State v. Kaymaz
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
ABDULJUBAR JUBAR KAYMAZ, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 24-0187
FILED 03-25-2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-131450-001
The Honorable Joshua Yost, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Diane L. Hunt
Counsel for Appellee
Kenney Law Firm, PLC, Florence
By Anthony Louis Kenney
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. KAYMAZ
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
P A T O N, Judge:
¶1 Abduljubar Jubar Kaymaz appeals from his convictions and
sentences for drive-by shooting, aggravated assault, and misconduct
involving weapons. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In the summer of 2020, Kaymaz agreed to repair the air
conditioning in Kendra’s1 car. Kendra’s car keys later went missing and
Kendra and her boyfriend, Geoff, believed Kaymaz may have taken them.
Sometime later, Kaymaz drove to Tina’s (a friend of Kendra’s) house and,
while still in his car, showed Kendra and Geoff the missing keys but refused
to return them. Kaymaz then fired a gun at Geoff, hitting him three times.
Kaymaz threatened to shoot Kendra and then drove away. Tina remained
inside her house, watching the incident on her camera monitor.
¶3 Kendra and Tina called the police and identified Kaymaz
from a photo lineup. The police obtained a search warrant and drove to
Kaymaz’s address, where they saw Kaymaz get out of the same car he had
been in when the incident occurred. During the search, the police found a
gun, as well as magazines containing ammunition inside the car.
¶4 Kaymaz was arrested and indicted on one count of drive-by
shooting, two counts of aggravated assault (one count as to Geoff, and one
as to Kendra), and one count of misconduct involving weapons. During the
six-day trial, the jury heard testimony from Kendra, Tina, Geoff, nine Mesa
Police Department law enforcement officials, and an expert witness from
the Mesa Police Department’s Forensic Services Unit, as well as Kaymaz,
who testified in his defense. Kendra, Tina, and Geoff testified that Kaymaz
shot Geoff. Kaymaz acknowledged that he shot Geoff, but testified that he
did so in self-defense.
1 We use pseudonyms to protect victim and witness identities. Ariz. R. Sup.
Ct. 111(i).
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STATE v. KAYMAZ
Decision of the Court
¶5 Kaymaz moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 of
the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing the State did not present
substantial evidence to warrant a conviction. He argued the State never
established he was physically located at the scene, nor did DNA or
fingerprint evidence show he possessed the gun. The court denied the
motion.
¶6 The jury convicted Kaymaz of drive-by shooting, aggravated
assault as to Geoff, and misconduct involving weapons. It also found the
State proved the aggravating circumstances of causing physical, emotional,
or financial harm to the victim. The jury acquitted Kaymaz of aggravated
assault as to Kendra. The court sentenced him to twelve years in prison,
with 542 days of presentence incarceration credit. Kaymaz timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
Section 13-4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Kaymaz argues insufficient evidence supports his
convictions. He contends the evidence demonstrates he had no motive to
commit the offenses, acted in self-defense, and the State “did not present
substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] did not act in self-
defense.” The State responds that Kendra’s and Geoff’s testimony that
Kaymaz shot them without being provoked was sufficient to sustain
Kaymaz’s convictions, and the State was not required to establish Kaymaz’s
motive to commit the crimes.
¶8 We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo but view
the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. See State v.
West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We reverse convictions for insufficient
evidence “only if no substantial evidence supports the conviction.” State v.
Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, 75, ¶ 6 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence is that which “reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to
support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Teagle, 217
Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 40 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).
¶9 To convict Kaymaz of drive-by shooting, the State had to
prove Kaymaz intentionally discharged a weapon from a motor vehicle,
and the discharge was at a person, another occupied motor vehicle, or an
occupied structure. A.R.S. § 13-1209(A). Kaymaz argues that “there is no
scientific evidence” establishing he used the gun because a detective
testified that the gun had no fingerprints. But establishing that Kaymaz
used the gun does not depend on scientific evidence; Kaymaz’s
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STATE v. KAYMAZ
Decision of the Court
admission—corroborated by Kendra’s and Geoff’s testimony that Kaymaz
shot Geoff—supported the jury’s findings that he used it. See State v. Flores, 202 Ariz. 221, 222, ¶ 5 (App. 2002). Further, Kaymaz testified that he shot
Geoff from his car (albeit claiming he did so in self-defense), which in and
of itself is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he used the
gun. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (explaining that
even where a record contains conflicting evidence, the jury alone “weigh[s]
the evidence and determine[s] the credibility of the witnesses.”). Thus, a
reasonable jury could find Kaymaz committed drive-by shooting.
¶10 Substantial evidence also supports Kaymaz’s conviction for
aggravated assault of Geoff. To convict Kaymaz of aggravated assault
using a deadly weapon, the State had to prove that Kaymaz
“[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ed] any physical injury to
another person” or “[i]ntentionally [put] another person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent physical injury” using a deadly weapon, which
includes a firearm. A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(A)(2), -1203(A)(1), (2), -105(15).
Although Kaymaz testified that he was not trying to fire the gun, he
ultimately fired three bullets at Geoff—all of which hit Geoff, and admitted
he “grabbed the handgun from [Geoff]” and “caus[ed] it to fire.” Geoff
testified that Kaymaz “fired two bullets that hit [his] left femur . . . and then
a third one hit [his] left arm.” As a result of his injuries, Geoff lost
consciousness for nine days, “died twice,” and needed surgical intervention
to install a titanium bar in his left femur and multiple bolts in his knee and
hand. A reasonable jury could have found Kaymaz guilty of aggravated
assault.
¶11 Finally, substantial evidence supports Kaymaz’s conviction
for misconduct involving weapons. As applicable here, the State had to
prove Kaymaz knowingly possessed a deadly weapon while he was a
prohibited possessor. A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4). To “possess” property, such
as a gun, a person must “knowingly . . . have physical possession or
otherwise . . . exercise dominion or control over property.” A.R.S. § 13-
105(34). Kaymaz testified that he had a prior felony conviction and did not
have his rights restored. And the State admitted into evidence a certified
memorandum from the Maricopa County Clerk of Court’s office, which
noted that it had no records indicating Kaymaz’s right to possess firearms
had been restored. The State also presented evidence that Kaymaz
exercised control over the weapon based on the testimony of Kendra, Geoff,
and Kaymaz himself. A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence
that Kaymaz was guilty of misconduct involving weapons.
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STATE v. KAYMAZ
Decision of the Court
¶12 Kaymaz argues that the State’s witnesses were not credible
and provided inconsistent testimony. But assessing witness credibility is
solely within the jury’s province, and we will not reweigh its findings of
credibility or how it evaluates conflicting evidence. State v. Barger, 167 Ariz.
563, 568 (App. 1990); see Williams, 209 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 6.
CONCLUSION
¶13 Substantial evidence supports Kaymaz’s convictions. We
affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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