Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Coulter, 339 P.3d 653.

26 citing documents.

  • State v. Valenzuela Arella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Valenzuela Arella Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    § 13–701(D)(9).”); ¶ 7 (App. 2014) (explaining that emotional harm under § 13-701(D)(9) includes “fright, fear, sadness, sorrow, despondency, anxiety, humiliation, depression (and other mental illnesses), and a host of other detrimental— from mildly unpleasant to disabling—mental conditions.”).
  • State v. Quarles Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Quarles Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    –76, ¶¶ 13, 16 (App. 2014) (explaining that testimony from the victim’s family member was sufficient for a jury to find an aggravating factor for emotional or financial harm).
  • State v. Fichtelman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Fichtelman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    ¶ 7 (App. 2014) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45 cmt.
  • State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    We “will affirm a verdict finding an aggravating circumstance if the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” ¶ 12 (App. 2014).
  • State v. Hernandez 476 P.3d 709 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Hernandez 476 P.3d 709 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain marginal conduct falls within the scope of the statute.” –75 ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974)).
  • State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Carrillo Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶ 14 (App. 2013); ¶ 17 (App. 2014).
  • State v. Ibarra Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Ibarra Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    –75, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“A statute is not vague simply because it is broad or that there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain marginal conduct falls within the scope of the statute.”).
  • State v. Francisco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Francisco Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    -75, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) ("A statute is not vague simply because it is broad or that there may be difficulty in deciding whether certain marginal conduct falls within the scope of the statute.").
  • In Re: Ms2009-000010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • In Re: Ms2009-000010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    ¶ 12 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 14 (2010)).
  • State v. Bolton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Bolton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    5 STATE v. BOLTON Decision of the Court this testimony as unreasonable because A.F.’s testimony, not based on scientific or medical knowledge, “provided the jury with an improper foundation upon which to evaluate emotional harm.” A.F.’s testimony, though, is the kind typically sanctioned in the aggravation phase, 276, ¶¶ 7, 16 (App. 2014) (describing “emotion” as “a state of feeling” and partially relying on witness testimony of her nightmares to uphold an emotional harm finding (citation omitte
  • State v. Godoy 418 P.3d 1100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Godoy 418 P.3d 1100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    See State v. Coulter , , ¶ 8, , 657 (App. 2014) (if legislature wanted provision, it could have expressly provided it).
  • Franklin v. Clemett 382 P.3d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Franklin v. Clemett 382 P.3d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶28 P.3d 653 (App. 2014), illustrates these points.