State v. Beckhum

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

COREY DION BECKHUM, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0345
FILED 08-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-147296-001
The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael T. O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee

Nova Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix
By Ryan Tait, Elizabeth Mullins
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. BECKHUM
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined and Judge D. Andrew Gaona
joined in part and concurred in the result. Judge D. Andrew Gaona also
filed a concurring decision.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Corey Beckhum appeals from his convictions and sentences,
arguing there is insufficient evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction
and the superior court erred in sentencing him for a higher-class felony. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Beckhum operated several unlicensed sober-living homes in
the Phoenix area. The Arizona Healthcare Cost Containment System
(“AHCCCS”) does not cover the costs of residents living in such homes,
even if they are licensed.

¶3 In September 2023, Beckhum called Recovery Syndicate—an
intensive outpatient substance-abuse program in Chandler that accepts
AHCCCS patients—and said he was looking for a treatment facility to
which he could refer the people living in his homes. Beckhum told the
Recovery Syndicate employee on the phone that other clinics typically paid
him $200 to $300 per day per client. The call was suspicious to the employee
because treatment centers typically call sober living homes to find housing
for their patients, rather than the other way around. And under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 13-3713, it is illegal to offer or accept any
commission or other consideration for referring a patient to a clinic that
provides medical or health-related services under AHCCCS.

¶4 Recovery Syndicate reported Beckhum’s phone call to the
Office of the Inspector General for AHCCCS. An undercover officer,
purporting to be from Recovery Syndicate, contacted Beckhum and
Beckhum told the officer he had twenty-five clients in his homes, six to
fifteen of whom he needed to onboard with a clinic. Beckhum later
increased this number to twenty-one clients. Beckhum and the officer
agreed Beckhum would receive $250 per person per day for seven days a
week for his referral and transportation of these clients. Beckhum, on his

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STATE v. BECKHUM
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company’s behalf, later signed a contract that the officer presented him
containing these terms. The contract described Beckhum’s company and
Recovery Syndicate as “partners in Mental Health Service Provision
business” and outlined the terms of the voluntary and involuntary
withdrawal of a partner.

¶5 The officer then represented that he had arranged
transportation for Beckhum’s clients with another undercover officer and
Beckhum sent the transportation person billing information for the clients
living in his homes. Beckhum was arrested shortly after.

¶6 A grand jury indicted Beckhum in October 2023 for
Conspiracy to Commit Consideration for Patient Referral (“Count 1”) and
Consideration for Patient Referral (“Count 2”), both Class 3 felonies in
violation of A.R.S. Sections 13-1003 and 13-3713. The case proceeded to trial
in June 2025. After the State rested, Beckhum moved for a judgment of
acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 as to Count 1, which
the superior court denied. The jury then found Beckhum guilty on both
counts. The court sentenced Beckhum to 3.5 years as to Count 1 and 2.5
years as to Count 2, ordered to run concurrently.

¶7 Beckhum timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant
to A.R.S. Sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Sustain Beckhum’s Conspiracy
Conviction.

¶8 Beckhum argues that insufficient evidence supports his
conspiracy conviction because the State did not establish that he knew his
actions were illegal. We review de novo whether sufficient evidence
supports a conviction, “viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 15 (2011) (quoting
State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 (1993)).

¶9 Courts must enter a judgment of acquittal “if there is no
substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1).
Substantial evidence “is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 16 (citation modified).
“Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where
there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.”
State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996). Evidence is sufficient as a matter

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of law when reasonable jurors could fairly debate whether the evidence
establishes a particular fact. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212 ¶ 87 (2004).

¶10 A person commits a Class 3 felony for the crime of
consideration for referral of patient, client, or customer when:

[A] person . . . knowingly offers, delivers, receives or accepts
any rebate, refund, commission, preference or other
consideration as compensation for referring a patient, client
or customer to any individual, pharmacy, laboratory, clinic or
health care institution providing medical or health-related
services or items . . . if the consideration had a value of one
thousand dollars or more.

A.R.S. § 13-3713(A)(1). A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit this crime
if they intend to “promote or aid the commission of” such conduct, the
intended conduct would constitute the crime, the defendant knew that such
conduct was a crime, and the person “commits an overt act in furtherance
of” such conduct. A.R.S. § 13-1003(A).

