State v. Hezlitt

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

TODD HEZLITT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0544
FILED 8-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900CR202500086
The Honorable Jon H. Saline, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joseph Newberg
Counsel for Appellee

The Rigg Law Firm, PLLC, Pinetop
By Brett R. Rigg
Counsel for Appellant

STATE v. HEZLITT
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Todd Hezlitt appeals his conviction and sentence for failure
of a sex offender to notify the sheriff of a change of address. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the jury’s verdict. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 615 (1997).

¶3 In 2013, Hezlitt registered as a sex offender after pleading
guilty to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. As a registered sex
offender, when Hezlitt entered an Arizona county for at least 72 hours, he
was required to register with the sheriff of that county. And every August
(his birth month), he was required to report in person to the sheriff’s office
to confirm his registration information, including his current residence.

¶4 Hezlitt confirmed his current registration information with
the Navajo County Sheriff in April 2024 and August 2024, and listed his
current residence as a parcel north of Heber, Arizona, with no listed address
(the “Heber Property”). The Heber Property was in a remote area with no
access to public utilities.

¶5 In October 2024, a sheriff’s deputy went to the Heber Property
to verify Hezlitt lived there. He observed no signs that anyone lived there.
There were two uninhabited structures on the property—one appeared to
be an unfinished cabin and the other was a storage shed. The unfinished
cabin had no visible furniture, stove, clothing, or heat source inside. There
were also no tire tracks or footsteps near any of the structures. There was a
motor home on the property, but its door was missing, and it was filled
with so much “stuff” that a person could not live in it.

¶6 The deputy returned to the Heber Property in January 2025
and, although he observed tracks indicating an ATV had driven straight
through without stopping, Hezlitt was not there, and there were still no

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signs that anyone was living there. The unfinished cabin was in the same
condition it had been in October, with no utilities, heat source, stove, or
furniture. The fire pit contained the same garbage the deputy observed
during his prior visit. The deputy knocked on the structure doors and
called out for Hezlitt but received no answer. Soon after this second visit
with no sign of Hezlitt, the State charged him with the failure of a sex
offender to notify the sheriff of a change of address.

¶7 Hezlitt learned of the charge and contacted the sheriff’s office
to say he did not understand why he was being charged, and claiming he
had registered his current address. The deputy spoke to Hezlitt over the
phone and informed him that registering an address was insufficient; he
actually had to live at the registered address.

¶8 The deputy returned to the Heber Property in April 2025 and
saw signs that someone was now living there. There were distinct tire
tracks and footprints showing steady travel in and out of the property.
Someone also installed a wood stove, grill, sink, and solar panels that had
not been there during prior visits. Hezlitt again did not answer when the
deputy knocked on the door, but the deputy observed a cat in the cabin.

¶9 Before trial, the State moved to admit the sentencing minute
entry from Hezlitt’s conviction as evidence that Hezlitt was required to
register as a sex offender, which contained information about his two sexual
conduct with a minor convictions. The court found the unfair prejudice of
the nature of the underlying convictions substantially outweighed its
probative value when all the State had to prove was that Hezlitt was
required to register as a sex offender. As such, the court ordered the minute
entry redacted to exclude the nature of the underlying convictions. After
redaction, the minute entry contained the following language: “IT IS
ORDERED that the defendant shall register as a sex offender pursuant to
the Notice of Sex Offender Requirements.”

¶10 At trial, the State presented the deputy’s testimony,
photographs, and the body-worn camera footage from his visits to the
Heber Property as evidence that Hezlitt did not live at his registered
residence and did not inform the sheriff’s office that he was living at a
different residence. Hezlitt moved for a judgment of acquittal under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 20, arguing the prosecution
did not present evidence sufficient to support a conviction. The court
denied the motion, reasoning that the evidence at least created fact
questions that the jury should decide.

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¶11 The court instructed the jury on the definition of “residence”
as follows:

“Residence” means:

(a) The person’s dwelling place, whether permanent or temporary.

(b) If the person is transient and does not spend at least three nights
in any location or place within a thirty-day period, the geographic
areas of the county where the person spends the nights.

