State v. Ahrens

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

TODD ERVIN AHRENS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0161
FILED 03-11-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. CR 2020-00678
The Honorable Joshua Steinlage, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Jana Zinman
Counsel for Appellee

Coconino County Legal Defender’s Office, Flagstaff
By Joseph Adam Carver
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Todd Ervin Ahrens appeals his conviction and sentence for
transportation of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine) for sale. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the jury’s verdict. See State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1
(App. 2019).

¶3 In May 2017, Cynthia Sosa was driving in Coconino County
with Ahrens as her passenger when her car broke down. She pulled over
and Ahrens tried to repair the car. Arizona Department of Public Safety
(“DPS”) Detective Nathan Solomon saw the car on the side of the road with
its hood up and stopped to help. Ahrens was working under the hood and
when he saw Detective Solomon he appeared “startle[d],” his “eyes got
wide, and then he dipped back behind the car out of sight.” Sosa was sitting
in the driver’s seat, “seemed anxious,” “was trembling,” and “breathing
rapidly.”

¶4 As they spoke, Detective Solomon smelled “a significant odor
of marijuana” coming from inside the car and called for backup; possession
of marijuana without a medical marijuana card was illegal at the time.

¶5 DPS Trooper Curtis Kuhn arrived and searched the car with
Detective Solomon. During the search of the car, Ahrens backed away and
walked up an embankment, almost tripping over a log. Detective Solomon
later found a “tooter” or drug “dosing cup” in the area where Ahrens had
been. In the car, the officers discovered an unusable amount of marijuana
residue in the ashtray. They found two Tupperware-style containers
containing two pounds of methamphetamine in Sosa’s bag. They also
found drug paraphernalia associated with methamphetamine use among
Ahrens’ belongings. The officers arrested Sosa and Ahrens and Sergeant
Henry Thomason interviewed them.

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¶6 Ahrens said that he traveled with Sosa from New Mexico to
Arizona with the expectation that he “would drive if she got tired,” but he
did not end up driving because “she did all right.” He initially denied that
he and Sosa visited Phoenix on that trip, but later admitted that he and Sosa
traveled to Phoenix where they met “some young girls” whom they
followed to an apartment complex; Sosa got out of the car and stepped
away with them before returning to the car. Ahrens said that he “didn’t
want to get up in their business,” he “kinda” knew what was going on
during that trip, but “just kinda stayed out of it,” and did not “want to say
things that might get her in trouble.”

¶7 Ahrens also said he traveled with Sosa to Arizona two other
times in recent years. Both trips involved Sosa meeting someone in
Phoenix, and giving Ahrens a cut of the methamphetamine she “brings up”
once they returned to New Mexico. He also admitted that he had seen
methamphetamine in the Tupperware container on those trips and did not
receive anything until they returned to New Mexico.

¶8 A grand jury indicted Sosa and Ahrens on one count of
transportation of dangerous drugs for sale. Sosa pled guilty to attempted
transportation and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Ahrens
proceeded to trial.

¶9 Following the close of the State’s evidence, which included
testimony from Detective Solomon, Trooper Kuhns, and Sergeant
Thomason, Ahrens moved for a Rule 20 judgment of acquittal and argued
that there was no substantial evidence that he acted “other than as a mere
presence on the trip.” The court denied the motion, reasoning that
substantial evidence supported the charge.

¶10 Ahrens called Sosa as a witness at his trial. Sosa testified that
she and Ahrens drove from New Mexico to Phoenix to pick up a package
of methamphetamine. She invited Ahrens on the trip for company, but
Ahrens was not involved with arranging the trip or the methamphetamine
pickup. Sosa testified that she told Ahrens that the purpose of the trip was
to buy a permit for manzanita wood, which she bought in Payson.
Although Sosa never expressly told Ahrens she was picking up
methamphetamine in Phoenix, she testified that he knew what she was up
to. The morning after their arrival in Arizona, Sosa and Ahrens drove to an
apartment in Phoenix, where she picked up the methamphetamine. Sosa
was driving them back to New Mexico when her car broke down.

