State v. Dean

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-02-0427-PR
Appellant,)
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) 1 CA CR 01-0827
DONALD GENE DEAN, )
) Maricopa County
Appellee.) Superior Court
) No. CR-01-002813
)
) O P I N I O N
)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Robert A. Budoff, Judge
AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
203 Ariz. 408, 55 P.3d 102 (2002)
VACATED

TERRY GODDARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals Section
and Billie A. Rosen, Section Chief Counsel
Drug Enforcement and Violent Crimes Section
Attorneys for Appellant

JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix
By Garrett W. Simpson, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Appellee

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 We granted review in this case to address a recurring

Fourth Amendment issue — whether the search of an automobile is

“incident” to the arrest of a defendant. In this case, the
search occurred after the defendant was arrested in a house,

some two and one-half hours after he had exited the vehicle.

The superior court held that the search violated the Fourth

Amendment; the court of appeals reversed. For the reasons

below, we hold that the superior court correctly found that the

search in this case did not fall within the “search incident to

arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

I.

¶2 On February 7, 2001, Phoenix police officers received

a tip that Donald Dean, the subject of two felony drug arrest

warrants, was residing at a house on East Cholla Street in

Phoenix. The police set up surveillance of the house and, at

about 6:00 p.m., observed a Jeep Grand Cherokee leaving the

residence, driven by a person fitting Dean’s description.

Several officers followed the Jeep in a marked patrol car; after

a short time, the officers activated their overhead lights.

Dean, who was in fact driving the Jeep, did not pull over, but

instead returned to the East Cholla residence and parked in the

driveway. He jumped out of the Jeep, leaving the keys in the

ignition, and ran into the garage of the house. One of the

officers then took the keys from the Jeep.

¶3 The officers on the scene summoned a tactical team

from the Phoenix Special Assignment Unit. After obtaining

permission from the owner of the house, the tactical team went

2
inside. The team eventually found Dean hiding in the attic,

arrested him, and took him to a waiting patrol car.

¶4 Dean’s arrest occurred approximately two and one-half

hours after he fled the Jeep. After Dean was arrested, officers

searched the Jeep and discovered methamphetamine in the

passenger compartment. Based on this discovery, the police

obtained a warrant to search the residence and, in executing

that warrant, discovered additional quantities of

methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and weapons.

Dean was subsequently charged with possession of equipment or

chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs, possession of

dangerous drugs for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

¶5 Dean filed a motion in the superior court to suppress

all evidence seized from the Jeep, alleging unlawful search and

seizure. The superior court granted the motion to suppress.

The trial court rejected the State’s contentions that the

vehicle was abandoned and that the search was simply an

administrative inventory of the vehicle contents. The superior

court also rejected the State’s argument that the warrantless

search of the Jeep was incident to Dean’s arrest, noting that

“[t]he arrest took place two and a half hours later at a

different location.”

¶6 The State timely appealed the suppression order

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-4032(6)

3
(2001). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Jeep

search fell within the “incident to arrest” exception to the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. State v. Dean, 203

Ariz. 408, 409 ¶ 1, 55 P.3d 102, 103 (App. 2002). The court of

appeals reasoned that because the police could have searched the

vehicle incident to an arrest if Dean had been apprehended

either inside the vehicle or directly outside of it, Dean could

not “evade a search by leaving the vehicle before the officers

arrest him.” Id. at 411 ¶ 10, 55 P.3d at 105.

¶7 Dean filed a petition for review, and we granted

review to address the applicability of the “incident to arrest”

exception to the warrant requirement in this situation. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona

Constitution, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.19(c)(3),

and A.R.S. §§ 13-4032(6) and -4033(A)(2) (2001).

II.

¶8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against

“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that search

warrants shall be issued only upon “probable cause.” U.S.

Const. amend. IV. Searches conducted without a judicially

approved warrant “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and

4
well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 357 (1967) (internal citations omitted). The State

suggests that the warrantless search of Dean’s Jeep can be

justified by virtue of three of those “exceptions”: (1) because

the Jeep was “abandoned”; (2) because the search was an

administrative “inventory” of its contents; and (3) because the

search was “incident” to Dean’s arrest.1

A.

¶9 The State’s first two arguments do not require

extended discussion. The superior court specifically found that

the Jeep, which was parked in the driveway of Dean’s residence,

was not abandoned. In reviewing an order involving a motion to

suppress, we review the facts in the light most favorable to

sustaining the order, and will not disturb the trial court’s

ruling absent “clear and manifest error.” State v. Hyde, 186

Ariz. 252, 265, 921 P.2d 655, 668 (1996). See State v. Jones,

203 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 8, 49 P.3d 273, 277 (2002) (“Clear and manifest

error . . . is really shorthand for abuse of discretion.”). We

find no such error here.

