State v. Trotter

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JERMAIN DESHAWN TROTTER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0240
FILED 03-26-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR201801799
The Honorable Derek Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Attorney at Law, Chandler
By Janelle A. McEachern
Counsel for Appellant

Jermain Deshawn Trotter, San Luis
Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Jermain Deshawn Trotter appeals the superior court’s
revocation of his probation and the resulting prison sentence. Trotter’s
counsel filed a brief per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v.
Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the
record, she found no arguable question of law that was not frivolous.
Counsel asks this court to search the record for fundamental error. Trotter
filed a supplemental brief and raised these issues: the witness testimony
was false and unreliable hearsay, the superior court improperly revoked his
probation solely based on restitution money owed, and he did not receive
a complete case record. After reviewing the record for arguable issues, we
affirm the revocation of Trotter’s probation and the prison sentence. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1988); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537,
¶ 30 (App. 1999).

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2021, Trotter pled guilty to forgery, a class 4 felony. The
superior court suspended imposing a sentence and placed Trotter on four
years of probation. Trotter requested that his probation supervision be
transferred to Georgia. Georgia accepted supervision. Terra Sears, a
probation officer in Mohave County, administratively oversaw Trotter’s
out-of-state probation.

¶3 In February 2023, Trotter was arrested in Las Vegas for
domestic battery, obtaining or using another person’s identification, and
obtaining or using a debit or credit card without the cardholder’s consent.
The next month, Sears petitioned to revoke Trotter’s probation. Sears
alleged that Trotter violated his probation by failing to 1) maintain a

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
superior court’s findings. State v. Vaughn, 217 Ariz. 518, 519, ¶ 3, n.2 (App.
2008).

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“crime-free lifestyle” based on a 2022 theft conviction and the February
2023 arrest; 2) report law enforcement contact within 72 hours; 3) report to
the probation department after sentencing and release from custody;
4) report his change in residence; 5) pay all restitution, fines, and fees; and
6) leaving Georgia without permission.

¶4 The superior court held a contested probation violation
hearing. The State presented several exhibits at the hearing, including
Trotter’s signed acceptance of his probation terms, the interstate compact
directive, past due notices for court-ordered financial obligations, and a Las
Vegas police report from the February 2023 arrest. Sears testified that she
spoke to Trotter’s probation officers in Georgia to determine Trotter’s
situation and whether he had permission to leave the state. She stated that
neither she nor the Georgia probation department permitted Trotter to
leave Georgia.

¶5 Sears also testified that Trotter failed to report his contact with
law enforcement twice. First, Trotter had law enforcement contact in Las
Vegas in May 2022. Although Trotter needed to report this contact as a
condition of his probation, Sears only learned of the interaction after
running a criminal history check in March 2023. Second, Trotter was
arrested in Las Vegas in February 2023. Trotter did not report the arrest,
and Sears learned about it when a victim called her. Sears testified that she
spoke with the Georgia probation department, which was also unaware of
Trotter’s February 2023 arrest. Sears explained that although the Las Vegas
police report named “Jermain Jackson” as the arrestee, the name was
Trotter’s alias, and the booking photo matched Trotter.

¶6 Trotter denied signing the document that showed that he had
accepted the terms of his probation. Next, he claimed he reported all law
enforcement contact to the Georgia Probation Department. Finally, Trotter
gave conflicting testimony about whether he had permission to leave
Georgia. He first claimed he was allowed to leave the state but later denied
having permission to leave, and finally claimed he did have permission.
The superior court stated Trotter’s testimony was “inconsistent
and . . . self-serving” and found Trotter’s testimony not credible.

¶7 The superior court found that Trotter violated his probation
by failing to report law-enforcement contact, changing his residence
without approval, leaving Georgia without permission, and failing to pay
restitution and other fines and fees. The superior court revoked Trotter’s
probation and sentenced him to prison for two and a half years. He received
79 days of presentence incarceration credit. Trotter appealed.

