Cited by

(“The question of spousal maintenance is left to the sound discretion of the [superior] court”).

needs of the spouse seeking maintenance,’ whether by actively producing income to provide for the spouse’s reasonable needs or by being converted into a suitable form so that it would so provide.” Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 85, ¶ 8 (quoting Deatherage v. 9 ).

(Property for spousal maintenance purposes includes “property presently producing income as well as property capable of producing income or otherwise transformed in order to provide for the 5 BEAUMONT v. BEAUMONT

Driss v. Driss, 1 CA-CV 18-0243 FC, 2019 WL 544495, at *4, ¶¶ 16-17 (Ariz. App. Feb.

¶9 We will affirm if substantial evidence supports the court’s decision, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and absent an abuse of discretion, will not substitute our opinion for that of the superior court

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-appealing party, -84, ¶ 31 (App. 2000), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the superior court

Even assuming that all of these assets could be converted to an income-producing state, (noting sufficient property "include[s] property presently producing income as well as property capable of producing income"), it is not obvious how such a small amount could provide for Wife's reasonable needs for the remainder of her life, Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 85- 86, ¶ 9.

¶12 We will affirm if substantial evidence supports the court’s decision, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the superior court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion

ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶22 We will affirm if substantial evidence supports the court’s decision, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the superior court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion

ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶21 We will affirm if substantial evidence supports the family court’s decision, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the family court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion

supports his contention that, in determining eligibility, the court must consider the interest income from Wife’s retirement account when considering Wife’s ability to achieve self- sufficiency under any § 25-319(A) factor.

hly income, however, the court did not consider the interest income potential of these assets because neither party presented a “calculation of the monthly income that could be generated from the investment of the assets Wife will receive.” ¶16

See Cullum, 215 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 13 (recognizing a court should consider the income potential of property received by a spouse seeking maintenance ()); (recognizing the income-producing potential of property 8 BUTLER v. BUTLER Decision of the Court awarded a spouse “is a ‘financial resource’ to be conside

Deatherage v. Deatherage , , 320

Ctr., (statute’s language “is the best and most reliable index of its meaning, and where language is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of its construction.”); (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible and therefore words used in a statute are to be accorded their obvious and natural meaning.”); (we may not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend a statute to matters not fall

-21 (App. 1984) (trial court should consider a spouse’s total properties, both income producing and non-income producing, in determining whether a spouse has sufficient property to meet his or her needs).

ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review ¶15 We will affirm if substantial evidence supports the family court’s decision, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the family court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion

ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review ¶16 We will affirm if reasonable evidence supports the family court’s decision, ¶ 9 (App. 2007), and will not substitute our opinion for that of the family court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion, (App. 1984).

¶24 “The question of spousal maintenance is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”