State v. West

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-10-0306-PR
Appellant, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division Two
) No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0342
RANDALL D. WEST and PENNY A. )
WEST, ) Pima County
) Superior Court
Appellees. ) No. CR20063310
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable John S. Leonardo, Judge
________________________________________________________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals Division Two
224 Ariz. 575, 233 P.3d 1154 (App. 2010)

VACATED AND REMANDED
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BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY Tucson
By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for State of Arizona

ROBERT J. HIRSH, PIMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Tucson
By Frank P. Leto
Attorney for Randall D. West

LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS JACOBS Tucson
By Thomas F. Jacobs
Attorney for Penny A. West
________________________________________________________________

P E L A N D E R, Justice

¶1 The issue presented is whether the same standard

governs a trial court’s rulings on pre-verdict and post-verdict
motions for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 20. We hold that the same standard applies,

disapproving of any contrary language in State ex rel. Hyder v.

Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 216, 624 P.2d 1264 (1981).

I.

¶2 Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse

after an infant in their foster care died from severe head

trauma. During their joint trial, each moved for judgment of

acquittal under Rule 20(a) at the close of the State’s case and

after the close of evidence. The trial court denied those

motions. The jury then found Randall guilty of reckless child

abuse under circumstances not likely to produce death or serious

injury and Penny guilty of negligent child abuse under

circumstances likely to produce death or serious injury.

¶3 After trial, the defendants timely renewed their

motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b). The trial

court granted the motions, finding that although “a rational

trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

victim’s injury was caused by an act of child abuse,” there was

“no substantial evidence proving whether it was both or only one

defendant that did so” and “no substantial evidence to establish

whether either defendant permitted the injury, and, if so, which

one.”

¶4 The court of appeals reversed. State v. West, 224

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Ariz. 575, 576 ¶ 1, 233 P.3d 1154, 1155 (App. 2010). The court

concluded that, in finding “insufficient evidence to support the

defendants’ convictions” but without identifying any evidentiary

or other legal error at trial, the trial court had improperly

“re-determined the quantum of evidence in violation of Hyder.”

Id. at 578 ¶ 12, 233 P.3d at 1157.

¶5 We granted the defendants’ petitions for review to

consider what standard governs a trial court’s ruling on post-

verdict motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b), an

issue of statewide importance that involves interpretation of

one of our rules. See State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 42 ¶ 8,

97 P.3d 865, 867 (2004). We have jurisdiction under Article 6,

Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24

(2003).

II.

¶6 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a) provides that

on a defendant’s motion or its own initiative, a trial court

“shall enter a judgment of acquittal” before the verdict “if

there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction,” and

that “[t]he court’s decision on a defendant’s motion shall not

be reserved, but shall be made with all possible speed.” Rule

20(b) provides that “[a] motion for judgment of acquittal made

before verdict may be renewed by a defendant within 10 days

after the verdict was returned.”

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¶7 In Hyder, this Court set aside the trial court’s post-

verdict judgment of acquittal because the judge had cited no

“legal basis” for that ruling and “gave no reasons for his

finding of no substantial evidence.” 128 Ariz. at 224-25, 624

P.2d at 1272-73. Hyder also said that if the trial court has

denied a pre-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, “the

judge may only redetermine the quantum of evidence if he is

satisfied that he erred previously in considering improper

evidence” and changes his “position on prior evidentiary

rulings.” Id. at 224, 624 P.2d at 1272. Although this language

arguably is dictum, our appellate courts, including the court of

appeals in this case, have applied it strictly. E.g., State v.

Villarreal, 136 Ariz. 485, 487, 666 P.2d 1094, 1096 (App. 1983).

¶8 For several reasons, we now disapprove of the

conditions Hyder placed on a trial court’s granting of post-

verdict motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b).