1
While Dean argues that the search in this case
violates both the Fourth Amendment and Article 2, Section 8 of
the Arizona Constitution, he presents no separate arguments
based on the state constitutional provision. We therefore
address his claim only under the United States Constitution.
See State v. Nunez, 167 Ariz. 272, 274 n.2, 806 P.2d 861, 863
n.2 (1991).

5
¶10 The State’s attempt to justify the search as an

“inventory” of the Jeep fails on similar grounds. While police

have the power to perform a warrantless “administrative” search

of an impounded vehicle for “community caretaking functions,”

see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976), such a

search must be “routine,” and not “a pretext concealing an

investigatory police motive.” Id. at 376. The officer who

conducted the search of the Jeep testified at the suppression

hearing that his purpose was “to search for evidence.” In light

of that testimony, the superior court did not err in concluding

that the search was not an administrative inventory.2

B.

¶11 We therefore turn to the only remaining applicable

justification for the warrantless search here, the “search

incident to arrest” exception. In Chimel v. California, 395

U.S. 752 (1969), the Supreme Court explained both this exception

and its justifications. Chimel involved the arrest of a

defendant inside his home and the subsequent warrantless search

2
Nor does this case involve the so-called “automobile”
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Under that exception, searches of vehicles may be allowed absent
a warrant if the police have “probable cause” to do so. See
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The State candidly
conceded at oral argument that the record in this case does not
establish probable cause for the search of the Jeep, and thus
did not argue in this court that the “automobile” exception
applies.

6
of the home. The California Supreme Court upheld the search as

“incident to a valid arrest.” Id. at 755. In an opinion by

Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court of the United States

reversed.

¶12 Chimel began from the premise that when a search is

conducted without a warrant, “[t]he scope of [a] search must be

‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which

rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 762 (alteration in

original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). When

a search is conducted incident to a valid arrest, Justice

Stewart explained, two sets of circumstances justify departure

from the general warrant requirement:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter
might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. And the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by
a like rule.

Id. at 763.

¶13 Chimel taught that these twin aims of the search

incident to arrest exception — officer safety and preservation

of evidence — provide “ample justification” for a warrantless

7
search “of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his

immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area

from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or

destructible evidence.” Id. The search in Chimel was of the

defendant’s entire house, taking between forty-five minutes and

an hour after the arrest. Because the search “went far beyond

the petitioner’s person and the area from within which he might

have obtained either a weapon or something that could be used as

evidence against him,” the Court held that there was no

constitutional justification for departing from the general

warrant requirement and that the search was unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 768.

C.

¶14 Under the rule announced in Chimel, determining

whether a particular area in which evidence was found was within

an arrestee's "immediate control" required an examination of the

facts and circumstances surrounding each arrest. This case-by-

case analysis “presented a significant burden to courts and

police” when the arrest occurred in or near an automobile and

police had to decide at the time of the arrest which portions of

the automobile were within the arrestee’s immediate control.

Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 137, 143 (Va. 1999) (Lacy,

J., concurring). In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),

the Supreme Court recognized the problem, noting that the

8
“courts have found no workable definition of the ‘area within

the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably

includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is a

recent occupant.” Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).

Because a “‘single familiar standard is essential to guide

police officers,’” id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442

U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)), the Court undertook in Belton to

establish such a “workable rule.” Id. at 460.

¶15 Belton arose from the stop of a speeding vehicle on

the New York State Thruway. The police officer stopped the

vehicle and, after examining the registration, discovered that

none of the four men inside owned the vehicle or was related to

its owner. The officer also smelled burnt marijuana and saw an

envelope marked “Supergold” on the floor of the vehicle. He

then removed the four individuals from the vehicle, separated

them, and searched the vehicle. In the back seat he found a

leather jacket belonging to Belton; inside a zipped pocket, the

officer discovered cocaine. Id. at 455-56.

¶16 The New York Court of Appeals held that because there

was no danger that the arrestee or his confederates could gain

access to the “zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket,” id.

at 456, the search exceeded the scope justified by the twin

goals of the Chimel exception and was not validly incident to

Belton’s arrest. The Supreme Court reversed. Once again

9
writing for the Court, Justice Stewart noted that “articles

inside the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact

generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which

an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary

ite[m].’” Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763)). The

Court therefore held that “when a policeman has made a lawful

custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a

contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger

compartment of that automobile” and any containers found within

the passenger compartment. Id.

