State v. Holmes

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SHEENA MAIETTA HOLMES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0311
FILED 07-08-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202300835
The Honorable Krista M. Carman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Eric Knobloch
Counsel for Appellee

Grand Canyon Law Group, LLC, Phoenix
By Victoria Wilde
Co-Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of Courtney R. Sullivan, PLLC, Phoenix
By Courtney R. Sullivan
Co-Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. HOLMES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Sheena Maietta Holmes appeals her convictions and
sentences for two counts of theft. Holmes argues that the superior court
erroneously denied her pretrial motions for severance and change of venue,
that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her convictions,
and that the prosecutor deprived her of a fair trial by asking improper
questions on direct examination. We detect no reversible error. We
therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Holmes was indicted in Yavapai County for two counts of
theft, against Yavapai Block Construction Company (“Yavapai Block”) and
The Coalition for Compassion and Justice (“the Coalition”), respectively.
Before the time set for trial, Holmes unsuccessfully moved to sever the
counts. She also unsuccessfully moved to change the venue. Both counts
proceeded to a joint jury trial in Yavapai County at which the State
presented evidence of the following facts.1

¶3 In November 2021, Holmes began working as a finance clerk
for Yavapai Block, a construction-supply company with a retail-store
component. As part of her duties, Holmes filled out deposit slips for all
cash and checks received so that the company’s president (or occasionally
Holmes) could deposit those monies at the bank each evening. Holmes also
sometimes took cash deposits to the bank during the day. Holmes’
handwritten deposit slips were supposed to match the amounts tracked by
the company’s point-of-sale system. But nobody other than Holmes
checked the slips against the automated data until the company hired a new
finance controller in January 2022.

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the
verdicts. State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 488 (1983).

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¶4 The new controller soon discovered discrepancies between
the cash reported by the point-of-sale system and the cash deposited. The
controller initially reported the discrepancies to the company’s president in
March 2022. Holmes left the company that same month. The controller
then completed her reconciliation and determined that more than $33,000
in cash was received but not deposited between December 2021 (the month
after Holmes began at the company) and March 2022 (the month Holmes
left the company). The controller found no missing monies outside of that
period.

¶5 Meanwhile, in April 2022, the Coalition, a non-profit
organization serving the homeless, hired Holmes as its director of finance
and human resources. The Coalition receives revenue via donations, thrift-
store sales, affordable-housing rents, and shelter rents. Holmes’ duties
included performing daily financial reconciliations, making bank deposits,
and preparing profit-and-loss reports for the organization’s board of
directors. For the thrift store, Holmes was responsible for retrieving each
day’s mostly-cash income from a drop safe, checking it against the store’s
point-of-sale system, and depositing it at the bank. She was similarly
responsible for retrieving, reconciling, and depositing the all-cash shelter
rents and the mostly-cash affordable-housing rents.

¶6 Holmes regularly presented financial reports to the
Coalition’s board. Her reports showed that the Coalition’s account balances
were very low. But the board members, trusting Holmes, simply assumed
that the organization was struggling. Holmes never mentioned that any
funds were unaccounted-for, and the board members never examined the
underlying deposit records.

¶7 In March 2023, Yavapai Block’s controller, at the company
president’s direction, reported the company’s missing funds to the police
and identified Holmes as a suspect. The police investigated Holmes,
discovered her new employment, and contacted the Coalition. Based on
that contact, the Coalition terminated Holmes’ employment in May 2023
and hired an auditor. The auditor determined that between June 2022 and
May 2023, more than $77,000 in cash received by the thrift store was not
deposited in any Coalition account, and the same was true for more than
$32,000 in affordable-housing rents and more than $1,000 in shelter rents.
The auditor further determined that the discrepancies did not persist after
Holmes left the organization.

¶8 Police arrested and interrogated Holmes in July 2023. She
denied all wrongdoing. Later, at trial, she declined to testify or present

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other evidence. The jury convicted Holmes on both counts, and the court
sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment for the theft from the Coalition
followed by seven years’ probation for the theft from Yavapai Block.

