Cited by

(“modification of a judgment which affects the substantial rights of a defendant requires his presence”); ¶ 23 (App. 2005) (“The exercise of sentencing discretion is the trial judge’s, not ours.”).

State v. Peña, ¶ 8 (2005).

“[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and reverse only if no substantial evidence supports the conviction.” Bieganski testified that he used this practice to save time but was unable to provide direct answers regarding why the girls did not bathe for church on Saturday night, why he did not shorten his morning routine, or why they did not attend a later service.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and we neither reweigh conflicting evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses, ¶ 38 (App. 2013).

Rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, ¶ 7 (App. 2005), and resolve all conflicts in the evidence against Brown, see Bustamante, 229 Ariz. at 258, ¶ 5.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and neither reweigh conflicting evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, see Buccheri-Bianca, ¶ 38 (App. 2013).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and “‘do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact,’” Borquez, 232 Ariz. at 487 ¶ 9 ().

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and neither reweigh conflicting evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, ¶ 38 (App. 2013).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and neither reweigh conflicting evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses.

When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense.” ¶ 8 (App. 2005).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and “do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” Borquez, 232 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9 (citation omitted).

“The sufficiency of the evidence must be tested against the statutorily required elements of the offense.” ¶ 8 (2005).

Additionally, we test the evidence "against the statutorily required elements of the offense," State v. Pena , , 505 ¶ 8, , 875 (App. 2005), and "do not reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact," State v. Borquez , , 487 ¶ 9, , 54 (App. 2013).

State v. Pena, 3 STATE v. CARRIZOZA Decision of the Court ¶ 7 (App. 2005).

is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 7, (internal quotations and citations omitted).

509, ¶¶ 11, 23-24 (2005).

We will reverse a conviction “only if no substantial evidence supports the conviction.” ¶ 7 , (citations omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we test the evidence “against the statutorily required elements of the offense,” ¶ 8 (App. 2005), and “do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.” Borquez, 232 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9.