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Nolan acknowledges that Drake’s post-conviction relief proceedings were pending at the time of his trial, and he recognizes that “[t]he right to invoke generally persists during post-conviction relief proceedings.” ¶¶ 14, 16 (App. 2002).

The test is whether the instructions, viewed in their entirety, adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.” ¶ 31 (App. 2002) (quotation omitted).

¶9 Further, even assuming general uncertainties in Anna’s recollection could support Ramirez’s requested instruction, a failure to give that instruction is not reversible error “unless it is prejudicial to the defendant and the prejudice appears in the record.” ¶ 31 (App. 2002).

¶¶ 31-34 (App. 2002); -62, ¶ 16 (1998).

¶15 Noting that “[c]ounsel are afforded wide latitude in closing argument,” ¶ 24 (App. 2002), Snodgrass contends that his counsel “merely argued a reasonable inference—that [Snodgrass] told the truth—based upon the evidence presented.” By sustaining the State’s objection, he argues, the court unfairly “deprived” defense counsel of the “wide latitude” to which he was entitled.

We review the “court’s decision to excuse a witness asserting the privilege against self-incrimination for abuse of discretion.” ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

“A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses to testify whose testimony is material and favorable to the defense.” ¶ 10 (App. 2002); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).

10 NAVIGATORS v. FIRST MERCURY Decision of the Court ¶34 Because the jury instructions given, viewed in their entirety, adequately set forth the applicable law and provided the jury with the correct rules for reaching its decision, see State v. Rosas-Hernandez, 202 Ariz. 212, 220 ¶ 31 (App. 2002); Lifeflite Med.

When a witness asserts a Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination, however, “the trial court must balance the interests of the defendant with those of the witness.” ¶ 10 (App. 2002) (citation omitted).

¶ 31 (App. 2002) (jury instructions must not mislead the jury).

¶10 First, as an initial matter, to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, “a witness must demonstrate a reasonable ground to apprehend danger from being compelled to testify.” ¶ 11, (citation omitted).

¶ 10 (App. 2002) (citing United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980)).

Cf., ¶ 31, (“The failure to give an instruction is not reversible error unless it is prejudicial to the defendant and the prejudice appears in the record.”).

[s]o I think they have a valid Fifth Amendment right to all questions posed by [defense counsel] in this case.” The court then found “there is a [Fifth Amendment] privilege with respect to these two witnesses.” ¶13 “We review a trial court’s decision to excuse a witness asserting the privilege against self-incrimination for an abuse of discretion.” ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

¶57 Hollingsworth also asserts that the prosecutor engaged in vouching when he said, “I believe the evidence shows that this [was] a kidnapping.” “Vouching occurs when a prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind a witness or when the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports a witness’s testimony.” ¶ 26

¶7 Jury instructions viewed in their entirety must “adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.” ¶ 31 (App. 2002).

¶ 26, (finding that a prosecutor did not engage in vouching because his comments were directed at the non- evidentiary statement of opposing counsel, not a witness’s testimony, and the prosecutor did not suggest that he had outside knowledge).

Court, 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) (the witness justifiably claims the privilege if he is “confronted by substantial and ‘real’, and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination”) (citation omitted); ¶ 11

¶15 Jury instructions must “adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.”