First, they are not grounded in the language of Rule 20 and, in

fact, are inconsistent with the rule when read as a whole. Rule

20(b) permits a defendant, after verdict, to renew a motion for

judgment of acquittal made before verdict under Rule 20(a) and

does not limit the trial judge in any way. Under subsection

(a), the only question is whether “there is no substantial

evidence to warrant a conviction.” By imposing an additional

requirement for granting post-verdict motions under Rule 20(b),

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Hyder departs from the rule’s language by essentially

prohibiting trial judges from granting such motions even if the

judge concludes that no substantial evidence supports a

conviction.

¶9 Under Hyder, a defendant who merely “renews” his pre-

verdict motion may not obtain relief under Rule 20(b). Unless

the defendant can show evidentiary, legal error during trial, a

post-verdict motion is futile because the judge is confined to

his denial of the pre-verdict, Rule 20(a) motion. This

construct conflicts with the language of Rule 20.

¶10 Second, Hyder’s qualifications lacked any supporting

authority or rationale, and case law elsewhere is to the

contrary. For example, federal courts (applying Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 29(c), the counterpart to our Rule 20(b))

apply the same standard to both pre-verdict and post-verdict

motions for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Rojas,

554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he test for determining

whether to grant such a [Rule 29(c)] motion is whether at the

time of the motion there was relevant evidence from which the

jury could reasonably find (the defendant) guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in light favorable to the

Government.”) (quotation omitted); 2A Charles Alan Wright et

al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 465 (4th ed. 2010) (“The

standard on a motion after discharge of the jury is the same as

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on a motion at the close of the government’s case or of all the

evidence.”). Likewise, other state courts apply the same

standard to pre-verdict and post-verdict motions, thus requiring

the judge to grant a post-verdict judgment of acquittal if the

state did not adduce substantial evidence to support a

conviction. See People v. Paiva, 765 P.2d 581, 582 (Colo.

1988); cf. State v. Spinale, 937 A.2d 938, 944-45 (N.H. 2007)

(stating sole question on a defendant’s post-verdict motion for

judgment notwithstanding a guilty verdict is whether evidence is

legally sufficient to support conviction).

¶11 Third, the qualifications Hyder added to Rule 20(b)

raise constitutional concerns. If those qualifications,

strictly applied, are not met, a trial court must let a

conviction stand even if it finds post-verdict no substantial

evidence to warrant the conviction. But that potentiality is

illogical and, more importantly, would conflict with well-

settled law. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982)

(stating Due Process Clause prohibits convictions based upon

legally insufficient evidence); State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64,

71, 796 P.2d 866, 873 (1990); cf. State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz.

485, 492 ¶ 19, 975 P.2d 75, 82 (1999) (“[I]f the evidence at

trial was insufficient to support the conviction, the charges

must be dismissed.”).

¶12 Fourth, Hyder’s limitation makes little sense from a

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policy and systemic standpoint. Because Hyder sharply limits

the ability to grant a post-verdict motion under Rule 20(b),

judges in close cases might err on the side of granting the

defendant’s pre-verdict motion under Rule 20(a), and if so,

double jeopardy principles would preclude the state from

challenging that ruling on appeal. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania,

476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986). Conversely, if judges are able to

reassess the quantum of evidence after a verdict, there will be

less incentive to grant pre-verdict motions under Rule 20(a).

¶13 In addition, unlike the limited special action

procedure available to the state in Hyder, 128 Ariz. at 218 &

n.3, 624 P.2d at 1266 & n.3, a statutory avenue for appellate

review currently exists should a trial court grant a post-

verdict judgment of acquittal. A 1992 statutory amendment now

allows the state to appeal from such a ruling. See A.R.S. § 13-

4032(7) (2010) (permitting state to appeal from orders granting

judgment of acquittal after guilty verdict). And if that ruling

is reversed on appeal, the verdict of guilt can simply be

reinstated without violating double jeopardy protections. See

United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).

