State v. Spreitz

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Supreme Court
) No. CR-00-0569-PC
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
v. ) Pima County
) Superior Court
CHRISTOPHER JOHN SPREITZ, ) No. CR-27745
)
Defendant-Petitioner. )
_________________________________) O P I N I O N

Appeal from the Superior Court of Pima County

Honorable Paul S. Banales, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

__________________________________________________________________

Janet Napolitano, Attorney General Phoenix
by Kent Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section,
Criminal Appeals Division
and
Jon G. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee

Bruner & Upham, P.C. Tucson
by Sean Bruner
Attorneys for Appellant

__________________________________________________________________

J O N E S, Chief Justice

Facts and Procedural History

¶1 Christopher John Spreitz (defendant) was convicted of the

first degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping of Ruby Reid.

He was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive

fourteen-year prison terms for the other crimes. Those convictions

and sentences were upheld by this court on direct appeal in State v.

Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 945 P.2d 1260 (1997). The facts of the case

were stated in our earlier opinion and need not be repeated here.

¶2 In the direct appeal, the defendant raised a single claim

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That claim was based on

trial counsel having admitted Spreitz’ responsibility for the death

of the victim in his opening statement, but arguing that legally the

defendant was guilty only of lesser offenses. This court found that

claim to be without merit. Spreitz at 146-47, 945 P.2d at 1277-78.

¶3 Spreitz also claimed several additional instances of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his subsequent petition

for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Because the single claim was raised and

addressed in the direct appeal, the trial court held that Spreitz

had waived any further claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel under Rule 32(a)(3). However, because Spreitz also alleged

that his appellate counsel was ineffective, the trial court

alternatively considered the ineffective assistance of trial counsel

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claims on the merits. The trial court ultimately concluded that no

colorable claims had been raised and denied relief. We granted

review on the question whether by raising one claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in the direct appeal, all later

ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims are precluded. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031 and Rule 32.9, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.

Analysis

¶4 Rule 32.2 precludes relief when: (1) an issue can be

raised on direct appeal or on post-trial motion; (2) an issue has

been finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding; or (3) an issue was waived at trial, on

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. Our basic rule is

that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or

could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief

proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be

deemed waived and precluded. See State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97,

100, 786 P.2d 948, 951 (1990).

¶5 In analyzing the preclusive effect, if any, of Rule 32 for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in an appeal, we

briefly review our recent cases in this area. In 1989, this court

recommended that ineffectiveness claims be raised in Rule 32

proceedings and consolidated with the direct appeal. State v.

Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 15, 770 P.2d 313, 319 (1989); see also State v.

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Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 599, 832 P.2d 593, 616 (1992)

(ineffectiveness claims should be brought in Rule 32 proceedings).

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 32

petition where a colorable claim is presented. State v.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 63, 859 P.2d 169, 173 (1993); State v.

Shurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 57-59, 859 P.2d 156, 167-69 (1993). The trial

court is the most appropriate forum for such evidentiary hearings.

¶6 However, we later determined to stop delaying the direct

appeal for the resolution of Rule 32 proceedings in the trial court

below when that procedure became unworkable. Krone v. Hotham, 181

Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1995). We repeated our

statement that Rule 32 set forth the proper procedure for resolving

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and reminded

practitioners that the normal rules of preclusion would apply to

subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. Under rules

implemented in 1992, the clerk of the supreme court automatically

files a notice of post-conviction relief when the capital conviction

and sentence are affirmed. Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. When an earlier petition has been filed, the petition

filed pursuant to the automatic notice will be a second and

subsequent petition.

¶7 Despite these repeated requests to resolve ineffectiveness

claims through the Rule 32 process, practitioners have continued to

raise them in direct appeals, as in the present case. The effect of

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doing so has been problematic, not always yielding consistent

results. At one time, a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel

claim raised in a Rule 32 petition which had been consolidated with

the direct appeal was remanded to the trial court for a full factual

determination with no discussion of preclusion or waiver. State v.

Watson, 114 Ariz. 1, 15-16, 559 P.2d 121, 135-36 (1979). This

occurred despite the fact that other ineffective assistance of

counsel claims had been raised and otherwise considered in the

direct appeal.

¶8 Later, we differentiated between trial ineffectiveness

claims and sentencing ineffectiveness claims. State v. Carriger,

132 Ariz. 301, 645 P.2d 816 (1982) (where trial ineffectiveness

claims were raised and addressed in the direct appeal, subsequent

sentencing ineffectiveness claims were neither waived nor

precluded). A subsequent trial ineffectiveness claim was precluded,

however, where similar claims had been previously raised and

adjudicated on the merits in the direct appeal, and a full

examination of the record did not reveal inadequate efforts by trial

counsel. State v. Raymond Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755

(1984). Moreover, this court has indicated that it would only

consider meritless claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on

appeal. Spreitz at 146, 945 P.2d at 1277; State v. Maturana, 180

Ariz. 126, 133, 882 P.2d 933, 940 (1994). Admittedly, Rule 32

waters have become murky.

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¶9 We endeavor today to clarify this issue for trial courts

and practitioners. Accordingly, we reiterate that ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32

proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct

appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by appellate courts

regardless of merit. There will be no preclusive effect under Rule

32 by the mere raising of such issues. The appellate court simply

will not address them. This ensures criminal defendants a timely

and orderly opportunity to litigate ineffectiveness claims and, we

believe, promotes judicial economy by disallowing piecemeal

litigation.

Conclusion

¶10 To the extent that the trial court in this case ruled

otherwise, we reverse that part of its ruling. The trial court

alternatively addressed the merits of the ineffectiveness claims,

and we affirm those findings. There was no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s determination of the substantive issues.

¶11 We modify and clarify State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. at 454,

690 P.2d at 755, State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. at 301, 645 P.2d at

816, and State v. Watson, 114 Ariz. at 1, 559 P.2d at 121, to the

extent the holdings of those cases differ from the rule announced

here. We disapprove of State v. Scrivner, 132 Ariz. 52, 643 P.2d

1022 (App. 1982), where it is inconsistent.

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¶12 We reverse the trial court’s determination that the

subsequent ineffectiveness claims were waived. We affirm the

substantive findings on those claims.

_________________________________
Charles E. Jones
Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

____________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

____________________________________
Stanley G. Feldman, Justice

____________________________________
Thomas A. Zlaket, Justice

____________________________________
Frederick J. Martone, Justice

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