¶17 The “bright-line” rule established in Belton thus

relieved police officers from a case-by-case justification as to

whether the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, as

opposed to only a portion of the compartment, was within the

“immediate control” of an arrestee who had been a recent

occupant of the vehicle. But, although Belton provided clear

guidance with respect to this spatial limitation on the incident

to arrest exception in the context of a vehicle search, it did

not specifically address a number of other questions. While

noting that it was undertaking to provide some clarity as to the

scope of a search incident to arrest when the defendant was a

“recent occupant” of a vehicle, id. at 460, the Court did not

undertake to define recent occupancy, other than to note in the

case before it that the search occurred immediately after the

10
arrest and that Belton was a passenger in the car “just before

he was arrested.” Id. at 462. And, while stating generally

that “a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which

justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the

person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area,” id. at

461, Justice Stewart did not purport to set forth any rule as to

where the arrestee must be located in relation to the vehicle at

the time of arrest in order to justify a warrantless search of

the passenger compartment. Again, this was likely because the

defendant in Belton was in close proximity to the car at the

time of arrest. See id. at 456.

¶18 Justice Stewart made plain in Belton, however, that

the Court was not retreating from Chimel, but rather simply

applying its principles to the particular problem before it.

See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3 (“[Belton] in no way alters the

fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding

the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial

arrests.”). Thus, Belton carefully distinguished cases such as

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), in which the

search of a footlocker occurred an hour after federal agents

gained exclusive control of the item and after the defendants

were securely in custody, and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753

(1979), which involved a suitcase in the trunk of a taxicab and

thus not within the defendant’s “immediate control.” See

11
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62. In each case, Justice Stewart

emphasized, there was no “arguably valid search incident to a

lawful custodial arrest.” Id. at 462.

D.

¶19 Because neither Belton nor any subsequent Supreme

Court case has defined just when a defendant is a sufficiently

“recent occupant” of a vehicle so as to allow a search incident

to arrest of the vehicle’s passenger compartment, state and

federal courts have struggled to find a workable definition of

the term. One line of cases has focused on the Court’s

statement in Belton that its holding was limited to the

“particular and problematic context” before it. Belton, 453

U.S. at 460 n.3. Noting that the police officer in Belton had

ordered the driver of the vehicle to stop before the arrest

occurred, see id. at 455, a number of courts have focused on

whether the police had initiated contact with the arrestee while

he was still in the vehicle.

¶20 United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115 (6th Cir. 1995),

exemplifies this approach. Hudgins held that as long as the

police officer “initiates contact” with a defendant “by actually

confronting the defendant or by signaling confrontation with the

defendant, while the defendant is still in the automobile,” and

the defendant is subsequently arrested, “a search of the

automobile’s passenger compartment falls within the scope of

12
Belton and will be upheld as reasonable.” Id. at 119.

Conversely, if the defendant voluntarily left the automobile and

began walking away before the police officer initiated contact,

“the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a

case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under

Chimel becomes necessary.” Id.

¶21 Under this approach, which views a defendant as a

“recent occupant” of a vehicle for purposes of the Belton rule

only when the police initiated contact when the arrestee was

still in the vehicle, state and federal courts have found Belton

inapplicable when the defendant left the vehicle before such

contact, even when the arrest occurred in close proximity to the

car. See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Fafowara, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir.

1989); State v. Thomas, 761 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v.

Fernegel, 549 N.W.2d 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 575 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 1991). Division Two of our

court of appeals recently adopted this approach in State v.

Gant, 202 Ariz. 240, 244-45 ¶ 11, 43 P.3d 188, 192-93 (App.

2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1784 (2003).

¶22 In Gant, the defendant had arrived in his car at a

residence at which police already were present. Recognizing the

defendant as someone wanted on an outstanding warrant and whose

license was suspended, an officer arrested him after he exited

13
his vehicle. The officer then searched the vehicle, discovering

a weapon and cocaine inside the car.

¶23 The superior court held the search lawful as conducted

incident to Gant’s arrest, but the court of appeals reversed.

The court of appeals started from the proposition that the rule

announced in Belton was limited to the “particular factual

situation in which it arose.” Id. at 244 ¶ 11, 43 P.3d at 192.

Because the police officer in Belton had initiated contact with

the defendant while the defendant was still in the automobile,

Gant concluded that Belton applied only under those

circumstances — when “the officer initiates contact with the

defendant, either by actually confronting the defendant or by

signaling confrontation . . . while the defendant is still in

the automobile.” Id. (quoting Hudgins, 52 F.3d at 119

(alteration in original)).

¶24 In Gant, the police officer had not initiated contact

while the defendant was still in the vehicle; the defendant

drove the vehicle to the home where the officer already was

present, and the confrontation first occurred after the

defendant left the car. Id. at 242-43 ¶ 3, 43 P.3d at 190-91.