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¶11 A jury convicted Ahrens of transportation of dangerous drugs
for sale. Ahrens filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, as relevant here,
that the verdict was contrary to the weight of evidence. Although the
superior court noted that Sosa was “clearly the more culpable party” and
the “primary player in the illegal activity,” it denied Ahrens’ motion and
found the evidence was “sufficient to find [Ahrens] guilty as [Sosa’s]
accomplice.” The court sentenced Ahrens to a five-year mitigated flat time
sentence and awarded him 29 days of presentence incarceration credit.

¶12 The superior court permitted Ahrens to file a delayed appeal.
We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Ahrens contends that insufficient evidence supported his
conviction for transportation of dangerous drugs for sale because the State
did not establish that he intentionally acted as an accomplice. He also
argues the superior court violated his right to present a complete defense
by not granting Sosa immunity to testify about their prior trips to Arizona.
He asks us to reverse his conviction or remand for a new trial.

I. Sufficient evidence supported Ahrens’ conviction.

¶14 Ahrens argues that because the State presented insufficient
evidence to prove that he intentionally facilitated Sosa’s crime, the superior
court erred by not granting his Rule 20 motion and motion for new trial on
that ground. The State responds that a jury could conclude from the
evidence that Ahrens intentionally acted as Sosa’s accomplice to transport
dangerous drugs for sale.

¶15 We review the superior court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion and
whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction de novo and will affirm
“unless no substantial evidence supports the conviction.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 39 (App. 2007); State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶¶ 15-16
(2011). Substantial evidence is that which “reasonable persons could accept
as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teagle,
217 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 40 (citation omitted). The evidence may be direct or
circumstantial. State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 7 (App. 2005).

¶16 A person is guilty of transportation of dangerous drugs for
sale if he (1) knowingly transported dangerous drugs for sale, and (2) the
substance was in fact a dangerous drug (i.e., methamphetamine as

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undisputed here).1 A.R.S. §§ 13-3407(A)(7), -3401(6)(c)(xxxviii). As relevant
here, a person can be guilty as an accomplice if, “with the intent to promote
or facilitate the commission of an offense[,]” he “[a]ids, counsels, agrees to
aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing an
offense,” or “[p]rovides means or opportunity to another person to commit
the offense.” A.R.S. § 13-301(2)-(3).

¶17 To convict Ahrens of transportation of dangerous drugs for
sale, either as a principal or an accomplice, the State was required to prove
Ahrens had “actual physical possession or constructive possession with
actual knowledge” that a dangerous drug was present. See Teagle, 217 Ariz.
at 27, ¶ 41 (citation omitted); State v. Rice, 1 CA-CR 22-0498, 2023 WL
5621896, at *4, ¶¶ 22-23 (Ariz. App. Aug. 31, 2023) (mem. decision); State v.
Gonzalez, 1 CA-CR 11-0494, 2012 WL 3129136, at *2, ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Aug. 2,
2012) (mem. decision) (discussing accomplice liability under Section 13-
3407(A)(7)). Possession can be actual or constructive. State v. Barreras, 112
Ariz. 421, 423 (1975). “Constructive possession can be established by
showing that the accused exercised dominion and control over the drug
itself, or the location in which the substance was found.” Teagle, 217 Ariz.
at 27, ¶ 41. A jury could therefore determine that Ahrens had constructive
possession of the substance if the evidence showed that he could control the
substance. See State v. Nadler, 129 Ariz. 19, 22 (App. 1981). The superior
court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of transportation of
dangerous drugs for sale and accomplice liability.

¶18 Although Sosa testified that she did not tell Ahrens what was
inside the bag, and Ahrens did not see her carry the bag into the car, Ahrens
had access to the bag’s contents during the drive. Sosa also testified that
Ahrens sampled the methamphetamine during the trip, and she gave him
permission to access her bag, which was later found to contain two pounds
of methamphetamine. A reasonable juror could therefore find that Ahrens
had constructive possession over the methamphetamine.

