Bill Parrot v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

BILL PARROT, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-05-0104-PR
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 04-0121
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, )
) Maricopa County
Defendant-Appellee. ) Superior Court
) No. CV02-008392
)
__________________________________) O P I N I O N

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Jonathan H. Schwartz, Judge

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
210 Ariz. 143, 108 P.3d 922 (App. 2005)

VACATED
________________________________________________________________

KROHN & MOSS, LTD. Phoenix
By Marshall Meyers
Ian Pryor
Attorneys for Bill Parrot

BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP Phoenix
By Negatu Molla
Jennifer L. Haman
Attorneys for DaimlerChrysler Corporation
________________________________________________________________

R Y A N, Justice

¶1 In this case, we must determine whether an automobile
lessee can maintain an action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act (“Warranty Act” or “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000),

and whether the lessee has a right to pursue remedies under the

Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (“Lemon Law”), Ariz. Rev.

Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 44-1261 to -1267 (2003 & Supp. 2005). We

hold that, under the circumstances of this case, a lessee

neither can sue under the Warranty Act nor have remedies under

the Lemon Law.

I

¶2 Bill Parrot leased a 2000 Jeep Cherokee from Pitre

Chrysler Plymouth Jeep Eagle (“Pitre”) in Scottsdale, Arizona.

The Jeep came with “Chrysler’s standard limited warranty.”

Simultaneously with executing its lease with Parrot, Pitre

assigned the lease to the lender, Chrysler Financial Company,

L.L.C. Pitre apparently retained title to the vehicle.1

¶3 Parrot alleges that while he possessed the vehicle, he

had to bring it to various dealerships at least thirteen times

for repairs including: at least eleven times for suspension/axle

defects; four times for alignment defects; three times for a

windshield leak; three times for brake defects; and once for an

exhaust system defect.

¶4 Dissatisfied with the repair work done on the Jeep,

1
At oral argument, Parrot claimed for the first time that
Pitre sold the Jeep to Chrysler Financial. However, nothing in
the record establishes that any such sale occurred.

- 2 -
Parrot filed suit in superior court alleging that

DaimlerChrysler had breached its written warranty and seeking

remedies under the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. The parties

filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court

granted DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary judgment.

¶5 Parrot appealed. The court of appeals reversed,

concluding that Parrot was a consumer subject to protection

under both the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. Parrot v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 210 Ariz. 143, 150-51, ¶¶ 30, 33, 39, 108

P.3d 922, 929-30 (App. 2005).

¶6 We granted DaimlerChrysler’s petition for review

because the applicability of the Warranty Act and the Lemon Law

to lessees is an issue of first impression for this Court. We

have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona

Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003).

II

¶7 This matter concerns the interpretation of the

Warranty Act and the Lemon Law. Statutory interpretation is an

issue of law and is decided de novo. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v.

W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503

(1994). “We interpret statutes to give effect to the

legislature’s intent. When a statute is clear and unambiguous,

we apply its plain language” to find the legislature’s intent

and do “not engage in other means of statutory interpretation.”

- 3 -
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 283, ¶ 14, 110 P.3d 1013,

1017 (2005) (citing Aros v. Beneficial Ariz., Inc., 194 Ariz.

62, 66, 977 P.2d 784, 788 (1999)). A statute is clear and

unambiguous when it admits of only one meaning. Millett v.

Frohmiller, 66 Ariz. 339, 345, 188 P.2d 457, 461 (1948).

¶8 We first examine the Warranty Act and then turn to

Arizona’s Lemon Law. Under neither is Parrot entitled to

relief.

III

A

¶9 In response to complaints “from irate owners of motor

vehicles complaining that automobile manufacturers and dealers

were not performing in accordance with the warranties on their

automobiles,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Abrams, 899

F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107

(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7708), Congress

enacted the Warranty Act in 1975. The purpose of the Warranty

Act is “to prevent warranty deception.” Milton R. Schroeder,

Private Actions under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 Cal. L.

Rev. 1, 9 (1978) (“Schroeder”). To further that purpose, the

Act requires conspicuous disclosure of the “terms and

conditions” of warranties “in simple and readily understood

language.” 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). And, “[t]o enforce its

- 4 -
requirements, the Act permits ‘a consumer who is damaged by the

failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to

comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a

written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract’ to sue

warrantors for damages and other relief in any court of

competent jurisdiction.” DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 768

N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. 2002) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)).

