Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Anaya, 799 P.2d 876.

50 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Preston Alton Strong 555 P.3d 537 Ariz. 2024
State of Arizona v. Preston Alton Strong 555 P.3d 537 Ariz. 2024
see Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 420.
State v. Purcell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Purcell Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State Kingston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State Kingston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, n.1 (1993), and wholly circumstantial evidence can support differing, yet reasonable inferences, State v. Anaya, 3 STATE v. KINGSTON Decision of the Court
State v. Wadi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Wadi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Rose Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Rose Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Further, because circumstantial evidence can support differing, yet reasonable inferences, the mere existence of an inference of innocence from circumstantial evidence does not warrant a directed verdict of acquittal
State v. Phillips Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Phillips Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
(“The substantial evidence required for conviction may be either circumstantial or direct, and the probative value of the evidence is not reduced simply because it is circumstantial.”).
State v. Wooten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Wooten Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Vaughn Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Vaughn Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Evidence that “a declarant still appeared nervous or distraught and that there was a reasonable basis for continuing emotional upset can be sufficient proof of spontaneity even where the interval between the startling event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought.” ().
State v. Gulley 382 P.3d 795 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Gulley 382 P.3d 795 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Thus, for hearsay to be admissible as an excited utterance, “(1) there must have been a startling event; (2) the statement must relate to the startling event; and (3) the statement must be made spontaneously, that is, soon enough after the event so as not to give the declarant time to fabricate.” ¶ 29 , ( , ).
State v. Uriarte-Velazquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Uriarte-Velazquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and “the probative value of the evidence is not reduced simply because it is circumstantial.”
State v. Hafen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Hafen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Land Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Land Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
“The substantial evidence required for conviction may be either circumstantial or direct, and the probative value of the evidence is not reduced simply because it is circumstantial.”
State v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Fernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Fernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Joe 316 P.3d 615 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Joe 316 P.3d 615 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Where the asserted loss is genuine, the prior statement is deemed not inconsistent under this rule, but if the loss is mere fakery, the statement falls within the rule.” , (dicta).
State of Arizona v. Kwame Roy Lowery 287 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Kwame Roy Lowery 287 P.3d 830 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
(jury may discredit defendant testimony for various reasons, including personal interest); (circumstantial evidence can support differing reasonable inferences).
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Fischer 199 P.3d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
“Evidence wholly circumstantial can support differing, yet reasonable inferences sufficient to defeat a motion for directed verdict.”
State v. Parks 116 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Parks 116 P.3d 631 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Beasley 70 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State v. Beasley 70 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
In order to admit hearsay under the excited utterance exception, “(1) there must have been a startling event; (2) the statement must relate to the startling event; and (3) the statement must be made spontaneously, that is, soon enough after the event so as not to give the declarant time to fabricate.”
State v. Garza 994 P.2d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Garza 994 P.2d 1025 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Taylor 2 P.3d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Taylor 2 P.3d 674 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Riley 992 P.2d 1135 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Riley 992 P.2d 1135 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
State v. Johnson 905 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
State v. Johnson 905 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
“Testimony that a declarant still appeared nervous or distraught and that there was a reasonable basis for continuing emotional upset can be sufficient proof of spontaneity even where the interval between the startling event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought.”
State v. Delgado 848 P.2d 337 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Delgado 848 P.2d 337 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Downing 831 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Downing 831 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992