, “due process requires that a

party be given a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal.’” United States

v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 280, 697 P.2d 658, 673 (1985)

(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Both the

Committee and this Court have provided Hamm ample opportunity to

be heard through hearings and written arguments. Moreover, this

Court, and not the Committee, made the ultimate decision on

Hamm’s application. Hamm received a full opportunity to be heard

before a fair tribunal.

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reached our decision without considering this factor.

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 V.

¶43 Because James Hamm has failed to meet his burden of

proving that he is of good moral character, we deny his

application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona.

__________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

_________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

_________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

_________________________________
Jefferson L. Lankford, Judge*

* The Honorable Rebecca White Berch recused herself; pursuant
to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the
Honorable Jefferson L. Lankford, Judge of the Court of Appeals,
Division One was designated to sit in her stead.

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