State v. Quarles

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

HENRY AUGUSTUS QUARLES, IV, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0468

FILED 11-07-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2021-130880-001
The Honorable Joseph Shayne Kiefer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Emily Tyson-Jorgensen
Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, PLC, Glendale
By Sheri M. Lauritano
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Henry Quarles appeals from his conviction for
second degree murder. He argues the superior court erred by (1) denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal, and (2) allowing the victim’s daughter
to present irrelevant testimony. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the conviction, State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 335, ¶ 70 (2022), the record shows
that late one summer evening, Quarles and his girlfriend went to a
convenience store they frequented. The store’s manager was on duty. The
manager’s friend, victim J.A., was also there.1 The manager spoke to
Quarles about two previous incidents Quarles had with store employees.

¶3 As captured by video surveillance cameras, while at the
cashier counter the manager asked Quarles, “Do you have a problem with
my guys who work here?” Quarles responded that he had a “huge
problem” with any man who tries to sexualize his girlfriend and that he
“would kill them.” Quarles and his girlfriend accused store employees of
making “inappropriate” comments about Quarles’s girlfriend. The
manager responded that he did not want their business and asked them to
leave.

¶4 The conversation intensified as the parties raised their voices
and talked over each other. The manager repeated that he did not want
Quarles and his girlfriend’s business and asked them to leave, but they
refused. The manager tried to stop the conversation, but Quarles continued
to argue over him. The incident escalated when Quarles tried to grab a
grocery bag on the counter and insulted the manager.

1 We refer to the victim and his daughter by using initials instead of
names to protect their privacy. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(i).

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¶5 In response, the manager grabbed a baseball bat stored
behind the counter. Quarles began to step away and then reached into a
black tote bag, which he wore over his right shoulder. J.A. saw Quarles
reaching inside the bag and started to intervene, grabbing the bottom of
Quarles’s bag. J.A. then stood up and held onto the bag, preventing Quarles
from reaching deeper into it. The manager held the bat for a few seconds
before he dropped it behind the counter when he saw Quarles and J.A.
struggling over the bag. J.A. managed to wrap his right arm around
Quarles, hugging him from behind, and both fell to the floor. While J.A.
held Quarles face down on the floor for about 20 seconds, Quarles yelled
that he was going to hurt J.A. After briefly allowing Quarles more space to
move, J.A. continued his efforts to prevent Quarles from reaching into the
bag. A few seconds later, however, Quarles was able to sit up and he shot
J.A. Several customers and employees were within several feet of the
gunshot.

¶6 While still holding the gun, Quarles pulled himself away from
J.A., stood up, and started collecting his belongings. Quarles lingered in
the store for about two minutes, during which he talked with his girlfriend,
fixed his hair, put on a beanie, and drank water. The manager and a
customer attended to J.A.’s injury, but he died shortly thereafter. Quarles
left the store, and police arrested him later that night. A grand jury indicted
Quarles for second degree murder, a class one felony.

¶7 At trial, after the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved
for a judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
20(a)(1) (“Rule 20”), arguing the State failed to prove its case. Defense
counsel also asserted his client’s actions were justified, stating that Quarles
“feared for his life” and acted in self-defense after the manager approached
him with a bat and J.A. grabbed him. The State argued that whether a
criminal offense is justified should not be considered in a Rule 20 motion;
instead, the focus is only whether the prosecution has established the
statutory elements of the crime.

¶8 The superior court denied the Rule 20 motion, explaining in
part that there are multiple ways the State can prove second degree murder,
and there is “substantial evidence from which the jury may reasonably
conclude that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.” The court
also stated that the points raised by defense counsel “are all going to be
factual issues for the jury to determine.”

¶9 After the court’s ruling, the court confirmed that Quarles
waived his right to testify and then instructed the jury on the elements of

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second degree murder as well as the lesser-included offenses of
manslaughter and negligent homicide. The court also gave a self-defense
instruction that outlined the circumstances for when a defendant is justified
in using or threatening deadly physical force.

¶10 The jury found Quarles guilty as charged, and the superior
court sentenced him to a slightly less than presumptive term of 15 years
imprisonment. Quarles timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

¶11 Quarles argues the superior court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present substantial
evidence that Quarles committed second degree murder. We review the
superior court’s ruling on a Rule 20 motion de novo. State v. Thompson, 252
Ariz. 279, 301, ¶ 86 (2022).

¶12 “After the close of evidence on either side . . . the court must
enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged in an indictment,
information, or complaint if there is no substantial evidence to support a
conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). Substantial evidence exists if
“reasonable persons could accept [evidence] as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Allen, 253 Ariz. at 335, ¶ 70. Our role is to determine “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16 (2011).
“When reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn from the facts, the
case must be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to
enter a judgment of acquittal.” State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997).

¶13 A person commits second degree murder, if without
premeditation, he (1) “intentionally causes the death of another person,” or
(2) knows that his “conduct will cause death or serious physical injury” and
then causes the death of another person, or (3) “recklessly engages in
conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of
another person.” A.R.S. § 13-1104(A). Quarles argues the State did not
present substantial evidence supporting any of the three ways in which
second degree murder may be committed.

