Cited by

But “absent ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply.” ¶ 9 (App. 2023); –50 (App. 1983) (noting that “where the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant”), aff’d, Scalia & Garner, supra ¶ 15, at 299 (noting that the rule of lenity applies only if “after a

at ¶ 15; –50 (App. 1983) (“[W]here the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”).

–50 (App. 1983) (“[W]here the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”), approved and adopted by cf. A.R.S.

And, if a statute remains unclear after considering those factors, “‘the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’” -50, 6 -49 (App. 1983), aff’d, P.2d 743 (1984).

Weaver, 158 Ariz. at 410, 762 P.2d at 1364

If that endeavor nevertheless leaves a statute “‘susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’” -50, -49 (App. 1983), aff’d, P.2d 743 (1984).

Furthermore, because ¶ 13-901.01(G) is ambiguous as to whether preparatory offenses are included in its purview, we apply the rule of lenity, which “ ‘dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” , -50 , -49 (App.1983) ( , ).

If a criminal statute is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” , (-50 , -9 (App. 1983)).

That rule applies only when a court determines that the language of a statute is “ ‘susceptible to more than one interpretation.’” Tarango, 185 Ariz. at 210 , 914 P.2d at 1302 , , approved

es the statute is ambiguous because it first grants the defendant “the right to have blood extracted by someone authorized by law [but then] the right is emasculated with the second sentence because the state need not show its compliance with that right.” He claims that the rule of lenity applies, dictating that any doubt as to the statute’s meaning be resolved in his favor

any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” , (-50 , -49 (App.1983), decision approved and adopted, , ), affd on reh’g, State v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections

When a statute is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” -50 , -49 (App.1983) ( , ); see Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 , 81 S.Ct.

“[W]here the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” -50 , -49 (App.1983) approved by , (citations omitted); , (rule of lenity mandates that doubts be resolved in defendant’s favor).

Vo, 172 Ariz. at 200 , 836 P.2d at 413 ; -50 , -49 (App.1983), approved

See Pena v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona

When, as occurred in Fredericks , a court “relie[s] on both grounds discussed in the opinion ..., neither holding is dictum.” , see also Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 371 F.2d 722, 726 (9th Cir.1967) (“Where an appellate court decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum.”).

Because certainty in the sentencing process is desirable, , approved, , we hold that a court must award a defendant presentence incarceration credit for the day on which he was booked into a detention facility, regardless of the time of day the booking occurred.

-50 , 683 P.2d .744, 748-49 (App.1983).

-550 , -49 (App.1983), approved and adopted

(court will decline to follow prior decision to avoid perpetuation of error); Castillo v. Industrial Comm’n, 21 Ariz.App.

-50 , -49 (App.1983) (opinion adopted in full by the Arizona Supreme Court at , )