Applying its interpretation of Belton, the court of appeals

invalidated the search. Id. at 246 ¶ 15, 43 P.3d at 194.

¶25 In dictum, Gant “emphasize[d] that, when police

attempt to initiate contact by either confronting or signaling

14
confrontation, a vehicle’s occupant cannot avoid Belton’s

application and create a haven for contraband by simply exiting

the vehicle when officers are seen or approach.” Id. at 244-45

¶ 11, 43 P.3d at 192-93. Under such circumstances, Gant

suggested, the search is incident to an arrest when the suspect

is “subsequently arrested.” Id. at 245 ¶ 11, 43 P.3d at 193.

¶26 Adopting the Gant dictum, the court of appeals in this

case held that the search of the vehicle was incident to Dean’s

arrest, notwithstanding that the arrest occurred long after he

left the vehicle and when he was inside the house, because he

fled the vehicle when the police approached after initiating

contact:

Dean cannot evade the search of the Jeep and the
discovery of contraband in his vehicle by parking
the Jeep and running into a house as soon as he
is confronted by a police officer. The search,
therefore, was incident to his arrest . . . .

Dean, 203 Ariz. at 412 ¶ 12, 55 P.3d at 106. The court of

appeals reasoned that had Dean not fled the car at the approach

of the police, he would have been arrested in or near the car,

and any subsequent search of the vehicle would then have been

plainly incident to the arrest. Id. at 412 ¶¶ 11-12, 55 P.3d at

106. Because both the time between Dean’s exit of the vehicle

and arrest, and his distance from the vehicle at the time of the

arrest resulted from Dean’s “attempt to evade” police, the court

15
of appeals held that he could not “evade” the warrantless search

of the Jeep. Id. at 412 ¶ 12, 55 P.3d at 106.

E.

¶27 The analytic approach taken by the court of appeals in

this case and in Gant, under which the applicability of the

Belton rule turns entirely on whether the police initiated

contact with the arrestee while he was still in the vehicle, is

not supported by the rationale of either Belton or Chimel. The

search incident to arrest exception explicated in Belton and

Chimel was designed to protect officer safety and avoid the

destruction of evidence. A suspect arrested next to a vehicle

presents the same threat to officer safety and the same

potential for destruction of evidence whether or not he was

alerted prior to arrest of the police’s interest in him. Yet,

under the approach Gant adopted from Hudgins and its progeny,

the police would be able to search the entire passenger

compartment of the automobile only if they initiate contact with

a passenger while the suspect is in the vehicle; in all other

cases, the Chimel “immediate control” test would apply. It

makes no sense to have two different rules applicable to arrests

occurring in what is for all relevant intents and purposes the

same situation.

¶28 Moreover, the singular focus on whether the police

initiated contact before the defendant departed the vehicle runs

16
counter to one of the purposes underlying Belton. The Supreme

Court sought in that case to create a workable definition of the

area within the “immediate control” of a recent occupant of a

vehicle, both to provide a “familiar standard” to police

officers and to avoid case-by-case litigation as to whether the

entire passenger compartment, or only a portion thereof, was

within the scope of a search incident to arrest. See Belton,

453 U.S. at 458-60. But, by defining “recent occupancy”

entirely in terms of whether the defendant was formally made

aware of the police presence before leaving the vehicle, Gant

and the opinion below would return the courts to the very sort

of inquiry that Belton abjured in every case in which contact

was not so initiated before the arrest.3

¶29 For these reasons, a number of courts have found

initiation of contact by the police irrelevant to the

determination whether an arrestee was a “recent occupant” of a

vehicle under Belton. See, e.g., United States v. Thorton, 325

3
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), suggests in
dictum that the Supreme Court did not mean to limit Belton to
cases in which the police initiated contact while the defendant
was in the vehicle. That case involved a defendant who met
police officers at the scene of an accident, where his vehicle
had swerved off the road into a ditch. In that case, in
upholding a search of the vehicle under the principles set forth
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court also specifically
noted that if the officers had arrested the defendant for
various traffic violations, they could have searched the
passenger compartment of the car under Belton. Long, 463 U.S.
at 1035 n.1.

17
F.3d 189, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sholala, 124

F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir. 1997); Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 141-42; see

also Gant, 202 Ariz. at 244 n.3, 43 P.3d at 192 n.3 (recognizing

a split in authority and collecting cases rejecting the

“initiating contact” construction of Belton). We agree with the

general analytical approach taken in these decisions. Belton

made clear that its holding “in no way alters the fundamental

principles established in the Chimel case.” Belton, 453 U.S. at

460 n.3. Thus, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the critical

factors of when and where the custodial arrest took place. “[A]

search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially

contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate

vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,

486 (1964).