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¶14 On this record, a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Quarles committed second degree murder.
First, Quarles intentionally caused J.A.’s death because Quarles shouted at
J.A., at least twice, “I’m going to hurt you,” and Quarles followed through
on those statements when he shot J.A. Second, Quarles knew that firing his
gun from close-range at J.A. would cause death or serious physical injury
to J.A. Third, Quarles recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave
risk that caused J.A.’s death, because a reasonable person in that situation
would not fire a gun in a store filled with customers and employees,
particularly when several of them were in close proximity to the gunshot.

¶15 Quarles also argues the court erred in denying his Rule 20
motion because the State was required to rebut his claim of self-defense but
failed to do so. If evidence of justification, including self-defense, is
“presented by the defendant, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act with justification.” A.R.S. § 13-205(A).

¶16 The record includes evidence supporting Quarles’s
self-defense claim, but the State presented substantial evidence that
contradicted his claim and the court properly determined that the jury
should resolve the contradiction. See State v. Haywood, ___ Ariz. ___, ___,
¶ 36, 550 P.3d 610, 619 (App. 2024) (affirming denial of Rule 20 motion, and
rejecting defendant’s argument under § 13-205(A) that the State failed to
show that self-defense “did not occur,” because the jury could have found
use of deadly force was not justified); see also State v. Riggins, 111 Ariz. 281,
284 (1974) (“Evidence is not insubstantial simply because the testimony is
conflicting or reasonable persons may draw different conclusions
therefrom.”); State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, 573, ¶ 14 (App. 2007) (“If
reasonable persons could differ as to whether the evidence establishes a fact
in issue, then the evidence is substantial.”). Thus, the court did not err in
denying Quarles’s Rule 20 motion for judgment of acquittal.

B. Testimony from the Victim’s Daughter

¶17 G.A. briefly testified that her father, J.A., was 72 years old
when he died, owned a small business restoring classic cars, lived and
worked in France for a time, was an Army veteran, and enjoyed cycling.
G.A. acknowledged she was not familiar with the store where he was killed.
The State then asked her about two in-life photos of J.A., the first one taken
“a year or two” before he was killed and the second was from the “early
2000s.” G.A. recognized the photos as accurate depictions of her father, and
the superior court admitted the photos without objection.

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¶18 Quarles argues the court committed fundamental error by
allowing G.A. to testify because her testimony was not relevant to “any
facts at issue in the case,” and even if it was relevant, the testimony was
unduly prejudicial.2 Because Quarles failed to object to the admission of
this evidence at trial, we review only for fundamental error resulting in
prejudice. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 138, ¶ 1 (2018). To establish
fundamental error, Quarles must show that “(1) the error went to the
foundation of [his] case, (2) the error took from [him] a right essential to his
defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have
received a fair trial.” Id. at 142, ¶ 21.

¶19 Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact
is of consequence in determining the action.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Relevant
evidence is generally admissible; irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Ariz.
R. Evid. 402. Also, relevant evidence may be excluded when “its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Ariz.
R. Evid. 403.

¶20 The State argues that G.A.’s testimony was relevant to
establish an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes, i.e., that “the
victim’s immediate family suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm”
because of the crime. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(9). Statutory aggravating
factors in a homicide case may properly be established through the
testimony of the victim’s family. See State v. Coulter, 236 Ariz. 270, 275–76,
¶¶ 13, 16 (App. 2014) (explaining that testimony from the victim’s family
member was sufficient for a jury to find an aggravating factor for emotional
or financial harm). The jury in Coulter first convicted the defendant and
then found an aggravating factor during the second phase of the trial. Id.
at 272, ¶ 2. The same process should have occurred here. Quarles does not
dispute that during the guilt phase G.A.’s testimony was admissible to
establish J.A.’s age; however, the rest of her testimony would only have

2 Quarles suggests that the photos were irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial because they were presented only to gain sympathy from the
jury, but he has not provided any supporting legal analysis. See State v.
Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 180, ¶ 13 (2019) (declining to consider an issue that
was neither developed nor supported by legal authority). Thus, he has
failed to establish that any error, much less fundamental error resulting in
prejudice, occurred relating to admission of the photos. See State v.
Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 298, ¶ 71 (2022) (concluding that the superior court
“did not abuse its broad discretion” in admitting an in-life photo of the
victims even though it had only “slight relevance”).

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been relevant during the aggravation phase to establish relevant factors for
sentencing purposes. Even so, Quarles has not met his burden of
establishing fundamental, prejudicial error.

¶21 Quarles does not argue that the error deprived him of a fair
trial, that the error deprived him of a right essential to his defense, or that
the error went to the foundation of his case. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142,
¶ 21. Moreover, Quarles has not met his burden of establishing he was
prejudiced by the error. G.A.’s testimony about her father’s life was very
brief, and the jury was instructed not to “be influenced by sympathy or
prejudice.” See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 69 (2006) (recognizing
the presumption that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions). Quarles
has not shown that without the irrelevant portions of G.A.’s testimony, “a
reasonable jury could have plausibly and intelligently returned a different
verdict.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 31.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm Quarles’s conviction and sentence.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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