¶12 During deliberations, the jury asked the court how long a
person has to be at a location for it to be considered their residence. The
court instructed the jury to refer to the definitions in the jury instructions.
The jury followed up on its question and asked: “And does the three nights
have to be consecutive to qualify as permanent or temporary?” The court
and the parties recognized that, based on that follow-up question, the jury
was conflating subsections (a) and (b) of the definition of “residence.” In
other words, it seemed the jury mistakenly thought that if a person’s
residence was only temporary, they were also transient. To cure this
confusion, the court suggested giving the jury the definition of “transient”
with a note that a person either has a dwelling place, whether permanent
or temporary, or they are transient; they cannot both be true at the same
time. Hezlitt’s counsel expressed concern that giving the definition of
transient may further confuse the jury and “muddy the waters,” but he did
not expressly object and agreed that the court’s note to the jury was an
accurate statement of the law. The court gave the clarifying instruction
without objection.

¶13 The jury convicted Hezlitt and the court sentenced him to two
years and nine months in prison. Hezlitt timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and
13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶14 Hezlitt raises three issues on appeal. He first argues the court
erred in denying his Rule 20 motion for a directed verdict because the State
did not present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the charged
offense. He next argues the State violated the court’s order that the State
not give testimony or evidence of the nature of Hezlitt’s sexual conduct
with a minor convictions. Finally, he argues the court erred by providing
the jury a clarifying instruction on the definition of “transient.”

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I. Sufficient evidence supports Hezlitt’s conviction.

¶15 Hezlitt contends the State did not present evidence that he
moved to a different address, only that there was uncertainty regarding his
residency. He argues the State “presented no evidence identifying another
residence for [Hezlitt],” and that absent such evidence, “the jury could not
determine whether [Hezlitt] moved at all.” Hezlitt also argues the State’s
case is undermined by the deputy’s testimony that Hezlitt was living at the
Heber Property in April 2025.

¶16 We review the sufficiency of evidence de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We will find evidence is sufficient to support
a conviction when “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 16. Our role is
not to reweigh the evidence, rather we “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the conviction,” and resolve “all reasonable
inferences” against the defendant. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997).
“Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where
there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.”
State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) (citation omitted).

¶17 Registered sex offenders are required to notify the sheriff
“[w]ithin seventy-two hours, . . . after moving to or from the person’s
residence.” A.R.S. § 13-3822(A). The sex offender must also inform the
sheriff of whether the new residence is “temporary or permanent.” A.R.S.
§ 13-3822(A). And “residence” means where the person lives, whether
temporary or permanent. A.R.S. § 13-3822(F)(4). So registered sex
offenders must notify the sheriff after changing residences, even if the sex
offender only lives at the new residence on a temporary basis.

¶18 The State was thus required to prove three elements: (1)
Hezlitt was required to register as a sex offender, (2) Hezlitt moved either
to or from a residence in Navajo County, even on a temporary basis, and (3)
Hezlitt did not inform the Navajo County Sheriff’s Office of his change of
residence. A.R.S. § 13-3822(A). The State provided sufficient evidence as
to all three elements.

¶19 Hezlitt was required to register as a sex offender after his plea
to and resulting sentence on two counts of sexual conduct with a minor.
This was supported by the redacted sentencing minute entry from Hezlitt’s
convictions and is not disputed on appeal. Hezlitt also does not dispute

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STATE v. HEZLITT
Decision of the Court

that he did not inform the sheriff’s office of a change of residence because
he insists that he did not move.

¶20 There is sufficient evidence that Hezlitt moved from his
registered residence in Navajo County without informing the Navajo
County Sheriff’s Office. The evidence showed that the deputy twice visited
his listed residence, the Heber Property, between October 2024 and January
2025, and there was no sign that Hezlitt lived there. During both visits,
Hezlitt was not present at the Heber Property, and there were no footprints
or consistent tire tracks that would be present if Hezlitt lived there. Further,
the unfinished cabin was in the same uninhabited state from October 2024
to January 2025. The Heber Property did not have a stove, heat source,
furniture, or water source during both visits. This evidence was sufficient
to establish, at minimum, a reasonable inference that Hezlitt moved away
from the Heber Property from October 2024 to January 2025, then back to
the Heber Property sometime after January 2025. And under Section 13-
3822(A), Hezlitt was required to inform the sheriff’s office if he moved away
from his registered address, even if only on a temporary basis. We resolve
“all reasonable inferences” against Hezlitt, including that he moved away
from the Heber property from October 2024 to January 2025. See Lee, 189
Ariz. at 603.

