State v. Lopez

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MANUEL A. LOPEZ, Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-CR 24-0339
1 CA-CR 25-0042
1 CA-CR 25-0043
(Consolidated)
FILED 01-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. CR2022-147085-001
CR2022-109080-001
CR2022-102158-001
The Honorable Monica S. Garfinkel, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Eric K. Knobloch
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer Roach
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. LOPEZ
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Manuel A. Lopez appeals his convictions and
sentences for two counts of aggravated domestic violence and the
revocation of his probation in two other aggravated domestic violence
cases. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2021, Lopez pled guilty to two domestic violence
offenses committed against his wife, Bethany (a pseudonym), in May 2021
(“Case 1”) and June 2021 (“Case 2”). Four months later, Lopez and Bethany
separated so he could “get some help and stop doing drugs.” Within 4
months of them separating, Lopez committed—and ultimately pled guilty
to—two more domestic violence offenses against Bethany in January 2022
(CR2022-102158-001 (“Case 3”)) and March 2022 (CR2022-109080-001
(“Case 4”)). As a consequence of these convictions, the superior court
placed Lopez on supervised probation for a period of three years, which
included a prohibition on any contact with Bethany.

¶3 Despite that, on the morning of December 15, 2022, Lopez
contacted Bethany and argued with her about moving back into the family
home with their two daughters. That afternoon, Bethany drove with their
youngest daughter to pick up their oldest daughter from school. When
Bethany arrived, Lopez “was already waiting there.” Bethany picked up
their daughter and their daughter’s friend and drove to the friend’s house.
Lopez followed.

¶4 While Bethany and their daughters walked the friend into the
house, Lopez parked his car behind her car. After Bethany and their
daughters returned to her car, Bethany took a fifteen-minute phone call in
the parked car. During the call, Lopez pulled up next to Bethany’s car and
began to yell at her, demanding she hang up the phone and take their
daughters home.

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Opinion of the Court

¶5 By the time Bethany ended her call, Lopez had pulled up in
front of her car, making Bethany feel like she could not leave. When Lopez
refused to move his car, Bethany backed up to try and drive around him,
but Lopez again pulled in front of her car and stopped her from leaving.
Lopez spent the next five to ten minutes yelling at Bethany and refusing to
let her leave, prompting Bethany to call the police. A neighbor also called
the police after witnessing Lopez “going crazy,” “trying to open [Bethany’s
car] door,” “calling her curse words,” and “banging on the [car] windows.”

¶6 By the time police officers arrived on the scene, Lopez had
reentered his car. One of the officers ordered Lopez to get out of his vehicle,
and when he failed to comply, the officer pulled him out. After a brief
struggle, the officer detained him. At the precinct, the officers searched
Lopez and found methamphetamine in his right pocket and sock.

¶7 A grand jury charged Lopez with four offenses. Count 1
alleged possession or use of dangerous drugs, a Class 4 felony, and Count
4 alleged resisting arrest, a Class 1 misdemeanor. As relevant here, Counts
2 and 3 alleged “Aggravated Domestic Violence,” each Class 5 felonies.
Count 2 alleged unlawful imprisonment, a domestic violence offense,
having been committed within 84 months of having been convicted of at
least two other domestic violence offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(A).
Count 3 alleged disorderly conduct, a domestic violence offense, again
having been committed within 84 months of having been convicted of at
least two other domestic violence offenses. See id.

¶8 At trial and relevant to this appeal, the State presented
evidence that Counts 2 and 3 were committed within eighty-four months
of Lopez’s two prior domestic violence convictions—Case 1 and Case 2,
committed in May 2021 and June 2021. The jury found Lopez guilty as
charged. Lopez was sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment on Counts
1–4, the longest of which was 10 years. For violating his probation in Cases
3 and 4, the court revoked his probation grants and sentenced him to 1.5
years in prison on each case.

¶9 Lopez timely appealed all three cases. We have jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Lopez makes two arguments on appeal. Because he failed to
object to either issue at trial, we review both for fundamental prejudicial
error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018).

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Opinion of the Court

I. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Convict Lopez of Two
Counts of Aggravated Domestic Violence.

¶11 Lopez first argues the State did not present sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Counts 2 and 3 were aggravated
domestic violence offenses. Lopez does not contest the sufficiency of
evidence of the underlying offenses for Counts 2 (unlawful imprisonment)
and 3 (disorderly conduct). Rather, Lopez takes issue with the allegation
that he committed those offenses within 84 months of having been
convicted of at least two other domestic violence offenses, which was
required to convict on Counts 2 and 3. He argues the State was required to
show Counts 2 and 3 did not arise from the “same series of acts” based on
the language of A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(D). And because Counts 2 and 3 arise
from the “same series of acts,” Lopez argues only one count could be an
aggravated domestic violence offense. He therefore asks us to vacate one of
his two convictions for aggravated domestic violence and to remand to the
superior court for entry of a judgment of acquittal because of insufficient
evidence.

¶12 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We also review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. State v. Holle, 240 Ariz. 300, 302, ¶ 8 (2016). The plain
language of a statute guides our interpretation. Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 251 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (2021). “We interpret statutes ‘in view
of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same
subject.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142, ¶ 15
(2024) (quoting Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019)). If the
language is unambiguous, we “give effect to that language without
employing other rules of statutory construction,” Parsons v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 320, 323, ¶ 11 (App. 2017), and construe it “sensibly
to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion.” State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 237 Ariz. 98, 101, ¶ 13 (2014).