¶19 In addition to proving Ahrens had constructive possession
over the methamphetamine, the State must show Ahrens had knowledge
of the methamphetamine’s presence. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 41. Knowing
participation can exist even if a defendant lacks actual knowledge that the
methamphetamine exists but was “aware of the high probability” of that
fact and “deliberately shut his eyes to avoid learning the truth.” State v.

1 The court accepted the parties’ stipulation to admit DPS’ scientific reports

identifying the substances found in the car as methamphetamine into
evidence.

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Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 420 (1983); see State v. Fierro, 220 Ariz. 337, 339, ¶¶ 5-9
(App. 2008) (adding that requisite knowledge can exist if a defendant acts
with “a conscious purpose to avoid learning the true contents” of the
vehicle).

¶20 Here, Ahrens repeatedly told law enforcement and testified
that he tried staying out of Sosa’s business. That Ahrens “deliberately shut
his eyes,” however, does not refute his knowing participation. Haas, 138
Ariz. at 420. The evidence showed that Ahrens knew about Sosa’s illegal
activities. Sosa testified that she “imagine[d]” Ahrens knew the
methamphetamine was in the car. Ahrens had purchased
methamphetamine from Sosa before. He also received a “cut” of Sosa’s
supply, and admitted to seeing the end product in a Tupperware container
when they returned to New Mexico after prior Phoenix trips. Ahrens knew
Sosa needed to meet someone in Phoenix. He admits that Sosa “probably
did” pick up methamphetamine the last time they visited Arizona.
Although he denied receiving any money or drugs for the instant trip,
Ahrens said that Sosa gave him money for the casino.

¶21 On appeal, Ahrens admits it would be reasonable to infer that
he knowingly facilitated Sosa’s crime because he knew Sosa intended to
pick up methamphetamine in Phoenix. He nonetheless contends that he
merely had knowledge, not intent, and claims that his knowing facilitation
of Sosa’s activities does not provide a basis to infer he “intentionally
facilitated her crime.” The evidence, however, was sufficient for the jury to
find that Ahrens intended to further Sosa’s crime, and the jury could find
the elements met through accomplice liability. Sosa asked Ahrens to join
her on the trip to keep her company, which helped her accomplish the task
of transporting methamphetamine. He said he would have helped Sosa
drive if she got tired. A jury could find that this agreement, along with
Ahrens’ other actions, were that of an accomplice aiding, counseling, or
attempting to aid Sosa or providing the means and opportunity for Sosa to
commit the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-301(2).

¶22 Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict.

II. Ahrens failed to make a sufficient offer of proof and even if he
had, he has not shown his defense was prejudiced when the
superior court declined to grant Sosa immunity to testify.

¶23 Ahrens contends that the superior court’s decision not to
grant Sosa immunity to testify about her prior trips to Arizona prevented
him from presenting a complete defense because he was unable to fully

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confront the State’s evidence that he previously traveled to Arizona with
Sosa. The State responds that we cannot review the issue of Sosa’s
immunity because Ahrens failed to make a sufficient offer of proof about
Sosa’s proposed testimony and even if we can, Ahrens has failed to show
error.

¶24 “An offer of proof is simply a detailed description of what the
proposed evidence is.” State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 115 (1986). Ordinarily,
we cannot review the superior court’s ruling excluding testimony without
“an offer of proof showing that the excluded evidence would be admissible
and relevant.” Id. Ahrens did not make a sufficient offer of proof during
trial. His only request was to have the “full, unbridled ability to cross-
examine” Sosa about prior trips to Arizona because the court admitted his
own statements about the prior trips, stating that “we want to be able to
cross and eliminate it and eliminate the speculation that the jury might
have, and we think that we’re being bound inappropriately if we can’t get
there.” On appeal, Ahrens speculates that Sosa’s testimony would have
“concerned [his] knowledge and actions on those prior trips,” and Sosa
“could have . . . corroborated [his] statements about the trip.” But Ahrens
fails to demonstrate how Sosa’s testimony would have impacted the
outcome of his case, so “we cannot know what the proffered testimony
would have shown.” State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 329 (1993).