To bring a cause of action under the Warranty Act, a person must

be a consumer of a consumer product and have a written warranty,

implied warranty, or service contract, as those terms are

defined by the Warranty Act.2

¶10 The Warranty Act defines “consumer product” as “any

tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and

which is normally used for personal, family or household

purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). The parties agree that the

Jeep is a consumer product. Therefore, the dispositive issue is

whether Parrot is a consumer as defined by the Act.

¶11 The Act creates three categories of consumers. Id. §

2301(3). The first category includes “a buyer . . . of any

consumer product,” other than for purposes of resale. Id. The

second encompasses “any person to whom [a consumer product] is

2
Although the Warranty Act also refers to implied warranties
and service contracts, because the issue before this Court is
whether Parrot has the right to enforce a written warranty, we
limit our analysis to written warranties.

- 5 -
transferred during the duration of . . . [a] written warranty.”

Id. The third category includes “any other person who is

entitled by the terms of such warranty . . . or under applicable

State law to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obligations

of the warranty.” Id.

¶12 Each category requires a qualifying sale - a sale in

which a person buys a consumer product for purposes other than

resale. The first category necessarily involves a qualifying

sale by its own terms, requiring that a consumer be a

“buyer . . . of any consumer product.” Id. (emphasis added).

The necessity of a qualifying sale for categories two and three

consumers arises from the Warranty Act’s definition of “written

warranty.” DiCintio, 768 N.E.2d at 1124.

¶13 The Warranty Act defines “written warranty” as:

(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product
by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature
of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises
that such material or workmanship is defect free or
will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or

(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund,
repair, replace, or take other remedial action with
respect to such product in the event that such product
fails to meet the specifications set forth in the
undertaking,

which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of
such product.

- 6 -
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (emphasis added).

¶14 Subsections (A) and (B) each expressly require a sale

of a consumer product by a supplier. Id. In addition, both

subsections are modified by the qualifying phrase at the end of

15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). That qualifying phrase calls for the

underlying sale to be to a buyer “for purposes other than

resale” and for the written affirmation, promise, or undertaking

to be part of the basis of the bargain. Id.

¶15 Consequently, the existence of a written warranty, as

defined by the Warranty Act, is a requirement for both category

two and category three “consumer” status. A person cannot be a

category two consumer unless some person purchased the vehicle

for purposes other than resale and the written warranty was

“part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a

buyer.” Id.

¶16 Similarly, a person cannot be a category three

consumer unless a qualifying sale has occurred. The category

three definition of “consumer” has two parts. Both parts

require that a qualifying sale occur - that a person purchased

the vehicle for purposes other than resale and that the warranty

was “part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a

buyer.” Id.

¶17 The first part states that, in addition to meeting the

- 7 -
foregoing requirements, a consumer must be a person “entitled by

the terms of such warranty . . . to enforce against the

warrantor . . . the obligations of the warranty.” 15 U.S.C. §

2301(3) (emphasis added). The use of the word “such” to modify

“warranty” logically refers to the previous use of “warranty” in

the statute. The previous use of “warranty” occurs in category

two when it defines a consumer as a person to whom the product

is “transferred during the duration of . . . [a] written

warranty.” Id. Thus, the first part of the definition of a

category three consumer means any person entitled by the terms

of a written warranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty

against the warrantor. As discussed above, the term “written

warranty,” as defined in the Warranty Act, is a “written

affirmation, promise, or undertaking [that] becomes part of the

basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes

other than resale of such product.” Id. § 2301(6) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, to be a category three consumer under the

first part of the definition, a qualifying sale as defined by

the Warranty Act must have occurred.

¶18 The second part of category three defines a consumer

as “any other person who is entitled . . . under applicable

State law to enforce against the warrantor . . . the obligations

of the warranty.” Id. § 2301(3) (emphasis added). In this

second part, the phrase “the warranty” should not be interpreted

- 8 -
in the generic sense as meaning any warranty. Such an

interpretation would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme

as a whole.

¶19 We presume that Congress uses terms consistently.

See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest

Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (noting that statutory

interpretation is “a holistic endeavor”). Other than references

to an implied warranty,3 every other use of the term “warranty”

in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) is either a direct reference to “written

warranty” or a short-hand reference to “written warranty.”

Thus, a consistent reading of the second part of section

2301(3)’s definition of a category three consumer requires

interpreting “warranty” as a written warranty as defined by the

Warranty Act.

¶20 We therefore conclude that to be a category three

consumer, a written warranty as defined by the Warranty Act must

exist. Because a written warranty requires a qualifying sale,

to meet the requirements under this category there must be

evidence of such a sale.

