State v. Knisley

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

NATHAN WILLIAM KNISLEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0338
FILED 06-13-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-115027-002
The Honorable Monica S. Garfinkel, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Celeste Kinney
Alexander Clausen (certified limited practice student)
Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, Glendale
By Sheri M. Lauritano
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Nathan Knisley appeals from his convictions for burglary in
the second degree, fraudulent schemes and artifices, and forgery. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2019, Lisa (a pseudonym) listed her home for sale in
Fountain Hills with a realtor for around $829,000. Lisa did not live in the
home while it was for sale and previously rented the home for around
$3,500 a month. A sign on the street stated the home was for sale.

¶3 On April 10, 2020, Lisa drove to the home to check on it, but
her garage opener would not open the garage door. Lisa then tried to open
the door with her key, which failed to work. Lisa also discovered the
security shutters on her windows were closed, even though she had
previously left them open.

¶4 Before Lisa investigated further, the garage door opened and
co-defendant Julia Carmen Soto-Tatro (who is not a party to this appeal)
walked out of the house. Lisa asked what Soto-Tatro was doing in her
house, and Soto-Tatro presented a lease, purportedly with Lisa’s signature,
claiming she moved into the house. The signature on the lease was
handwritten. Lisa told Soto-Tatro “that is not my signature. . . . This house
is for sale,” and told her husband to call the sheriff.

¶5 When police arrived, Knisley gave conflicting accounts about
the property. Knisley first said he found the property via VRBO, but he later
claimed to have seen a rental listing on Craigslist. At another point, Knisley
claimed his cousin found the house for him. When asked to identify his
cousin, Knisley struggled to remember his name, stating “I believe,
Thomas.” Knisley also took a significant amount of time to punch in his
purported cousin’s phone number, and police were unable to contact the
cousin. Knisley claimed the rent was $950 for a 30-day lease-term. He also
claimed he paid by money order, which he inconsistently claimed either he

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or the cousin obtained. Knisley claimed he obtained the money order from
a Fry’s in Mesa but could neither identify the particular Fry’s nor produce
a receipt for the order. When asked how he entered the home, Knisley
claimed a garage opener was left out front. At trial, Lisa testified she never
left a garage opener out front.

¶6 While searching the house, police discovered the realtor lock
box on the front of the door was missing and a handwritten sign on the
front door stating “Quarentining [sic] 30 days || please do not disturb.”
Police also found bolt-cutters and a printer in the bedroom that did not
belong to Lisa, a portable electricity-power box from SRP, and an
instruction manual for filling out a residential lease in Knisley and Soto-
Tatro’s car.

¶7 At the conclusion of evidence at his trial, Knisley moved for a
judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”)
20(a), which the court denied. The jury convicted Knisley on all counts.
Knisley appealed, and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-
4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Knisely argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient
evidence and that the court erred by denying his Rule 20(a) motion. When
a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the
conviction if there is “substantial evidence” to support the guilty verdict.
State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). Likewise, we review the denial of
a Rule 20(a) motion for acquittal for “whether the record contains
substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559,
562, ¶ 14 (2011) (cleaned up). “Substantial evidence is such proof that
reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 25, ¶ 14 (2010) (cleaned up). We do not reweigh the
evidence to decide if we would reach the same conclusion as the trier of
fact. State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361 (App. 1994). Rather, “[a]ll evidence
will be viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the conviction,” and
we resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. Guerra, 161 Ariz.
at 293.

¶9 A person commits burglary in the second degree by “entering
or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential structure with the intent to
commit any theft or any felony therein.” A.R.S. § 13-1507(A). A person is
guilty of fraudulent schemes and artifices who, “pursuant to a scheme or

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artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses [or] representations.” A.R.S. § 13-2310(A). And a
person is guilty of forgery “if, with intent to defraud, the person: [f]alsely
makes, completes or alters a written instrument; or [k]nowingly possesses
a forged instrument.” A.R.S. § 13-2002(A)(1)–(2).

¶10 Knisley argues the State failed to prove he intended to commit
a theft or felony in Lisa’s home because “[n]o evidence was presented that
the Appellant knew that the lease was false and that he and his girlfriend
should not have been in the house.” Instead, Knisley argues the plan to stay
in the property and forge a lease was entirely the idea of Soto-Tatro. Knisley
next argues the State did not present evidence that he obtained a benefit as
required to establish fraudulent schemes. And Knisley argues only Soto-
Tatro possessed and presented the lease with intent to defraud, which
defeats the forgery charge.

¶11 The evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to
support the convictions. Lisa, the homeowner, testified the home was for
sale and not for rent, and Knisley had no right to be in her home. Lisa and
police further testified that a sign in front of the house stated the home was
for sale, she never left a garage opener outside which became disabled, the
realtor lock box was missing, and the windows’ security shutters were
closed. The responding police officer testified Knisley could not produce a
rental listing, struggled to remember his cousin’s name, and could not
identify the Fry’s he purportedly obtained the money order from.

¶12 Knisley made conflicting statements regarding his
involvement in finding and entering the home and paying rent. Based on
this evidence the jury could find Knisley knew both that he lacked a right
to be in the home and that the lease was false. See State v. Bustamante, 229
Ariz. 256, 258, ¶ 6 (App. 2012) (circumstantial evidence may support a
conviction); State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 287, ¶ 8 (App. 2003) (“An intent
to defraud may be, and often is, deduced from circumstantial evidence.”).
And when Knisley signed the lease, he exercised physical control and
thereby possession of the lease. A.R.S. § 13-105(34) (“’Possess’ means
knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion
or control over property.”). Finally, the jury could find Knisley obtained a
benefit by living in a nearly million dollar home rent-free and that signing
a false lease was in furtherance of that benefit. See State v. Watson, 248 Ariz.
208, 213, ¶ 13 (App. 2020) (the crime of fraudulent schemes encompasses a
wide range of activities). Sufficient evidence supported each of Knisley’s
convictions.

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CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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