¶25 And even if Ahrens made a sufficient offer of proof at trial, he
has failed to demonstrate the court’s denial of immunity to Sosa deprived
him of the right to present a complete defense. Ahrens called Sosa as a
witness at trial. The court permitted Ahrens to treat her as a hostile witness
during her testimony. On the first day of Sosa’s testimony, Ahrens
questioned her about their trip to Arizona in the present case. The parties
and court then discussed the State’s request to grant Sosa immunity to
testify about prior trips she and Ahrens had taken to Arizona. The superior
court denied the request, based on its interpretation of Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), and informed Sosa that she
“cannot be required to testify as to anything surrounding any prior
incidents that might have occurred,” and could “assert [her] Fifth
Amendment right regarding those incidents.”

¶26 During direct examination of Sosa, she invoked her privilege
against self-incrimination when asked if she went to Phoenix to pick up
methamphetamine on two prior occasions, but when asked whether
Ahrens joined her on two prior trips, Sosa answered “I can’t remember.
Maybe one more, I guess.” She continued answering questions about the
two prior trips and said she would talk about Ahrens’ actions during the

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prior trips if she could remember. When asked if she could discuss Ahrens
going “into anyplace to get drugs” with her, Sosa said, “I could if I would,
but I don’t remember. It’s been so long ago.”

¶27 During cross-examination of Sosa, the State asked her several
questions about the trips she and Ahrens had taken to Arizona. She
responded that they only traveled to and from New Mexico to Arizona
together, that he helped her drive on those trips, and she paid for his way
on those trips. She said she could not recall whether Ahrens knew there
was methamphetamine in the car on May 4, 2017, prior to their contact with
law enforcement, but later responded she “imagine[d] he did” know. She
testified she paid Ahrens in methamphetamine after their prior trips to
Arizona.

¶28 The State contends that “[e]ven if Ahrens could somehow
demonstrate that Sosa would have testified that Ahrens did not have any
knowledge of her illegal activities when he accompanied her on previous
drug runs, this would not be clearly exculpatory evidence because it would
be possible for Ahrens to have been an innocent passenger in the past, but
an accomplice in the instant matter.” We agree.

¶29 Ahrens’ actions on the two prior trips were not material to the
offense at hand. Evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that
its disclosure would have altered the trial’s result. State ex rel. Romley v.
Super. Ct., 172 Ariz. 232, 238 (App. 1992). Here, Ahrens’ culpability did not
depend on his actions on prior trips; he had sufficient knowledge and
constructive possession on the current trip to find him guilty of the crime.
See supra ¶¶ 16-21. Further, even assuming the court erred in refusing to
grant Sosa immunity, Ahrens has failed to show how not giving Sosa
immunity deprived him from presenting a complete defense because he
made no showing that Sosa’s testimony “would present clearly exculpatory
evidence.” State v. Martinez, 218 Ariz. 421, 428-29, ¶¶ 25-29 (2008) (citation
omitted). Ahrens was able to elicit some responses from Sosa regarding
previous trips to Arizona, in which she largely responded that she could
not remember details due to memory loss, likely resulting from recent head
injuries she suffered while in prison.

¶30 Further, the jury heard Ahrens’ interview with law
enforcement, in which he made multiple inculpatory statements about their
previous trips to Arizona, as discussed above. Ahrens has therefore failed
to show how not granting Sosa immunity was error, considering that the
jury heard Ahrens’ own statements implicating himself in prior trips to pick
up methamphetamine in Arizona, and Sosa’s testimony included

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statements that she did not remember Ahrens’ involvement in prior trips.
See State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 (1982) (a defendant can only compel
immunity for a witness who can present testimony that is “clearly
exculpatory and essential” to the defendant’s case). The jury was also
instructed that the evidence of the prior trips was “admitted only for the
limited purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, plan and
knowledge.”

¶31 Accordingly, we find that Ahrens failed to make a sufficient
offer of proof and even if he had, he has failed to show how his defense was
prejudiced by the court’s denial of the State’s motion to grant Sosa
immunity.

CONCLUSION

¶32 We affirm Ahrens’ conviction and sentence.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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