State v. Tafoya

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SCOTT TAFOYA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0028
FILED 11-14-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. SO900CR202300440
The Honorable Dale P. Nielson, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Eric Knobloch
Counsel for Appellee

The Rigg Law Firm PLLC, Pinetop
By Brett R. Rigg
Counsel for Appellant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Scott Tafoya appeals his conviction of failure to appear and
the resulting sentence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In March 2023, Tafoya was involved in a car crash in which
his four-year-old son suffered a serious physical injury. The State charged
Tafoya with multiple felony offenses arising out of the collision.

¶3 Just over a week later, an officer with the Navajo County
Sheriff’s Office served Tafoya with a summons to appear in the criminal
matter, handing the paperwork to him face-to-face. The summons noted
the criminal case number, listed the charges against Tafoya, and stated,
“YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appear before [the Navajo County
Superior] Court at Holbrook, Arizona in Division 3 at 9:00 AM on
MONDAY APRIL 10, 2023.” (Emphases in original.) The summons
warned Tafoya that a warrant would be issued for his arrest should he fail
to appear. Tafoya did not appear for his arraignment on April 10, 2023, and
the court issued a warrant for his arrest.

¶4 That same day, because Tafoya did not go to his arraignment,
the State charged him with first-degree failure to appear. One week later,
a Holbrook police officer noticed Tafoya attempting to duck and hide in the
front passenger seat of a car, then leave the vehicle and attempt to run away
on foot. The officer caught up with Tafoya, confirmed he had an
outstanding warrant, and arrested him. During the arrest, the driver asked
Tafoya, “you know you had court, right?” and Tafoya responded that he
“put in a motion to get it dismissed.” But no such motion was filed.

¶5 Tafoya testified on his own behalf during the two-day jury
trial on the failure-to-appear charge. He explained that he did not read the
summons or understand that it related to criminal charges against him,
assuming instead that it had to do with his then-pending case with the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”).

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¶6 After considering Tafoya’s testimony and the State’s contrary
evidence, the jury found Tafoya guilty of failure to appear. The court then
sentenced him to a minimum term of four years’ imprisonment, with credit
for 108 days of presentence incarceration.

¶7 Tafoya timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Tafoya argues that his conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence and that prosecutorial error and instructional error
warrant reversal.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

¶9 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, State v.
West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011), viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to upholding the verdict, State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 488 (1983).
Substantial evidence to support a conviction is evidence that “reasonable
persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212, ¶ 87 (2004). A fact
may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Stuard, 176
Ariz. 589, 603 (1993).

¶10 First-degree failure to appear requires proof that a defendant
charged with a felony was required to appear in court and “knowingly”
failed to appear. A.R.S. § 13-2507(A). “‘Knowingly’ means . . . that a person
is aware or believes that the person’s conduct is of that nature or that the
circumstance exists. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness
of the act or omission.” A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b).

¶11 Tafoya does not contest the fact that he was required to
appear in connection with the felony charges against him or that he failed
to do so, and the evidence supports those elements. Tafoya asserts only
that the State failed to prove he “knowingly” failed to appear, suggesting
instead that he simply did not understand the summons.

¶12 The evidence showed, however, that Tafoya received a
summons specifically delineating the criminal case number, the felony
charges against him, and the time and place at which he had to appear—
information that was emphasized in an all caps, bold, and underscored font.
The law enforcement officer who served the summons confirmed handing
it to Tafoya directly, and Tafoya acknowledged receiving it. Further,

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during the stop, when the driver said, “you know you had court, right?”
Tafoya responded that he had moved to dismiss the case—but he did not
deny knowing he had a court date. This evidence gave the jury ample basis
to infer that Tafoya knew he was required to appear to answer felony
charges and knowingly failed to do so. See State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386,
389 (1970) (“Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no
different from testimonial evidence.” (quoting Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 140 (1954))); State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357, ¶¶ 22, 27–28 (2007)
(noting sufficient evidence of “knowingly” based on a combination of direct
and circumstantial evidence).

¶13 Largely relying on his own testimony, Tafoya asserts that he
was simply confused and did not realize the summons related to felony
charges, assuming instead that the paperwork pertained to his DCS case.
The summons itself, however, expressly listed felony charges, and the jury
did not have to accept Tafoya’s alternative explanation. See State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 49, ¶ 15 (2017) (“Appellate courts . . . defer to the factual
findings of the jury . . . .”).