B

¶21 Parrot claims that he is a category two or three

3
The Act defines “implied warranty” as “an implied warranty
arising under State law . . . in connection with the sale by a
supplier of a consumer product.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7). As noted
in footnote 2, the issue of an implied warranty is not presented
in this case.

- 9 -
consumer with a written warranty governed by the Warranty Act.

He is neither because no qualifying sale – a purchase for

purposes other than resale – has occurred.

¶22 Parrot conceded at oral argument that Pitre purchased

the Jeep from DaimlerChrysler for the purpose of resale. The

only identifiable sale in the record before this Court is to the

lessor, Pitre, whose ultimate goal is to resell the vehicle.

Consequently, the only sale here was for purposes of resale.

¶23 Even though the language defining a category two

consumer

appears to reach beyond sales of consumer products to
include transactions in which a merchant leases goods
to consumers or in which the consumer is only a
bailee, such a reading is erroneous. The definition[]
of [a] written . . . warrant[y] still require[s] a
sale between a supplier and a buyer. Thus, this
portion of the definition of “consumer” must be viewed
as referring to transferees after an initial sale of
the product. There must be an initial buyer who buys
“for purposes other than resale” of the product.

Schroeder at 11 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Parrot concedes that there is no such sale here.

¶24 Thus, we hold that because the only sale in this case

was for purposes of resale, Parrot does not have a written

warranty governed by the Warranty Act.

C
¶25 Parrot relies on several recent cases to support his

claim that he is either a category two or three consumer. We do

not find these cases persuasive. For example, in Cohen v. AM

- 10 -
General Corp., the court concluded that “the purpose of the

transaction . . . was not for resale, but for the lease of the

vehicle.” 264 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The court

based its conclusion on the following factors: the leasing

company would not have purchased the vehicle but for the fact

that the car dealer had entered into a leasing agreement with

the plaintiff; the leasing company did not “intend[] to add the

vehicle to its inventory or advertise it for sale to other

parties”; and it profited through the lease agreement. Id. In

Peterson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the court concluded

that when a lessor purchased a vehicle for purposes of leasing

the vehicle instead of reselling it, the lessee came within the

purview of the Act as a category three consumer. 697 N.W.2d 61,

71-73, ¶¶ 33-37, 41-42 (Wis. 2005).

¶26 But here, Parrot conceded that Pitre, the dealer-

lessor, had purchased the Jeep for resale. Thus, both Cohen and

Peterson, in which the purpose of the purchase of the motor

vehicle was found to be for leasing, are inapposite.

¶27 Parrot also relies heavily on opinions that have held

that interpreting the Warranty Act as not applying to leases “is

inconsistent with the purposes of the [Warranty] Act – to

protect the ultimate user of the product.” Szubski v. Mercedes-

Benz, U.S.A., L.L.C., 796 N.E.2d 81, 88, ¶ 28 (Ct. Com. Pl. Ohio

2003); see also Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (holding that

- 11 -
“[t]his reading . . . best serves Congress’ goal of ‘better

protecting consumers’”) (citation omitted); Mesa v. BMW of N.

Am., LLC, 904 So. 2d 450, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (same).

Although this interpretation of the Act has a certain

attraction, it does not comport with the plain language of the

Act. As discussed above, a person must be a consumer as defined

under the Warranty Act, which requires that there be a

qualifying sale. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), (6). In the absence

of such a sale, Parrot simply does not qualify as a consumer

under the Act.

¶28 Finally, a few courts, including our court of appeals,

have concluded that if state law permits enforcement of a

written warranty, then the Warranty Act governs that warranty

even if the written warranty does not otherwise meet the

requirements of the Warranty Act. See, e.g., Voelker v. Porsche

Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir. 2003); Parrot,

210 Ariz. at 148-49, ¶¶ 21-27, 108 P.3d at 927-28; Mesa, 904 So.

2d at 457; Dekelaita v. Nissan Motor Corp., 799 N.E.2d 367, 372

(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).

¶29 We find the reasoning of these courts flawed in two

respects. First, they rely upon an incorrect reading of 15

U.S.C. § 2301(6). Second, they rely upon the mistaken

assumption that the use of the term “the warranty” in the second

part of category three’s definition of “consumer” means that the

- 12 -
Warranty Act governs any warranty enforceable under state law.

¶30 For instance, in Parrot, the court mistakenly limited

the qualifying phrase “which written affirmation, promise, or

undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a

supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such

product” to subsection (B) of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). See 210

Ariz. at 147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926.4 Instead, as set forth in

paragraphs 13 and 14, above, the qualifying phrase applies to

both subsection (A) and (B) of § 2301(6). See also 16 C.F.R. §

700.11(b) (“A written warranty must be ‘part of the basis of the

bargain.’ This means that it must be conveyed at the time of

sale of the consumer product . . . .”).

