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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 240 P.3d 1235.

50 citing documents.

State v. Colorado 535 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Colorado 535 P.3d 941 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
¶ 6 (App. 2010) (“[W]e review the superior court’s legal decisions de novo.”).
State v. Parise Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Parise Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Botch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Botch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Because we defer to the superior court’s credibility determinations, ¶6 (App. 2010), and because the record supports the court’s conclusion that Botch consented to the search of his pockets, the court did not err in its ruling.
State v. Blanco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Blanco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
In our review, we consider “only the facts presented to the superior court at the suppression hearing.” ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2010).
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2010); ¶ 26 (2016) ( ¶ 11 (2011)).
State v. Wallace Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Wallace Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
On review of the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, ¶ 9 (2016), and defer to the court’s credibility determinations, ¶ 6 (App. 2010).
Flynn v. Hon starr/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Flynn v. Hon starr/state Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
We likewise “defer to the [trial] court’s determinations of the credibility of the officers and the reasonableness of the inferences they drew.” ¶ 6 (App. 2010) ().
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
In doing so, we defer to the superior court’s determination of the witnesses’ credibility, ¶ 6 (App. 2010), and we will uphold the ruling if it is legally correct for any reason, ¶ 19 (App. 2016).
State v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Jackson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2010); ¶ 6 (App. 2000).
State v. McCoy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. McCoy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Lohse 431 P.3d 606 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
State v. Lohse 431 P.3d 606 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
See State v. Mendoza-Ruiz , , ¶ 8
State v. Epsy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Epsy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Aguayo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Aguayo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
In doing so, we defer to the superior court's determination of officers' credibility, ¶ 6 (App. 2010), and uphold the court's ruling if it is legally correct for any reason.
State v. Black Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Black Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
“These caretaking activities do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they are warranted ‘either in terms of state law or sound police procedure.’” ¶ 9 (App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991)).
State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶22 Accordingly, construing the record in the light most favorable to affirming, n.1, ¶ 2, n.1 (App. 2010), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress.
State v. Kroetz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Kroetz Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Because we defer to the trial court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the reasonableness of the inferences it drew, ¶ 6, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the good faith requirement was met.
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Holguin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
We view the facts presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, n.1, ¶ 2, n.1 (App. 2010); ¶ 16, (citations omitted), and resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the State.
Sandoval v. Tempe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Sandoval v. Tempe Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Under this function, police officers are “expected to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community safety.” ¶ 9, see also Ortiz v. State, 24 So.3d 596, 600 (Fla.
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
See State v. Mendoza–Ruiz, ¶ 6
State v. Wilson 333 P.3d 774 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Wilson 333 P.3d 774 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State of Arizona v. Esgardo Javier Nevarez 329 P.3d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. Esgardo Javier Nevarez 329 P.3d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
(reasonableness standard arises from police officer’s status as “‘jack-of-all-emergencies,’ who is ‘expected to .
State v. Baggett 306 P.3d 81 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State v. Baggett 306 P.3d 81 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State of Arizona v. Guillermo C. Becerra 291 P.3d 994 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Guillermo C. Becerra 291 P.3d 994 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 4 ¶¶ 14-18, (stop of vehicle proper as community caretaking function when reasonable to believe vehicle having trouble); (proper exercise of pol
State of Arizona v. Aaron Raymond Fikes 267 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Aaron Raymond Fikes 267 P.3d 1181 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
See, P.3d 1235 (App. 2010); P.3d 611 (App. 2010).

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