¶13 “A person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence if the
person within a period of eighty-four months commits a third or
subsequent violation of a domestic violence offense.” A.R.S. § 13-
3601.02(A).

The dates of the commission of the offenses are the
determining factor in applying the eighty-four month
provision in [A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(A)] regardless of the
sequence in which the offenses were committed. For purposes

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Opinion of the Court

of this section, a third or subsequent violation for which a
conviction occurs does not include a conviction for an offense
arising out of the same series of acts.

A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(D).

¶14 Lopez argues this language prohibits convicting him for two
counts of aggravated domestic violence in this case because, in his view,
they are “offenses that arose from the ‘same series of acts.’” We disagree.

¶15 Subsection D begins by discussing the timing of the prior
convictions. Notably, the “same series of acts” limitation immediately
follows this discussion about prior convictions. Though subsection D does
not explicitly state “the same series of acts as the prior two convictions,” given
the statute’s context and the language used in the rest of the subsection, the
legislature limited the aggravation of domestic violence offenses to those
that occur after and separately from the first two convictions.

¶16 The Arizona Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in
State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284, 285–86 (1987). In that case, Noble committed
four offenses on the same day, and sentences for all four offenses were
enhanced based on prior convictions. Id. at 285. Noble appealed the
enhancements based on the following language in A.R.S. § 13-604(H) (1984),
the “repetitive offenders” statute: “Convictions for two or more offenses
committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for
purposes of this section.”1 Id.

¶17 Noble argued his convictions were committed on the same
occasion and thus an enhanced sentence could be imposed only once. Id.
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that the whole statute was a
“repetitive offenders” statute and the enhancement came from prior
convictions committed on multiple occasions. Id. “Thus, the focus is on the
defendant’s prior, rather than present, convictions” and the “limits
articulated . . . are applicable only in determining the number of prior
convictions.” Id. at 285–86. Therefore, Noble’s four sentences, though
imposed for crimes committed on the same day, were all properly enhanced

1 Although A.R.S. § 13-604 (1984) was repealed in 2008, see 2008 Ariz. Sess.

Laws, ch. 301, § 15 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2207), the relevant language of
A.R.S. § 13-604(H) (1984) analyzed in Noble was moved to A.R.S. § 13-
703(L)—the current “repetitive offenders” statute. See 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws,
ch. 301, § 28.

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Opinion of the Court

because his two prior convictions were committed on two separate
occasions. Id. at 286.

¶18 Noble is instructive because A.R.S. § 13-3601.02 is a repetitive
offender enhancement statute like A.R.S. § 13-703. Our legislature has
determined that “repeat offenders should suffer harsher penalties than
first-time offenders.” State v. Diaz, 224 Ariz. 322, 325, ¶ 17 (2010). Each
subsequent domestic violence offense may properly be charged and
punished as an aggravated domestic violence offense under A.R.S. § 13-
3601.02(A), just as each subsequent sentence in Noble could be enhanced.
Noble, 152 Ariz. at 286. And the limitations here, like in Noble, apply to the
prior convictions, specifically that a third or subsequent offense may not
arise out of the same series of acts as the prior two convictions. Id. at 285.

¶19 Furthermore, Lopez’s proposed interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-
3601.02 would lead to an absurd result. Lopez only challenges one of his
two aggravated domestic violence convictions. But if Lopez’s argument is
correct that a “third or subsequent violation” cannot arise from the “same
series of acts,” neither Count 2 nor Count 3 could be aggravated. Under
Lopez’s interpretation, neither would qualify as a “third or subsequent
violation,” as they each arise from the ”same series of acts.” For example, if
a defendant had two prior domestic violence convictions and committed a
third against a spouse and then a fourth against a child in the “same series
of acts,” neither could be aggravated. That result would defeat the purpose
of the statute: to punish a defendant more harshly for committing more
than two domestic violence violations within eighty-four months. See A.R.S.
§ 13-3601.02. To conclude a defendant could avoid aggravation by simply
committing at least two violations in the “same series of acts” is nothing if
not absurd.

¶20 Rather, the statute prevents the following scenario: When a
defendant does not have any prior domestic violence convictions and
commits three domestic violence offenses on the same day in the “same
series of acts,” the third offense cannot be aggravated under A.R.S. § 13-
3601.02(D). The “same series of acts” language prevents the State from
relying on multiple offenses committed together to artificially “aggravate”
one of the counts.

¶21 The State provided sufficient evidence to show Counts 2 and
3 were committed within eighty-four months of Cases 1 and 2. Therefore,
Lopez fails to show error.

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 STATE v. LOPEZ
Opinion of the Court

II. The Jury Instructions for Aggravated Domestic Violence Were
Proper.

¶22 Lopez next argues his right to a jury trial was violated because
the jury instructions for Counts 2 and 3 “omitted the element that the third
or subsequent violations resulting in convictions cannot arise from the same
series of acts.” We review de novo “whether jury instructions properly state
the law.” State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 505, ¶ 68 (2013).

¶23 As discussed supra ¶¶13–21, the omitted information is not an
element of aggravated domestic violence. The State did not need to prove
Count 2 and Count 3 arise from a different series of acts from each other.
Rather, the State needed to show the two prior domestic violence
convictions, Case 1 and Case 2, arise from a series of acts different from
those in Count 2 and Count 3. A.R.S. § 13-3601.02(D). Lopez fails to show
error.

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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