¶21 We are unpersuaded by Hezlitt’s argument that the State was
required to show evidence of the residence he moved to after leaving the
Heber Property. Section 13-3822(A) requires no such showing; again, the
State must only show that Hezlitt either moved to or from a residence in
the county. Hezlitt insists that, absent a showing of where he moved to, the
State’s evidence only established that Hezlitt was not present during the
two visits. This mirrors the defense that Hezlitt raised at trial, but as the
superior court correctly reasoned, this was a factual issue for the jury to
decide. See State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 335, ¶ 72 (2022) (“[W]here
reasonable minds may differ on the inferences drawn by the evidence, the
trial court should not grant [a] defendant’s Rule 20 motion.”).

¶22 The jury was free to consider Hezlitt’s assertion that, despite
the lack of signs of habitation at the Heber Property, he was living there and
just happened to be absent during the deputy’s visits. But the jury was also
free to conclude, as it ultimately did, that Hezlitt was not living at the Heber
Property based on the deputy’s testimony, photos, and body-worn camera
footage presented at trial. The jury also considered evidence that Hezlitt’s
wife lived in Wilcox, that he registered his vehicle to an address in Wilcox,
and listed his mailing address as an address in Wilcox. Hezlitt further
contends that testimony about signs of habitation later supports the notion

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STATE v. HEZLITT
Decision of the Court

that Hezlitt did not abandon the property and establishes reasonable doubt
regarding whether he lived there during the initial visits. He essentially
asks us to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we will not do. Lee, 189
Ariz. at 603. Sufficient evidence supports Hezlitt’s conviction.

II. The State did not violate the court’s order by referring to Hezlitt as
a “sex offender” during trial.

¶23 Hezlitt argues that the court’s order precluding the State from
“offering testimony or evidence of the nature of the underlying offenses in
any way” prohibited the State from referencing Hezlitt’s status as a
registered sex offender at trial. Hezlitt does not dispute that he was a
registered sex offender, only that the State should not have been allowed to
call him a sex offender during the trial. Because Hezlitt did not object to
the State’s use of the term “sex offender” at trial, we review only for
fundamental error. State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 547, ¶ 11 (2021). Hezlitt
must establish that error exists, that the error was fundamental, and that
the error was prejudicial. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018).
To the extent Hezlitt now suggests that the prosecutor’s use of the term “sex
offender,” constitutes prosecutorial error, that “inquiry is consistent with—
if not subsumed within—Escalante’s framework for fundamental error
review.” Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶¶ 12, 15.

¶24 The State’s use of the term “sex offender” did not violate the
court’s order. The court’s order, in relevant part, prohibited the State from
“offering testimony or evidence [of] the nature of the underlying offenses.”
The court found that the underlying sexual conduct with a minor
convictions were substantially outweighed by any probative value. Under
Hezlitt’s interpretation of that order, the State’s use of the term “sex
offender” informed the jury of the nature of the underlying offenses by
informing them that Hezlitt “had prior sex offenses.”

¶25 But the fact that Hezlitt is a sex offender was an element and
necessary preliminary of the crime charged; even more, the term “sex
offender” appears in the name of the charge itself. Cf. State v. Ferrero, 229
Ariz. 239, 242, ¶ 15 (2012). The court recognized in its order when it said
that “[c]ertainly, the fact that there exist two felony convictions that require
sex offender registration is a fact that can be elicited and discussed by the
State, and the redactions . . . allow for that information to be provided to
the jury to decide the facts.” The court’s order also admitted the sentencing
minute entry in Hezlitt’s underlying offense, which ordered Hezlitt to
register as a “sex offender” and did not redact the term “sex offender.”
Evidence of Hezlitt’s status as a sex offender was not evidence of the nature

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STATE v. HEZLITT
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of the underlying offenses, it was evidence necessary to prove an essential
element of the crime charged: the “failure of a registered sex offender to
notify the sheriff of a change of address.”

¶26 Hezlitt urges us to find that the State’s use of the term “sex
offender” was “inflammatory rhetoric designed to invoke fear and moral
outrage” in the jury. Not so. The State said in its opening statement that
“[Hezlitt] is a registered sex offender,” asked witnesses to confirm that
Hezlitt was a registered sex offender, and elicited general testimony about
the process by which sex offenders register and verify their address. None
of these instances were used in an inflammatory or provocative manner,
and more importantly, they did not elicit testimony about the nature of
Hezlitt’s underlying offenses against children as the court’s order sought to
prevent. Even Hezlitt’s counsel used the term “sex offender” multiple
times when questioning the witnesses at trial. The State’s use of the term
“sex offender” did not violate the court’s order.

