State v. Knight

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RAYMOND JAMES KNIGHT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0306
FILED 07-18-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300CR202100982
The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jacob R. Lines
Counsel for Appellee

Huss Law, PLLC, Tempe
By Jeremy L. Huss
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. KNIGHT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Raymond James Knight appeals his convictions
and resulting sentences for sale or transportation of drugs
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, contending the
superior court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Because Knight has
shown no error, his convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 An Arizona Department of Public Safety Detective was the
sole witness at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. See State
v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 70 ¶ 23 (2012) (“We consider the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”). One afternoon in July 2021, the
Detective was in a marked patrol car, parked in the median of Interstate 17
near Highway 69 in Yavapai County. He saw a white Toyota Camry, with
a “fleet” Colorado license plate (indicating it was a rental car), driving too
close behind the car in front of it. The Detective testified that the Camry’s
driver and passenger (Knight) were sitting in an upright position, staring
straight ahead and, as he pulled up beside the car, they remained in the
same position.

¶3 The Detective initiated a traffic stop for following another car
at an unsafe distance, ultimately issuing a warning. The Detective testified
that the entire interaction took about 15 minutes. The events leading up to
the warning being issued (about 10 of those 15 minutes) provide context for
Knight’s challenge but are not contested. Instead, Knight argues that the
Detective improperly prolonged the stop after issuing the warning.

¶4 After stopping the Camry, the Detective approached the
passenger side and spoke to the driver through the passenger window. The
Detective told the driver he would be issuing a warning for following at an
unsafe distance. When the driver provided his Wyoming driver’s license,
the driver’s hands were shaking. The Detective also asked for the rental car

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paperwork, but neither the driver nor Knight were initially able to locate it.
At the Detective’s request, in the 100-degree heat, the driver got out of the
Camry and followed him to the front of the patrol car. The driver then stood
next to the patrol car while the Detective prepared the written warning.

¶5 Knight remained in the passenger seat of the car. Knight then
found the rental car paperwork in the glove box and held it out of the
passenger’s side window for the Detective to retrieve. When handing the
paperwork to the Detective, Knight’s hands were shaking. The Detective
then went back to his patrol car, where the driver was standing, to complete
the warning. The rental agreement was between the rental car company and
a third person; neither the driver nor Knight were listed on the rental
agreement, which the Detective said was very unusual.

¶6 For the next several minutes, while running a check on the
driver and filling in the warning, the Detective asked the driver questions.
The Detective saw the driver breathing rapidly and that he was leaning
against the hood of the patrol car to keep his balance. The driver explained
that they were returning to Cheyenne, Wyoming after driving from
Wyoming to Phoenix to visit his mother who was in the hospital. The two
drove 15 hours to Phoenix and stayed less than 24 hours. The Detective
testified that spending such a short time at a destination after such a long
drive was uncommon.

¶7 After questioning the driver, the Detective went back to the
Camry to check the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). The Detective
then handed Knight a small piece of white paper, the nature of which is
unclear, but it was not the warning. Knight argues that was when the traffic
stop ended, and the remaining interaction was no longer consensual. The
superior court, however, found the traffic stop ended a few minutes after
the Detective handed Knight the white paper, which was about 10 minutes
after the stop began.

¶8 The Detective then spoke with Knight, asking about the
purpose of the trip and Knight provided information consistent with what
the driver had said. The Detective testified Knight appeared nervous
throughout the entire interaction.

¶9 By then, a second officer had arrived, and as shown on dash
camera footage, the second officer began speaking with the driver near the
patrol car. The second officer asked the driver more questions about the trip
and returned the driver’s license and rental agreement and the driver then

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signed the warning. The superior court found the purpose of the stop
concluded at that time, about 10 minutes after the stop began.

¶10 The driver, however, did not immediately return to the
Camry after receiving the warning. For the next few minutes, the second
officer asked the driver more questions about the trip and the driver
voluntarily answered those questions. The second officer asked the driver
whether there were any drugs in the car, and the driver said no.

¶11 When he was asked about drugs, the driver got extremely
nervous, could not stand still, and crinkled the warning in his hands. The
officers asked to search the car, and the driver responded “Why?” Although
no consent was given, at that point, the Detective told the driver that he
would use his drug dog to sniff around the car. The Detective asked Knight
to get out of the Camry, and he complied. The dog then alerted to the
presence of drugs in the car and officers found methamphetamine in the
trunk.

¶12 The State charged Knight with sale or transportation of drugs
(methamphetamine), a Class 2 felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a Class 6 felony. Knight moved to suppress all evidence
obtained during the traffic stop, arguing the Detective lacked a reasonable
suspicion necessary to prolong the traffic stop after issuing the warning.
After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied the motion, finding
the totality of the circumstances indicated sufficient reasonable suspicion to
justify extending the traffic stop. Knight unsuccessfully moved for
reconsideration.