¶11 Here, the State presented substantial evidence that Beckhum
knew his conduct was illegal. Beckhum had a compensation structure set
up in which the funds for the operation came from the clinics that paid
Beckhum for his referrals and he was aware that money came from
AHCCCS. He did not charge patients for living in his homes and was not
licensed to, nor could he, bill AHCCCS directly. Beckhum agreed to be paid
$250 per person per day for seven days a week for referring and
transporting his residents to Recovery Syndicate. When the undercover
officer mentioned billing AHCCCS “for the whole day” despite agreement
that Beckhum’s residents would not arrive at the clinic until noon, Beckhum
did not express any objection. To the contrary, he stated that he did not care
what Recovery Syndicate did “on the back end.” Evidence also established
that Beckhum had done business before with three clinics that lost their
ability to bill AHCCCS because of fraud concerns.

¶12 Beckhum contends the State’s evidence indicates only that he
was aware some of the clinics he dealt with may have committed fraud and
were under scrutiny for their billing practices. However, Beckhum
admitted he knew he was being paid from AHCCCS reimbursements and
he could not receive money directly from AHCCCS. Beckhum’s
conversations with the officer show he was aware of challenges in
arranging funding for his type of business because of “crackdowns,” and
that he was knowledgeable about this fraud that caused the increased

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difficulty. Given this circumstantial evidence, jurors could have reasonably
concluded his awareness of the fraud and his willingness to move forward
with the arrangement to be paid with AHCCCS money was evidence he
knew his actions were illegal.

¶13 In addition to the State’s evidence, the jury also heard
Beckhum’s testimony that he was not aware his actions were illegal until
after his arrest. Although such evidence contradicted the State’s case-in-
chief, by finding Beckhum guilty, the jury necessarily rejected his testimony
and drew a negative inference from it. See State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24,
27 (App. 1976) (“The inference to be drawn from contradictory
testimony . . . is permissive and is based upon the jury’s finding of fact.”).
Thus, on this record, the court did not err in denying Beckhum’s Rule 20
motion.

II. Beckhum Has Not Established Fundamental, Prejudicial Error
Occurred When the Trial Court Sentenced Him for a Class 3 Felony
on Count 1.

¶14 Beckhum argues the court erred in sentencing him on Count
1 as a Class 3 felony. Citing the jury’s failure to make a finding on the
amount involved in the conspiracy, Beckhum contends the trial court
violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), under which any
fact that increases a defendant’s punishment must be determined by a jury.

A. Standard of Review

¶15 Because Beckhum did not object to the jury instructions or the
verdict form at trial, we review this argument for fundamental error only.
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018) (explaining failure to object
to an error at trial forfeits the right to obtain appellate relief except when
the error is fundamental and results in prejudice). To obtain relief, Beckhum
must first demonstrate the court committed error. State v. Hippensteel, ___
Ariz. ___, ___, 590 P.3d 835, 839 ¶ 13 (2026). “If error exists, he must also
show that under the totality of the circumstances, (1) the error went to the
foundation of the case, (2) the error took from him a right essential to his
defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have
received a fair trial.” Id. (citation modified). Our supreme court has clarified
that Apprendi violations are generally trial error, not structural error, so the
third prong is not at issue here. See State v. Ring (III), 204 Ariz. 534, 553 ¶¶
44–45 (2003) (concluding “failure to submit [an] element of capital murder
to the jury does not constitute structural error”). Thus, Beckhum must also
separately show prejudice. Hippensteel, 590 P.3d at 839 ¶ 13. “The defendant

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bears the burden of persuasion at each step.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142 ¶
21.

B. No Apprendi Violation

¶16 Beckhum argues he should have been sentenced to a Class 6
felony on Count 1—not a Class 3 felony—because the jury did not expressly
determine the amount of consideration he attempted to acquire under
Count 1. He contends the court engaged in impermissible judicial fact-
finding by using the jury’s finding as to the amounts involved as to Count
2 to sentence him on Count 1. Per Beckhum, this use violated Apprendi. Not
so.

¶17 Under Apprendi, any fact other than a prior conviction “that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530
U.S. at 490. Because Beckhum challenges his sentencing for his conspiracy
conviction, we look to the requirements for conviction and sentencing
under that charge. The relevant statute provides that “conspiracy is an
offense of the same class as the most serious offense which is the object of
or result of the conspiracy.” A.R.S. § 13-1003(D). The relevant “object” of
Beckhum’s conspiracy was his violation of A.R.S. Section 13-3713 (i.e.,
Count 2), which, in turn, establishes different felony classifications based
on the amount of consideration involved in an unlawful referral
arrangement. Specifically, a violation is a Class 3 felony if the value of the
consideration is over one thousand dollars but is a Class 6 felony if the value
of the consideration is one hundred dollars or less. A.R.S. § 13-3713(A)(1),
(3).