4
Specifically, the court quoted the definition of a warranty
in the following manner:

any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product
by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature
of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises
that such material or workmanship is defect free or
will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time, or

any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale
by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to
such product in the event that such product fails to
meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of
such product.

Parrot, 210 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926 (emphasis
added).

- 13 -
¶31 This error led the court to conclude that, to be a

category two consumer, one need only have a “written

warranty . . . ‘made in connection with the sale’ of a consumer

product by ‘a supplier’ to ‘a buyer.’” Parrot, 210 Ariz. at

147, ¶ 15, 108 P.3d at 926 (citations omitted). Likewise, the

court’s conclusion that Parrot is a category three consumer

rests in part on its mistaken reading of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6).

See id. at 148, ¶¶ 21-22, 108 P.3d at 927.

¶32 In Dekelaita, the court concluded that the lessee was

a category three consumer because the lessee was entitled to

enforce the warranty under state law. 799 N.E.2d at 372. This

conclusion rested on the premise that “the third [category] does

not exclusively require that the warranty meet[] the Act’s

definition if in fact it is enforceable under state law.” Id.

at 374.

¶33 But Dekelaita comes to this conclusion without any

discussion of the statute or reference to “warranty” as used in

the definition of a category three consumer. See id. at 372.

Instead, the court simply assumed that a category three consumer

may obtain remedies under the Warranty Act if a warranty is

enforceable under state law. See id. But this is an incorrect

reading of the reference to warranty in the definition of a

category three consumer. Under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), for the Act

to apply, a purchase for purposes other than resale is required.

- 14 -
Dekelaita simply does not address these requirements.

¶34 The court in Dekelaita nevertheless went on to

conclude that a written warranty, as defined by the Warranty

Act, existed in that case. See id. at 372-74. This conclusion,

however, relies upon the same mistaken reading of 15 U.S.C. §

2301(6) as was made in Parrot. See Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at

370.

¶35 Because the court in Dekelaita relied on this

misreading of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), it ignored the issue of

whether the sale was for purposes other than resale and whether

the written warranty was part of the basis of the bargain

between the supplier and the buyer.5 See 799 N.E.2d at 372-74.

Dekelaita’s holding that all that is necessary to be a category

three consumer is to have some warranty that is enforceable

under state law is based upon a mistaken premise.

¶36 In Voelker, the court depended upon the holding in

Dekelaita to conclude that because the lessee could enforce the

5
The court in Dekelaita does note that the question of
whether the car was purchased for resale was important in the
DiCintio opinion. 799 N.E.2d at 375. But it dismisses
DiCintio’s reasoning by stating “[t]he problem with that
reasoning is that most automobile purchasers buy a car with the
ultimate goal of resale . . . . Under the DiCintio court’s
reasoning, few buyers could ever enforce the Act.” Id. (citing
Cohen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 620). Because Parrot has conceded
that the purchase by Pitre – the only purchase in the record in
this case – was for purposes of resale, we need not today decide
whether other purchasers qualify under the terms of the Act.

- 15 -
warranty under state law, the lessee was a category three

consumer. 353 F.3d at 524 (citing Dekelaita, 799 N.E.2d at

372). Because we do not find Dekelaita persuasive precedent for

this proposition, we decline to follow Voelker.

¶37 We therefore hold that because Pitre purchased the

vehicle for purposes of resale, and there is no other qualifying

sale on the record before us, Parrot does not qualify as a

consumer under the Warranty Act. As a result, he cannot

maintain an action against DaimlerChrysler under the Warranty

Act.6

IV

¶38 The Warranty Act “apparently was not successful in

resolving consumer problems with chronically defective

automobiles.” Abrams, 899 F.2d at 1317. As a result, a number

of states enacted so-called lemon laws. Id.; see also Joan

Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and

a Proposal for Reform, 1985 Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 592 (“Due to the

inadequacy of the UCC and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, thirty

seven states have now passed lemon laws to deal with automobile

warranty disputes.”). Arizona enacted its version of a lemon

law in 1984. See 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 265, § 1 (codified

as amended at A.R.S. §§ 44-1261 to -1265).

6
This does not mean Parrot has no remedies. DaimlerChrysler
acknowledged that Parrot “retains any common law” or other
possible remedies.

