State v. Finch

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHASE MCKENNA FINCH, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0479
FILED 08-08-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202300169
The Honorable Richard D. Lambert, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Ashley Torkelson Levine
Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
 STATE v. FINCH
Decision of the Court

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Chase McKenna Finch appeals her convictions and sentences
for two counts of aggravated assault. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Because Finch challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
against her, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining her
convictions. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989).

¶3 On February 9, 2023, Lake Havasu City police officers
arrested Finch for an unrelated crime and one of the arresting officers
("Officer 1") transported her to the Lake Havasu City Jail. While a detention
officer ("Officer 2") booked Finch into jail, she became "verbally combative,"
yelled at the officers, and refused to remove her jewelry. Officer 1 and
Officer 2 then took Finch by her arms and moved her toward a jail cell.
Finch flailed and swung her arms and "grabbed ahold" of Officer 2's
shoulders. The officers unsuccessfully "pull[ed] and tugg[ed] at [Finch's]
hand to get her away," and Officer 1 struck Finch in the face. Eventually,
the officers pried Finch's "hand loose" from Officer 2's shoulder and closed
the cell door. During the incident, Finch also struck Officer 2 "superficial[y]
across [her] chest."

¶4 After the incident, Officer 2 found human blood on her
uniform, while Officer 1 had a "raised welt on the outside of [her] left
forearm" due to the incident.

¶5 The State charged Finch with three counts of aggravated
assault. Count 1 and Count 2 were brought pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-1204(A)(8), and Count 3 was brought pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 13-1204(A)(10). At trial, Officer 1, Officer 2, another police officer present
at the initial arrest, and Finch testified. The jury also viewed body camera
footage of the incident. After the State rested, Finch sought a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 20(a)(1)
on all counts. The court denied the Rule 20 motion on all counts, concluding
that "the state [] provided substantial evidence to support a conviction."
The jury acquitted Finch on Count 1 and convicted her on Counts 2 and 3.
The court sentenced her to one year of intensive probation with 247 days'
time served. Finch timely appealed the convictions, and we have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

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Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶6 Finch argues her convictions "were in error because they were
not supported by substantial evidence." Specifically, she contends neither
officer sustained a serious injury during the incident and there is no direct
evidence that Finch contacted Officer 1. The State argues that Finch did not
have to injure the officers to be convicted of aggravated assault but only
had to "knowingly touch[] the officers with the intent to injure or provoke
them" and sufficient evidence was presented to affirm the convictions.

¶7 Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law we review de
novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). In considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view all facts in favor of the verdict and
resolve all evidentiary conflicts against the defendant. State v. Pena, 235
Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla
and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 134, ¶ 65 (2006) (cleaned up). If
reasonable people "could differ as to whether the evidence establishes a fact
in issue, that evidence is substantial." State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432
(1984). Further, in conducting our review, we compare the evidence
"against the statutorily required elements of the offense," State v. Brock, 248
Ariz. 583, 592, ¶ 22 (App. 2020) (quoting State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 8
(App. 2005)), and do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would
reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact," State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563,
568 (App. 1990). Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial.
Pena, 209 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 7.

¶8 As relevant here, a person commits aggravated assault by
assaulting another (1) "knowing or having reason to know that the victim"
is a peace officer, or (2) while in custody and "knowing or having reason to
know that the victim is acting in an official capacity as an employee" of a
detention facility of a city or county. A.R.S. § 13-1204 (A)(8), (10). A person
commits assault by "[k]nowingly touching another person with the intent
to injure, insult or provoke such person." A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(3).

¶9 Finch does not contend that she lacked the requisite
knowledge that Officer 1 was a police officer and Officer 2 was a detention
officer or that both acted in their official capacity during the incident.

¶10 As to the assault element, Finch contends that there were no
physical injuries to the officers "other than [a] bump or bruise," and that
there is "no evidence that Ms. Finch directly struck or pushed one of the

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Decision of the Court

officers." This argument is unpersuasive. "Assault under § 13–1203(A)(3)
does not require a resulting injury to the victim." In re P.D., 216 Ariz. 336,
338, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). Instead, assault only requires that Finch touch the
officers "with the intent to injure, insult or provoke" them. A.R.S.
§ 13-1203(A)(3). Whether the defendant had the requisite intent is a jury
determination and "may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances
disclosed by the evidence and need not be established by direct proof."
State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 108 (1975) (citation omitted).

¶11 At trial, Officer 2 testified that Finch began "swinging her
arms at us as if to strike us" and was "flai[ling] and swing[ing] and
grab[bing] for [them]" before grabbing "ahold of [her] shoulder bands."
Officer 2 also testified that she "most definitely" believed she was going to
be hurt during the incident and was "struck superficially across [her] chest."
Officer 1 testified that Finch "was flailing around" while they attempted to
place her into the cell and that she suffered a "raised welt" on her forearm
during the incident. Finch testified that she refused to go into the cell until
the officers gave her "a reason for being" there and admitted to "screaming"
at the officers and "flailing around." She also testified that she believed the
body camera footage was "tampered-with" and she never grabbed ahold of
Officer 2 or struck either officer. But the jury viewed the body camera
footage from Officer 1 and could readily disbelieve Finch's testimony that
the footage was tampered with. See State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293, 300, ¶ 21
(App. 2009) (deferring to the jury's assessment of a defendant's credibility
and the weight to be given to the defendant's testimony). And in rejecting
Finch's account, the jury "could consider [her] false denials as evidence of
guilt." State v. Crain, 250 Ariz. 387, 400, ¶ 53 (App. 2021).

¶12 On this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Finch
touched Officer 2 with the intent to injure, insult, or provoke when Finch
grabbed "ahold of [Officer 2's] shoulder bands" while "flailing" her arms
and "yelling" about the arrest. See State v. Lester, 11 Ariz. App. 408, 410
(1970) ("Intent may be inferred from the acts of the accused and the
circumstances of the assault."). As for the assault on Officer 1, based upon
the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Finch
caused Officer 1's welt and did so with the intent to injure, insult, or
provoke the officer. See State v. Williams, 13 Ariz. App. 201, 202 (1970) ("To
constitute an assault, it is not necessary that any actual injury be inflicted,
but if an injury is inflicted, it may be considered in connection with other
evidence in determining whether an assault was committed.").

¶13 Alternatively, based upon the video evidence and testimony,
the jury could have also reasonably concluded that Finch either directly

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contacted Officer 1 or set in motion another person or object to contact
Officer 1 with the intent to injure, provoke, or insult. See State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316 (1987) (noting that we will uphold a verdict unless it
"clearly appear[s] that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury"); In re Jeremiah T.,
212 Ariz. 30, 33, ¶ 6 (App. 2006) (noting that touching "does not require
direct, person-to-person physical contact" and that it "is sufficient if the
defendant sets in motion a force or process that produces some sort of
contact with the victim"). Thus, Finch has failed to show that her
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm Finch's convictions and sentence.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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