¶14 For these reasons, we disavow Hyder to the extent it

provides that a trial court may grant a post-verdict judgment of

acquittal under Rule 20(b) only if the court concludes that it

“consider[ed] improper evidence” and changes its “position on

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prior evidentiary rulings.” 128 Ariz. at 224, 624 P.2d at 1272.

The standards for ruling on pre- and post-verdict motions for

judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 are the same. On either

motion, the controlling question is solely whether the record

contains “substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 20(a).

¶15 This question of sufficiency of the evidence is one of

law, subject to de novo review on appeal. State v. Bible, 175

Ariz. 549, 595, 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993) (“We conduct a de

novo review of the trial court’s decision [on a Rule 20 motion],

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the

verdict.”). The appropriate standards that trial courts should

employ in ruling on motions under Rule 20(a) or (b) are well

established but bear repeating here.

¶16 On all such motions, “the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Mathers, 165 Ariz. at 66, 796 P.2d at 868 (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).1 “Substantial evidence,”

1
In view of this objective legal standard, we disavow
statements in Hyder and other Arizona cases that a trial court’s
ruling on Rule 20 motions hinges on whether the court
subjectively “has a conscientious conviction that the elements
of the offense have not been proven.” Hyder, 128 Ariz. at 224,
8
Rule 20’s lynchpin phrase, “is such proof that ‘reasonable

persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a

conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Id. at 67, 796 P.2d at 869 (quoting State v. Jones, 125 Ariz.

417, 419, 610 P.2d 51, 53 (1980)). Both direct and

circumstantial evidence should be considered in determining

whether substantial evidence supports a conviction. See State

v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290, 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (1996).

¶17 As we noted in Mathers, however, “[t]he fact that a

jury convicts a defendant does not in itself negate the validity

of the earlier motion for acquittal” because “[i]f it did, a

jury finding of guilt would always cure the erroneous denial of

an acquittal motion.” 165 Ariz. at 67, 796 P.2d at 869. “[A]

properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it

can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at

317).

¶18 On the other hand, “[w]hen reasonable minds may differ

on inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted

to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a

judgment of acquittal.” State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944

P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997); accord State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191,

624 P.2d at 1272; see also State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 205,
403 P.2d 521, 524 (1965).
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212 ¶ 87, 84 P.3d 456, 477 (2004). Thus, in ruling on a Rule 20

motion, unlike a motion for a new trial under Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(1), a trial court may not re-weigh

the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn

from the evidence. See State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 97, 692

P.2d 272, 276 (1984) (contrasting applicable standards for

motions under Rule 20 and Rule 24.1); cf. Peak v. Acuna, 203

Ariz. 83, 85 ¶ 9, 50 P.3d 833, 835 (2002) (in ruling on a motion

for new trial, judge acts as a “so-called thirteenth juror” and

may grant motion if he “simply disagrees with the jury’s

resolution of conflicting facts” and “believes the conviction is

against the weight of the evidence”).

¶19 Finally, although Rule 20 does not require a trial

court to specify reasons for granting a post-verdict motion for

judgment of acquittal, we strongly encourage judges to do so.

That practice will aid the parties and appellate courts, which

(on any appeal from the ruling) will review de novo whether

there is substantial evidence to support a conviction, applying

the same standard governing trial court rulings under Rule 20.

See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 595, 858 P.2d at 1198; State v. Guerra,

161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).

¶20 Here, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons

for granting defendants’ post-verdict motions under Rule 20(b).

Because the court of appeals understandably reviewed the trial

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court’s ruling under Hyder’s now-discarded limitation, however,

the appellate court did not determine whether the record

reflects substantial evidence to warrant the convictions. We

therefore remand the case to the court of appeals to address the

sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial court’s

granting of judgments of acquittal under Rule 20(b). See State

v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 263, 782 P.2d 737, 739 (1989); Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 31.19(i)(3).

III.

¶21 The court of appeals’ opinion is vacated and the case

is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

__________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

CONCURRING:

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Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

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W. Scott Bales, Justice

_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice

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