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DISCUSSION

¶8 We have read and considered counsel’s brief and have
reviewed the record for arguable issues. See Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30. We
find none. Trotter was present and represented by counsel at all stages of
the proceedings against him. See State v. Jackson, 16 Ariz. App. 476, 478
(1972). The record reflects the superior court afforded Trotter all his
constitutional and statutory rights and conducted the proceedings
according to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The superior court
held appropriate hearings, and the evidence presented at the probation
revocation hearing and summarized above was sufficient to support the
superior court’s findings. And Trotter was allowed to speak before
disposition. Trotter’s presumptive sentence falls within the range
prescribed by law. See A.R.S. § 13-2002(C); A.R.S. § 13-702(D). And the
superior court gave Trotter appropriate presentence incarceration credit.

¶9 We have also evaluated the arguments raised in Trotter’s
supplemental brief. We address each issue in turn.

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Admitting Sears’s Testimony.

¶10 Trotter argues that Sears gave false and unreliable testimony
at his contested probation violation hearing. Trotter further argues that
because Sears’s testimony was “not based on first hand oversight
knowledge” and because his “direct supervisory probation officer” from
Georgia did not testify, the superior court relied impermissibly on Sears’s
“second hand hearsay.”

¶11 During probation violation hearings, “[t]he court may receive
any reliable evidence not legally privileged, including hearsay[.]” Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3); see also State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 82 (1985). Hearsay
testimony is admissible in probation violation hearings when the testimony
is trustworthy. See Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82; see also State v. Brown, 23 Ariz. App.
225, 231 (App. 1975) (Reliable evidence is what is trustworthy.). Generally,
communications between probation departments are sufficiently reliable to
justify probation revocation. See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 116 Ariz. 61, 63
(1977), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 562 (1989);
State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232, 234 (1975) (“Unchallenged information
presented by a county probation officer concerning communications and
records within the probation department would normally be considered
reliable information.”). Here, Sears testified that she communicated with
the Georgia probation officers, who told her Trotter did not have

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permission to leave the state. The superior court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting Sears’s testimony.

¶12 Trotter also disputes Sears’s testimony about law
enforcement contact in Las Vegas and challenges the admission of the
police report. He highlights that the Las Vegas police report names
“Jermaine Jackson” instead of “Jermain Trotter.” But Sears testified that
“Jermain Jackson” is Trotter’s alias, and the arrest booking photo matched
Trotter as he appeared at the hearing. The superior court found that Trotter
“admitted the person in the police report is him despite the fact the name is
Jermain Jackson.” The superior court noted that although the police report
is hearsay, it is “reliable hearsay.” The superior court has reasonable
discretion to determine whether the evidence is reliable. State v. Snider, 172
Ariz. 163, 164 (App. 1992). We will not disturb the superior court’s decision
to admit the evidence and Sears’s testimony. See Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Revoke Trotter’s Probation Just
Because He Failed to Pay Restitution.

¶13 Trotter alleges that the superior court only revoked his
probation because he failed to make restitution payments. He also claims
that Sears’s “only reason for testifying for the state . . . hinges solely on
restitution monies owed.” The court did not revoke Trotter’s probation just
because he owed restitution. The superior court found that Trotter violated
several other probation conditions along with his failure to pay. During
sentencing, the superior court noted that if Trotter’s lack of payment were
his only violation, he would not be sentenced to prison. We find no error.

C. We Decline to Review Trotter’s Claim that His Counsel Failed to
Provide Him with a Complete Record.

¶14 Trotter alleges that his counsel failed to provide him with a
complete record of the probation revocation hearing. The record shows
Trotter’s counsel sent him all the documents from his file, including
transcripts. Nevertheless, whether Trotter’s counsel provided him with the
complete record for his appellate review is not an appropriate claim for
appeal. If Trotter wishes, he may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, which he must do in a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v.
Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002).

CONCLUSION

¶15 The revocation of Trotter’s probation and his resulting prison
sentence are affirmed. After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s

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obligations pertaining to Trotter’s representation in this appeal will end
after informing Trotter of the outcome of this appeal and his future options,
unless counsel’s review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the
Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140
Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984).

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: TM

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