¶13 After a failed conditional plea, Knight submitted the matter
to the court as finder of fact following a proper waiver of trial rights. After
considering the record, the court found Knight guilty as charged. Given his
prior criminal history, the court sentenced Knight to concurrent prison
terms of 10.5 years for Count 1 and 2.25 years for Count 2, properly
awarding him 340 days of presentence incarceration credit. This court has
jurisdiction over Knight’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of
the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A) (2024).1

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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DISCUSSION

¶14 “In reviewing an order involving a motion to suppress, we
review the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the order, and will
not disturb the trial court's ruling absent ‘clear and manifest error.’” State v.
Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 161 ¶ 9 (2003) (quoting State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265
(1996)). This court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion, deferring to the “court's factual findings if reasonably supported
by the evidence,” but reviewing the court’s “ultimate legal determination
de novo.” State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58, 60 ¶ 9 (2019). This court will not
“reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility issues on appeal.” Williams v.
King, 248 Ariz. 311, 317 ¶ 26 (App. 2020) (citation omitted).

¶15 Knight does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop. In
addition, the State concedes Knight has standing to challenge the
lawfulness of the extension of the traffic stop. The dispositive issue is
whether the Detective had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop
after providing the driver the written warning.

¶16 Law enforcement may stop a car and detain its occupants
pending inquiry into a traffic violation. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,
327 (2009). Such a traffic stop allows officers to do things like check driver’s
licenses, determine whether there are any outstanding warrants for
occupants in the car, and inspect and confirm proof of insurance and
registration. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 349 (2015). An
officer’s authority for a traffic stop ends when tasks related to the traffic
infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed. See Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 354 (citation omitted). Once an officer has concluded the purpose
of a traffic stop, or reasonably should have, the officer must allow the
vehicle’s occupants to leave unless the continuing encounter is consensual,
or the officer has developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See
State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23 ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

¶17 Reasonable suspicion exists when the State can provide proof
of a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by
the person stopped. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (citation
omitted). The inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances,
“considering such objective factors as the suspect’s conduct and
appearance, location, and surrounding circumstances, such as time of day,
and taking into account the officer’s relevant experience, training, and
knowledge.” State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 76 ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (citing cases).
While reasonable suspicion must be more than an inchoate hunch, it only
requires specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational

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inferences from those facts, reasonably justify the officer’s actions. Teagle,
217 Ariz. at 23 ¶ 25 (citation omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

¶18 Based on the record, Knight has not shown the superior court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court’s determination, based
on weighing and assessing witness credibility in light of the evidence
provided, is supported by the record.

¶19 Knight’s two main arguments on appeal rest on State v.
Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107 (App. 2010), and State v. Magner, 191 Ariz. 392 (App.
1998). First, Knight argues Sweeney found reasonable suspicion was lacking
based on many of the same factors presented here, also arguing the superior
court’s reliance on drug courier profile factors in this case was erroneous.
However, Sweeney emphasized the importance of considering the totality
of the circumstances when addressing reasonable suspicion, 224 Ariz. at 114
¶ 28, not the checklist approach Knight advocates. Sweeney also listed
factors, not elements, in addressing reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the
superior court here relied on more than just the Sweeney factors attributed
to drug courier profiles.

¶20 Second, citing Magner, Knight asserts nervousness alone is
not sufficient to prolong a traffic stop. True, Magner stated that “courts must
be wary of granting much weight to a law enforcement officer’s subjective
observation that a defendant was nervous.” 191 Ariz. at 397 ¶ 14. But the
State correctly counters that the superior court did not rely on nervousness
alone. Instead, in denying Knight’s motion to suppress, the court relied on
various factors the factual record shows were indicia of reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, including: (1) the straight, upright body
positions of the driver and Knight and their unchanged body positions
when approached by the Detective driving a marked patrol car; (2) the
persistent, nervous behavior by the driver and Knight; (3) the short
duration of the stop; (4) the short duration of their stay in Phoenix; and (5)
the rental car with Colorado plates that was rented to a third party, and
neither the driver nor Knight were listed on the rental agreement or listed
as authorized drivers. See United States v. Pettit, 785 F.32d 1374, 1382 (10th
Cir. 2015) (“In the trooper’s professional experience, and in our case law,
driving a vehicle registered to an absent third party can indicate drug
trafficking.”) (citations omitted).

¶21 The superior court, viewing this as a close case, appears to
have been persuaded by the issues presented by the third-party rental
agreement. That fact, the court noted, gave it “great pause in weighing
evidence” and, ultimately, “tips the scale” in showing that the Detective

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had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in extending the traffic stop.
The court emphasized that “[w]ithout the rental agreement, the Court
would likely be in agreement with Defendant’s counsel on his suppression
argument considering” Sweeney.

¶22 When determining whether an officer had reasonable
suspicion, a court must collectively examine the evidence presented in the
context of all applicable legal factors. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24 ¶ 25 (citation
omitted). Considering the third-party rental agreement, the other factors
discussed in Sweeney, and the factors beyond mere nervousness, including
a driver and a passenger in a rental car leased by an absent third party, the
superior court correctly found the Detective had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify extending the traffic stop after the issuance of the
warning.

¶23 In substance, Knight argues the evidence should have been
weighed differently. But this court does not reweigh the evidence
considered and assessed by the superior court. See State v. Duncan, 548 P.3d
1128, 1136 ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. 2024) (citation omitted). On this record, Knight
has shown no error in the denial of his motion to suppress or his motion to
reconsider.

CONCLUSION

¶24 Knight’s convictions and resulting prison sentences are
affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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