¶18 Here, the jury expressly found Beckhum’s conduct implicated
more than $1,000 in kickbacks as to Count 2 and did so beyond a reasonable
doubt, as recorded in the verdict form for Count 2. True, the jury did not
record a similar finding as to an amount specific to Count 1 on that verdict
form. But such a finding was unnecessary because the conspiracy statute
specifies that the classification of Count 1 is derived directly from the
classification of the “object” offense; here, Count 2. See A.R.S. § 13-1003(D).
The jury’s undisputed finding that Count 2 involved consideration that
exceeded $1,000 confirmed Count 2’s classification as a Class 3 felony. See
A.R.S. § 13-3713(A)(1). And because Count 1’s classification is wholly
dependent on Count 2’s classification as the “object” offense, it too was
automatically set as a Class 3 felony by the jury’s same finding.

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Decision of the Court

C. Failure to Show Prejudice

¶19 Beckhum also failed to meet his burden of establishing
prejudice. He does not explain how a jury could have found he attempted
to receive a kickback of over $1,000 for Count 2, but not found he was
conspiring to do so per Count 1 under the exact same facts. Such a
conclusion defies common sense and lacks support in the record.

¶20 Because Beckhum did not demonstrate the court erred under
Apprendi, let alone fundamentally erred, and because he failed to
demonstrate any prejudice, his arguments fail.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

G A O N A, Judge, concurring:

¶22 I concur in the Court’s decision affirming Beckhum’s
conspiracy conviction and resulting sentence, but respectfully disagree
with the majority’s assertion, supra ¶ 11, that “the State presented
substantial evidence that Beckhum knew his conduct was illegal.”

¶23 At best, the State’s evidence showed that Beckhum knew that:
(1) he couldn’t be directly reimbursed by AHCCCS and thus had to
establish relationships with entities that could; (2) there was fraud in the
industry at large (including some allegations against clinics he’d dealt
with); and (3) AHCCCS was acting to combat that fraud. On those facts, no
rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Beckhum
knew his business operation was illegal. The superior court thus should
have granted Beckhum’s Rule 20 motion.

¶24 If that were all the evidence we could consider on appeal, this
would be a dissent. But it’s not, because when a Rule 20 motion “is denied
at the close of the state’s case, and the defendant goes forward and presents
his case, he is deemed bound if deficiencies in the evidence are supplied.”
State v. Savoy, 109 Ariz. 531, 532 (1973); State v. Bustamante, 103 Ariz. 551,
553 (1968) (a defendant who proceeds in this way “waive[s] any error”).
Under these circumstances, we review “the entire record, including any
evidence defendant supplied.” State v. Nunez, 167 Ariz. 272, 279 (1991). We
would treat a similarly situated defendant who doesn’t present any
evidence differently—“[a] motion for acquittal made at the close of the

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Gaona, J., Concurring

prosecution’s case is tested on the sufficiency of the evidence at that point.”
State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990) (emphasis added).

¶25 For me, this “waiver rule,” see, e.g., State v. Kinsella, 796
N.W.2d 678, 682 ¶ 11 (N.D. 2011) (using this label), is dispositive. Beckhum
testified in his own defense and told the jury that he didn’t know that
anything he’d done was illegal until after his arrest. He even said that he
didn’t believe what he was doing was “wrong” (even if not illegal) because
he thought he was “helping people” by “trying to keep [them] off of drugs.”
The jury considered and rejected Beckhum’s testimony when it convicted
him of conspiracy. In the precedent’s parlance, Beckhum “supplied” the
missing evidence from which a rational jury could convict him.

¶26 Applying the waiver rule, I thus concur in the majority’s
decision to affirm Beckhum’s conspiracy conviction. I do so with unease,
however, because that rule forces a criminal defendant to choose between
“resting and sacrificing the right to present a defense out of fear that his or
her testimony may cure defects in the prosecution’s case, or putting on such
evidence and thereby possibly assisting the prosecution in proving its
case.” In re Anthony J., 117 Cal. App. 4th 718, 732 (2004) (rejecting the waiver
rule because, among other things, due process requires the State to “prove
a prima facie case before the defendant is required to present any evidence
in his or her defense”); see also State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 951 (Conn. 2004)
(Katz., J., dissenting) (“[T]he waiver rule places a criminal defendant on the
horns of an unfair dilemma, forcing him to choose between two equally
fundamental rights: the right to present a defense, and the right to have the
state bear the burden of proving each and every element of a charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). But until our Supreme Court says otherwise,
I’m bound to hold that Beckhum’s decision to present a defense waived his
ability to obtain appellate review of whether the State proved its case-in-
chief—effectively conditioning his constitutional right to appeal, see Ariz.
Const. art. 2, ¶ 24, on foregoing the “due process right to ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense,’” Draper v. Gentry, 255 Ariz. 417,
422 ¶ 16 (2023) (citation omitted).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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