¶9 Holmes timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Holmes waived her severance request by not renewing it at trial,
and the denial of her pretrial motion was not error in any event.

¶10 Holmes first contends that the superior court erred by
denying her motion to sever the two charged counts. We hold that Holmes
waived the issue.

¶11 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.4(c), a
defendant must renew his or her pretrial motion for severance at trial or
else the right to severance is waived. We apply this rule strictly to prevent
gamesmanship. See State v. Flythe, 219 Ariz. 117, 120, ¶¶ 9-10 (App. 2008).
Here, Holmes waived her severance claim because she did not renew her
pretrial motion.

¶12 Further, even if we review the pretrial denial of severance, we
detect no fundamental error. See id. at ¶ 11 (indicating that we may, on
request, review a waived severance issue for fundamental error).
Reversible fundamental error is prejudicial error that goes to the foundation
of the case, takes away an essential defense right, and is of such magnitude
that it prevents a fair trial. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 568, ¶¶ 22, 24
(2005). Here, the court did not err, much less fundamentally err, by denying
severance. Offenses may be joined in an indictment if they “are of the same
or similar character” and “evidence of the other offense or offenses would
be admissible if the offenses were tried separately.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
13.3(a)(1), 13.4(b). Here, each of the thefts involved skimming cash
deposits, and evidence of each would be cross-admissible in separate trials
to show Holmes’ “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident” under Arizona Rule
of Evidence 404(b).

II. The superior court properly denied Holmes’ motion for a change
of venue.

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¶13 Holmes next contends that the superior court erred by
denying her motion for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. We
review the ruling for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149,
156, ¶ 12 (2008). We detect none.

¶14 Pretrial publicity warrants a change of venue only if it is so
pervasive as to create fundamental unfairness in the form of actual or
presumptive jury prejudice. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. The mere fact that jurors have
been exposed to pretrial publicity is not dispositive; the court may find no
actual prejudice if the jurors affirm in voir dire that they can decide the case
based strictly on the evidence. Id. at 156-57, ¶ 14; State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz.
191, 206-07, ¶¶ 50-51 (2004). Further, the burden to show presumptive
prejudice is “extremely heavy.” State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 554, ¶ 13 (2014)
(citation omitted). Primarily factual, non-inflammatory news coverage is
insufficient to create presumptive prejudice. State v. Bigger, 227 Ariz. 196,
200, ¶ 11 (App. 2011). Presumptive prejudice arises only when the publicity
is “so unfair, so prejudicial, and so pervasive” as to “permeate[] the
proceedings or create[] a ‘carnival-like’ atmosphere.” Cruz, 218 Ariz. at 157,
¶ 15 (citations omitted).

¶15 Here, Holmes moved for a change of venue because her case
was reported in multiple newspaper articles disseminated in Yavapai
County. The articles did not, however, exceed the bounds of normal
informational news reporting or create an unusual atmosphere creating
presumptive prejudice. Nor does the record reveal actual prejudice. Only
one juror reported awareness of the media coverage, and that juror
expressly confirmed that her knowledge would not affect her decision-
making. As there was neither presumptive nor actual prejudice, the
superior court acted within its discretion by declining to change the trial
venue.

III. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Holmes’
convictions.

¶16 Holmes next contends that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support her convictions. We review the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We do not
reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. State v. Cox, 217
Ariz. 353, 357, ¶ 27 (2007); State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App.
2004).

¶17 Trial evidence is sufficient when reasonable persons could
accept it as adequate to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

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committed every element of the charged offense. Cox, 217 Ariz. at 357, ¶ 22.
Sufficient evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, and it may
support differing reasonable inferences. State v. Anaya, 165 Ariz. 535, 543
(App. 1990). We will not reverse for insufficient evidence simply because
the jury could have reached a different verdict. State v. Rios, 255 Ariz. 124,
131, ¶ 26 (App. 2023). We will reverse only if “there is a complete absence
of probative facts to support the conviction.” State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423,
424-25 (1976).

