Cited by

That filing, called a lis pendens, “is a statement that a party is claiming an interest in real property which would affect the title.” Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship

would either infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist.” Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12(1) cmt.

E.g., Tucson Ests., Inc. v. Superior 5 WESTBROOK RENTAL, -05 (App. 1986) (plaintiffs sued to enforce rights incident to title to golf course and recorded lis pendens on property); Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, -19 (App. 1987) (plaintiff sued to foreclose liens, recorded lis pendens, and, upon learning of sale of property, amended complaint to add transferee); Evergreen W., Inc., 167 Ariz. at 618, 621 (concluding that lis pendens was proper where plaintiff sued owner of property for s

In other words, mere “[i]nformation from which a reasonable person could infer that a dangerous condition exists is sufficient to impose liability.” Id.; see also Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, (explaining the phrase “’reason to know’ .

Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship

See, ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (holding that whether defendant knew or had reason to know that the recorded document was invalid is a question of fact); Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, (finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether plaintiff knew or should have known the recorded document was groundless).

§ 47-9102 (defining encumbrance as “a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property”); HSL Linda Gardens Properties, (“For example, the encumbrance might be a lien securing a debt.”); Coventry Homes, (“equitable lien is a right over real property constituting an encumbrance, so that the real property itself may be proceeded against in an equitable action”).

t is proven if a reasonable person would “either infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his [or her] conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist.” Williamson v. PVOrbit, Inc., , 73 n. 1 ¶ 20, , 81 n. 1 (App. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, , (quoting Restatement Second § 12 (“Reason to Know, Should Know”)).

See Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bartschi, ¶ 11 , see also Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, , (“A notice of lis pendens is a statement that a party is claiming an interest in real property which would affect the title.”).

P.3d 839 (App. 2004), and Coventry Homes, Delmastro maintains that because the “„reason to know‟ element of A.R.S.

While the statute does not define the terms “know” or “reason to know,” “ ‘reason to know 1 is a commonly used term in tort litigation.” Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship

z. 281 , (rejecting argument that action for breach of contract by real property purchaser against seller affected rights incident to title merely because seller had since initiated foreclosure of deed of trust; purchaser sought money damages and any judgment would not erase debt owing to seller that underlay the foreclosure); see also Coventry Homes, Inc. v. Scottscom P’ship, , (holding that because equitable lien is an encumbrance on real property, an action to impose such a lien is one affect

“It is well established that a lis pendens may not be predicated on an action or suit for money judgment but applies only to an action or suit which directly affects the title to real property.” Coventry Homes

§ 33-420(A); Coventry Homes

Coventry Homes, , Richey, 140 Ariz. at 601 , 684 P.2d at 173 .

See Coventry Homes, , (must be some basis for assertion that litigation will affect title to real property).

Evergreen argues, however, that in determining whether the lis pendens is groundless under § 33-420, the trial court may look beyond the face of the complaint to the merits of the underlying claim, citing Coventry Homes

In Coventry Homes, , this court implicitly followed *16 Division Two’s interpretation of A.R.S.