Cited by

(quoting Bruggeman, 161 Ariz. at 510); 420–21 ¶¶ 11, 26, 28 (App. 2003) (finding an “incomplete” instruction, “in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel,” warranted reversal).

and failure to do so constitutes fundamental error.” ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (citation omitted).

While a prosecutor’s closing argument may ameliorate an erroneous jury instruction by “clarif[ying] any possible misunderstanding,” id., it may also compound the prejudice of an erroneous instruction, 420, ¶¶ 11, 26 (App. 2003) (finding an “incomplete” instruction, “in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel,” warranted reversal).

¶ 33 (2008); ¶ 27 (App. 2003) ("When an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.").

clarified any possible misunderstanding” (internal citations omitted)); ¶ 11 (App. 2003) (finding an erroneous instruction “in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel” warranted reversal); Dickinson, 233 Ariz. at 533 ¶ 22 (holding that no prejudice occurred in part because the prosecutor consistently emphasized the jury had to find an intent to kill); cf. Ontiveros, 206 Ari

¶¶ 10–11 (App. 2003) ().

We evaluate jury instructions “in context and in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel.” ¶ 11 (App. 2003).

¶ 11 (App. 2013) (explaining appellate courts “consider [jury] instructions in context and in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel” when evaluating their sufficiency); (“Closing arguments of counsel may be taken into account when assessing the adequ

¶ 11 (App. 2003) ("[I]n evaluating the jury instructions, we 4 The standard jury instruction was promulgated in 2005 and does not rely on Arizona authorities for the reference to damages.

¶ 11 (App. 2003) (“[I]n evaluating the jury instructions, we consider the instructions in context and in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel.”).

¶12 Lastly, Wallace contends the superior court erred when it “failed to instruct the jury on in court identification.” While a party is entitled to any instruction reasonably supported by the evidence, ¶ 10 (App. 2003), a court does not commit fundamental error by failing to provide an instruction that was neither 4 STATE v. WALLACE Decision of the Court requested nor relevant to the issues raised at trial.

§ 13-203(B)(1); ¶¶ 19–21 (App. 2003) (applying transferred intent under § 13-203(B)(1) to reasonable apprehension assault under § 13-1203(A)(2)).

¶ 11 (App. 4 A dangerous instrument is defined as “anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” A.R.S.

of Maricopa Cty., -34, ¶ 50, - 39 (App. 2009) (party entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory reasonably supported by evidence) (citation omitted); ¶ 10, (appellate court reviews superior court’s decision to give an instruction for abuse of discretion).

¶ 11, (appellate court considers closing arguments of counsel when evaluating jury instructions) (citation omitted).

¶ 7, (citations omitted); ¶ 10, (recognizing that a conviction may be reversed if jury instructions may have misled the jury or are otherwise deficient (citations omitted)).

However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” ¶ 27, (citation omitted); ¶ 19, (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); -32, -

Finally, “[I]n evaluating the jury instructions, we consider the instructions in context and in conjunction with the closing arguments of counsel.” ¶ 11, (citation omitted).

We review a court’s decision to adopt a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 10 (App. 2003), and review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the law, ¶ 4 (App. 2000).