¶30 The correct rule, we believe, was stated by the

Supreme Court of Virginia in Glasco. In upholding a vehicle

search as incident to a lawful arrest, the Virginia court stated

that a defendant is “a recent occupant of a vehicle within the

limits of the Belton rule” when he is arrested “in close

proximity to the vehicle immediately after the [defendant] exits

the automobile.” Glasco, 513 S.E.2d at 142. While concepts

such a “close proximity” and “immediately after” are of course

subject to factual analysis, they directly correspond to the

rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception, which

18
is designed to protect officer safety and preserve evidence. At

the same time, the Glasco test is faithful to the general

notions that the Fourth Amendment disfavors warrantless searches

and that any exceptions to that general rule are narrowly

limited in light of their underlying justifications.

¶31 In determining whether a search was “substantially

contemporaneous” with an arrest of a recent occupant of a

vehicle, the courts have reached a wide variety of results under

a broad array of factual circumstances. Compare, e.g., United

States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1504-07 (7th Cir. 1989)

(upholding a search of a defendant’s car as incident to an

arrest made of the defendant after he walked nine blocks away

from the vehicle), with United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782,

787-88 (9th Cir. 1987) (invalidating a search of a vehicle

occurring thirty to forty-five minutes after the defendant’s

arrest); see also United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159

(6th Cir. 1993) (holding that an arrestee was not a “recent

occupant” of a vehicle when arrested thirty feet from the

vehicle); People v. Saverda, 907 P.2d 596, 599 (Col. 1995)

(holding an arrestee to be a “recent occupant,” despite a five-

minute lapse in time between the arrestee exiting the vehicle

and the subsequent search); Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411,

414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that defendant who had

parked truck and was sitting inside a restaurant when confronted

19
by police was not a “recent occupant” of a truck); State v.

Vanderhorst, 419 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

(finding defendant no longer a recent occupant where he had left

his car, walked three miles home, requested a ride back to the

car, and was attempting to rescue the car when police arrived).

But we have been able to discover no case, and the State has

cited none, in which a search of the passenger compartment of a

vehicle was upheld under Belton when the driver was arrested as

long after he left the vehicle and as far from vehicle as was

the defendant here.

¶32 Under any reasoned analysis, Dean simply was not a

“recent occupant” of the Jeep for Belton purposes when he was

arrested. He had not occupied the vehicle for some two and one-

half hours, and his arrest occurred not in close proximity to

the car, but instead inside the house. Under the circumstances

of this case, neither of the justifications for a warrantless

search of the vehicle — protection of the arresting officers and

preservation of evidence — is present.

¶33 While the bright-line rule announced in Belton

relieves the police of demonstrating that a particular portion

of the passenger compartment is within the “immediate control”

of an arrestee, it does not purport to dispense with all such

analysis as to whether the police may search the vehicle at all.

Here, given the physical distance of the arrestee from the

20
vehicle at the time of arrest and the long lapse of time between

the arrest and Dean’s exit from the vehicle, the search simply

cannot be characterized as “incident” to the arrest and excepted

from the general requirement that a warrant be obtained.

¶34 We therefore hold that when, as here, the arrest

occurs long after the defendant had left the vehicle and far

from the vehicle, the warrant requirement of the Fourth

Amendment applies. Because, as Chimel and Belton teach, the

Constitution requires a warrant except under those exigencies

that allow otherwise, the issue is not whether the defendant has

“evaded” a search by departing the vehicle, but rather whether

the totality of the facts still presents the kind of situation

that justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement.4 In this

case, the facts do not support such a result.

IV.

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

warrantless search of Dean’s Jeep cannot be justified as a

4
Whether the defendant “fled” the vehicle is no more
relevant to the Belton analysis than a defendant’s flight from a
home would be relevant to the determination of whether a search
of that home after the defendant was arrested miles away was
incident to that arrest. Indeed, by its very nature, flight
from the vehicle tends to minimize the dual concerns that
underlie the search incident to arrest exception — police safety
and protection of evidence. Flight may, of course, be relevant
to establish other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement, such as whether the defendant has abandoned the
vehicle, whether an administrative inventory of the vehicle is
necessary, or whether sufficient probable cause exists to
justify a warrantless search under the automobile exception.

21
search incident to arrest. Accordingly, we vacate the opinion

of the court of appeals and reinstate the order of the superior

court suppressing the evidence seized in this search. This case

is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

_
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

______
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

_
Rebecca White Berch, Justice

_
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

22