¶27 Hezlitt also takes issue with the deputy’s testimony
answering the prosecutor’s question about the purpose of the registration
requirement, namely that the “history of sex offender registration goes back
to situations where children went missing or were molested and the parents
would say, well, if I had known there was a sex offender living across the
street from me, my child would not have been left playing out there.” But
this response provided general background information about the
registration statute and made no link to Hezlitt. In short, this comment did
not reveal the nature of Hezlitt’s underlying convictions, did not tie back to
Hezlitt, and also did not violate the court’s order precluding mention of
Hezlitt’s sexual conduct with a minor convictions. We discern no error.

III. The court did not abuse its discretion in giving a clarifying
instruction on the definition of “transient.”

¶28 Hezlitt argues the court erred by giving a clarifying
instruction to the jury on the statutory definition of “transient.” He claims
there is no evidence in the record that he was transient and that the
clarifying instruction “gave the jury an entirely different basis in which to
convict Hezlitt.” We review the trial court’s decision to give a clarifying
instruction for an abuse of discretion, but we assess the legal adequacy of
the instructions de novo, viewing them in their entirety. State v. Rushing, 260 Ariz. 180, 192, 196, ¶¶ 33, 51 (2025).

¶29 The issue here centers on the definition of “residence” under
Section 13-3822(F)(4) and the definition of “transient” under subsection

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STATE v. HEZLITT
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(F)(6). Residence is defined as either “(a) [t]he person’s dwelling place,
whether permanent or temporary,” or (b) “[i]f the person is transient and
does not spend at least three nights in any location or place within a thirty-
day period, the geographic areas of the county where the person spends the
nights.” A.R.S. § 13-3822(F)(4). At first, the court instructed the jury only
on the definition of “residence.”

¶30 After receiving these instructions, the jury asked the court
how long a person has to be at a location in order for it to be considered
their residence. The court instructed the jury to refer to the definitions in
the jury instructions. But this did not resolve the jury’s question, and it
followed up by asking: “And does the three nights have to be consecutive
to qualify as permanent or temporary?” The court and parties recognized
that based on the jury’s follow-up question, it was conflating subsections
(a) and (b) of the definition of “residence.” The court then suggested giving
the jury the definition of “transient” with a note that a person either has a
dwelling place, whether permanent or temporary, or they are transient;
they cannot both be true at the same time. Although Hezlitt’s counsel
initially expressed concern that providing the definition of “transient”
could “muddy the waters,” he ultimately agreed that it was a correct
statement of the law.

¶31 A court abuses its discretion in deciding whether to give
clarifying instructions if the court’s decision was “clearly untenable, legally
incorrect, or amount[ed] to a denial of justice.” Rushing, 260 Ariz. at 192, ¶
33 (citation omitted). And the court “should fully and fairly respond to
requests from deliberating juries when it is clear they are confused by the
provided instructions.” State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 138, ¶ 67 (2019).
The instructions the court provided initially were legally correct and
supported by the record, and Hezlitt does not contest either point. But
based on the jury’s questions, the jury did not fully understand the issues.
In such cases, it is the duty of the court to take steps to ensure the jury
understands the law before the jury makes a decision. See id.; Rushing, 260
Ariz. at 196, ¶ 51.

¶32 Hezlitt also does not argue the court gave the incorrect
definition of “transient.” Instead, he argues that giving this definition
allowed the jury to “make assumptions that Hezlitt was transient,
something completely unsupported in the record.” But the distinction
between the registration requirements of transient sex offenders and sex
offenders who have a dwelling place was brought up multiple times during
trial. Not only that, but the word “transient” appeared in the definition of,
and the court’s instruction on, the term “residence.” A.R.S. § 13-

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STATE v. HEZLITT
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3822(F)(4)(b). Supplying this clarifying instruction under these
circumstances was therefore supported by the record, and it correctly stated
the law. The court did not abuse its discretion. See State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz.
187, 191 (1986) (finding no reversible error where supplemental instruction
did not misstate the law).

¶33 Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, the instructions
“adequately set forth the law applicable to the case.” State v. Teran, 253
Ariz. 165, 171, ¶ 16 (App. 2022). We find no error.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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