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Additionally, the jury heard evidence of Jones’s statements to Tess such as, “You’re going to make me hurt you.” ¶ 16 (2009); ¶ 13 (App. 2015).

Defense counsel moved for a directed 1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” n.2 (App. 2015) ().

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” n.2 ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

“was no longer restrained” and, therefore, “the kidnapping was no longer occurring.” ¶18 Because “a defendant’s state of mind is seldom, if ever, susceptible of proof by direct evidence,” a defendant’s intent “may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” ¶ 13 (App. 2015) (cleaned up).

That distinction suggests that as used in this statute, “misconduct” carries a meaning different from “neglect.” (“[W]hen the legislature chooses different words within a statutory scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.”).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” ¶ 2 n.2 (App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 12 (App. 2011); n.2 (App. 2015).

See, e.g., Pinal Vista Props., ¶ 10 (App. 2004) (noting that “each word or phrase of a statute must be given meaning so that no part is rendered void, superfluous, contradictory or insignificant.”); ¶ 19 (App. 2015) (stating that “when the legislature chooses different words within a statutory scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.”); ¶ 18 (App. 2022).

“[A] sentence enhancement does not offend double jeopardy.” ¶ 23 (App. 2015).

¶2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” ¶ 2 n.2 (App. 2015)

¶ 2, n.2 (App. 2015) ().

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” n.2 ¶ 2 (App. 2015)

In the context of § 36-533(B), therefore, “accompanied” and “include” are not synonymous, and we must conclude that had the legislature intended that having reports accompany the affidavit would constitute compliance, it would have used some form of “accompany” instead of “include.” (“[W]hen the legislature chooses different words within a statutory scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate language.”)

–73 (1980); ¶ 23 (App. 2015).

Mohamed denies ever throwing anything at C.O. 1“We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” ¶ 3 n.2 (App. 2015) ().

2 Likewise, because the court properly followed the controlling authority in Fischer, we reject the State’s did not require the court to find Hunter intended to promote the gang’s interests.