- 16 -
¶39 The Lemon Law definition of “consumer” parallels the

definition in the Warranty Act:

“Consumer” means the purchaser, other than for
purposes of resale, of a motor vehicle, any person to
whom the motor vehicle is transferred during the
duration of an express warranty applicable to the
motor vehicle or any other person entitled by the
terms of the warranty to enforce the obligations of
the warranty.

A.R.S. § 44-1261(A)(1). An important difference between the

Lemon Law and the Warranty Act is that the Lemon Law does not

define the term “warranty.” Accordingly, the requirement that

there be a sale for purposes other than resale does not apply to

warranties under the Lemon Law. Thus, although Parrot would not

qualify as a category one consumer under the Lemon Law because

he did not purchase the Jeep, he may qualify as a category two

or three consumer under A.R.S. § 44-1261(A)(1). However, we

need not decide whether Parrot would qualify as a category two

or three consumer because of the limited remedies afforded by

the Lemon Law.

¶40 The Lemon Law’s remedies for the failure of a

manufacturer “or its authorized dealers” to correct or repair

“any defect or condition which substantially impairs the

use . . . of the motor vehicle,” are replacing the vehicle “or

accept[ing] return of the motor vehicle from the consumer and

refund[ing] to the consumer the full purchase price, including

all collateral charges, less a reasonable allowance for the

- 17 -
consumer’s use of the vehicle.” A.R.S. § 44-1263(A).

¶41 Both remedies assume that the consumer has the right

to transfer title to the vehicle back to the manufacturer. Only

the owner of the vehicle or holder of title can transfer title.

See A.R.S. § 28-2058 (2004). This record, however, establishes

that Pitre is the owner and title holder; at oral argument

Parrot conceded that he did not have title in the vehicle. A

person who neither owns a vehicle nor has title to it cannot

return the vehicle to the manufacturer, nor is he entitled to

have the defective vehicle replaced by another. Therefore,

under the Lemon Law, Parrot has no remedy.

¶42 That the statute’s remedies are inapplicable to

lessees is implicit in A.R.S. § 44-1263(A), which provides

express protection of a “lienholder,” requiring that “[t]he

manufacturer shall make refunds to the consumer and lienholder,

if any, as their interests appear,” without providing protection

for lessors.

¶43 Our conclusion is bolstered by a 1992 amendment to the

section of Arizona’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code7

pertaining to leases. See 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 226, § 4

(codified as amended at A.R.S. §§ 47-2A101 to -2A532 (2005)).

In the section governing revocation of acceptance of a lease,

lessors and lessees may agree to be bound by the Lemon Law and

7
A.R.S. §§ 47-1101 to -10102 (2005).

- 18 -
not by the Uniform Commercial Code:

The lessee and lessor may, by a conspicuous writing
contained in the lease or elsewhere, provide that the
provisions of this section will not apply to a new
motor vehicle which is otherwise subject to the
provisions of title 44, chapter 9, article 5 [the
Lemon Law]. . . . When the parties have so agreed,
then for the purposes of title 44, chapter 9, article
5, the lessee shall be deemed the consumer of the
motor vehicle, with the lessor having all the rights
of a lienholder in such motor vehicle.

A.R.S. § 47-2A517(F). Subsection F recognizes that although

leases may be “otherwise subject” to the Lemon Law, the remedies

provided in section 44-1263(A) are, as a practical matter,

simply not available to the lessee. As the latter part of

subsection F makes clear, for such remedies to be available, the

lessee and lessor have to be made the functional equivalents of

a consumer and a lienholder. There is no “conspicuous writing”

evidencing such an agreement in this case.

¶44 Furthermore, a proponent of the amendment noted that

“unlike a buyer, a lessee normally does not have the right to

sell or otherwise alienate title to the leased goods, an

important reason why it may often be inappropriate to allow the

lessee the remedies available under the lemon law.” State Bar

of Ariz., Corp., Banking and Commercial Loan Section, Comm. on

U.C.C. Article 2A, Report of the Comm. on Article 2A (Oct. 1,

1991) (on file with Ariz. Legislative Council) (related to H.B.

2421, Fortieth Legislature, Second Regular Sess.) Accordingly,

- 19 -
unless the lessor and lessee have expressly provided in writing

to permit the lessee “to ‘sell’ the vehicle back to the

manufacturer or other responsible party or to exercise other

remedies under the lemon law,” a lessee has no remedy under the

Lemon Law. Because Parrot and Pitre did not expressly provide

for such a contingency, Parrot’s claim under the Lemon Law

fails.

V

¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of

the court of appeals and affirm the summary judgment entered by

the superior court.

__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

CONCURRING:

_________________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_________________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_________________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

_________________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

- 20 -