¶18 Here, the State had to establish that Holmes, acting without
lawful authority, knowingly controlled Yavapai Block and the Coalition’s
money with the intent to deprive those organizations of the same. See
A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1). The State met that burden. With respect to Yavapai
Block, the State presented evidence that during the time Holmes was
responsible for preparing the company’s income for deposit, not all the cash
was deposited. Holmes emphasizes the paucity of direct evidence tying her
to the missing money. But the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
permit reasonable jurors to conclude that Holmes was responsible. She
often had unilateral control over the cash and the deposit slips, and cash
went missing only during her tenure. Similarly, with respect to the
Coalition, the evidence that cash went missing only during the period when
Holmes controlled the organization’s deposits was sufficient to support her
conviction.

¶19 Contrary to Holmes’ contention, the jury was not compelled
to acquit her based on the absence of physical evidence and the police’s
failure to recover stolen monies from her. Physical evidence is not
necessary where other evidence suffices to show guilt, State v. Hall, 204
Ariz. 442, 454, ¶ 49 (2003), and the jury may infer elements of theft even
where the stolen property is never found, State v. Coleman, 147 Ariz. 578,
580-81 (App. 1985). Also, contrary to Holmes’ contention, the jury was not
required to believe her denials of guilt. See Cox, 217 Ariz. at 357, ¶ 27
(holding that questions of witness credibility are for the jury). Nor was the
jury required to conclude that others with access to the funds committed
the thefts. See Williams, 209 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 6 (holding that weighing the
evidence is for the jury). The jury appropriately convicted Holmes on both
counts based on the evidence.

IV. The prosecutor did not engage in conduct depriving Holmes of a
fair trial.

¶20 Holmes finally contends that she was denied due process
based on prosecutorial error. Holmes argues that when the prosecutor

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STATE v. HOLMES
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questioned Yavapai Block’s controller on direct examination, he asked
multiple leading questions summarizing the company president’s
testimony. She argues that the prosecutor’s questions violated Arizona
Rule of Evidence 611(c), which prohibits leading questions on direct
examination except as necessary to develop the testimony. She further
argues that the questions violated Arizona Rule of Evidence 615 and
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.3, which encourage truthful
testimony by precluding witnesses from hearing or otherwise reviewing
others’ testimony. See Spring v. Bradford, 243 Ariz. 167, 170-71, ¶¶ 13-16
(2017). Because Holmes objected to only one of the relevant questions at
trial (and that objection was sustained), we review her claim of a pattern of
misconduct for fundamental error. See State v. Speer, 221 Ariz. 449, 458, ¶ 42
(2009). We detect none.

¶21 Prosecutorial error “is not merely the result of legal error,
negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole,
amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper
and prejudicial.” State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39 (App. 2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Prosecutorial error constitutes
fundamental error only when it is “so egregious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial.” State v. Hernandez, 170 Ariz. 301, 307 (App. 1991). Here,
when questioning Yavapai Block’s controller, the prosecutor described the
company president’s testimony about Holmes’ employment dates, the
president’s practice of depositing the income at the bank, the controller’s
report to the president about missing funds, and the date of the controller’s
call to police. To be sure, these questions were improperly leading because
they suggested their answers. See State v. Romero, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 23,
588 P.3d 1123, 1129 (2026). The questions also improperly summarized a
different witness’ testimony. See Spring, 243 Ariz. at 170-71, ¶¶ 13-16. But
the defects in the questions did not rise to the level of prosecutorial error
depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The questions went only to repetitive
background information. We also note that several of the questions’
prompts reiterated information potentially helpful to the defense—i.e., that
the company did not promptly report the theft and that Holmes did not
typically transport the deposits.

¶22 Further, the questions were asked in front of the jurors, who
could consider their phrasing in assessing the controller’s credibility. See
Cox, 217 Ariz. at 357, ¶ 27. The jurors also were instructed not to consider
the prosector’s statements as evidence, and we presume they followed that
instruction. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). The
prosecutor’s questions, although imperfect, did not amount to reversible
error.

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CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm Holmes’ convictions and the court’s imposition of
prison and probation.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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