¶14 Tafoya argues that there was no evidence he intentionally
sought to avoid court proceedings. But “knowingly,” not “intentionally,”
is the required mental state. See A.R.S. § 13-2507(A). Tafoya also argues
that he reasonably misunderstood what was required because of the
purportedly confusing summons and the emotional turmoil of concurrent
DCS proceedings. But it was Tafoya’s responsibility to read the summons,
rather than assume it was regarding a different case. Moreover, the
summons is clearly not related to a DCS case, as it mentions four counts of
criminal conduct, and no children are named. The fact that Tafoya was
undergoing DCS proceedings does not negate an inference of an actual,
knowing awareness of a duty to appear for the criminal case.

II. Prior Failure-to-Appear Conviction.

¶15 Tafoya argues that the superior court erred by permitting the
State to impeach him with a prior misdemeanor conviction for failure to
appear, asserting that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of
the Arizona Rules of Evidence. He also argues that his previous failure to
appear was not relevant to any permissible non-propensity purpose.

¶16 “[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such evidence may “be admissible
for other purposes, such as . . . absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R.

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Evid. 404(b)(2). When other-act evidence is offered for a permissible
purpose, “it may be admissible under Rule 404(b), subject to Rule 402’s
general relevance test, Rule 403’s balancing test, and Rule 105’s requirement
for limiting instructions.” State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 242, ¶ 12 (2012).

¶17 We generally review a 404(b) ruling for abuse of discretion.
State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 491 (1996). Because Tafoya did not object on
this basis at trial, we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error. State
v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018); see also State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz.
433, 434, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve
the issue on another ground.”).

¶18 In his opening statement, Tafoya’s attorney stated that there
would be no evidence that Tafoya had ever failed to appear in court. And
Tafoya testified that he was never cited or charged with failure to appear.

¶19 Tafoya had in fact previously been convicted of misdemeanor
failure to appear, so the State requested permission to impeach him with
evidence of that prior conviction. The court granted that request, and the
State elicited testimony from Tafoya acknowledging that he had a
conviction for failure to appear in September 2020.

¶20 Because Tafoya testified that he had never been charged with
failure to appear, the court properly allowed the State to impeach him with
his misdemeanor failure-to-appear conviction. See Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b)(1).
And the court properly instructed the jury that evidence of the conviction
could be used only to assess Tafoya’s credibility, not as evidence of guilt.
See Ariz. R. Evid. 105. His claim of error is unavailing.

III. Prosecutorial Error.

¶21 Tafoya argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized the State’s
burden of proof of the “knowingly” mental state during closing argument
and that there is a reasonable likelihood the error affected the jury’s verdict,
depriving him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Because Tafoya
failed to object to the State’s alleged error during trial, we review only for
fundamental, prejudicial error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19–
20 (2005).

¶22 Prosecutorial error warrants reversal only if (1) error occurred
and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the error could have affected the
jury’s verdict and thus denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Moody, 208
Ariz. 424, 459, ¶ 145 (2004); see also In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458, 469–70,

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¶¶ 46–47 (2020) (defining and distinguishing between prosecutorial error
and prosecutorial misconduct).

¶23 During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

I don’t know why the suggestion was made that I have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was going
to get charged in criminal court because of that incident, that’s
not a burden that I have. The point that I was making was that
a person having been involved in that situation would be
wondering, would be concerned, would be fearful, oh, boy,
might I get in trouble criminally? Might some prosecutor be
thinking I’m culpable? That’s the issue, that’s the alert issue.
It’s not that he had to know it, that he’s concerned. Common
sense screams that a person in his situation would be
concerned about forthcoming charges.

¶24 The statement was not error. The State’s closing argument
was about what was required to show that Tafoya knew he was being
charged in criminal court, not the State’s burden of proof that Tafoya
“knowingly” failed to appear. In Tafoya’s closing argument, defense counsel
described the accident and then asserted that a person in Tafoya’s position
would not immediately think they would be charged with a felony. The
prosecutor’s statement responded to defense counsel’s argument that the
State had to prove Tafoya knew at the time of the collision that charges were
forthcoming. See State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 16 (1997) (“Comments that are
invited and prompted by opposing counsel’s arguments are not improper
if they are reasonable and pertinent to the issues raised.”). Taken in context,
the complained-of statement was a fair rejoinder to Tafoya’s closing
argument and did not relate to the burden of proof to establish that Tafoya
“knowingly” failed to appear in court.

¶25 Finally, the jury was properly instructed several times on the
elements of the offense and the definition of knowingly. Tafoya has not
established prosecutorial error, much less fundamental error.

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CONCLUSION

¶26 We affirm Tafoya’s conviction and sentence.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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