Cited by

Cf. Klokic, 219 Ariz. at 249 ¶¶ 37–38 (discussing how separate defenses to multiple acts give rise to the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict); (“All of the acts were basically the same .

see also Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 138, ¶ 1.

(concluding that guilty verdict implied jury did not believe only defense offered); (finding it “peculiarly within [jury’s] province” to disbelieve defendant’s story).

(explaining that witness credibility is an issue the jury decides).

¶ 29 (App. 3 STATE v. TUCKER Decision of the Court 2013) (“[J]urors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions, including curative ones.”); (concluding court’s instruction cured any prejudice caused by improper testimony).

t alleges constitutes the crime, or instruct the jury that they must agree unanimously on a specific act that constitutes the crime before the 8 STATE v. SUTTER Decision of the Court defendant can be found guilty.” ¶ 14 (App. 2008) ().

¶ 24 (2009) (“[F]or Sixth Amendment purposes, courts look beyond the indictment to determine whether defendants received actual notice of charges, and the notice requirement can be satisfied even when a charge was not included in the indictment.”); (finding, under similar circumstances, defendant had adequate notice of charged offense).

¶ 10 (App. 2008) ( and then Ariz. R. Crim.

See Klokic, 219 Ariz. at 246- 48, ¶¶ 26-27, 31-34 (discussing Davis, Counterman, ); ¶¶ 41-42 (App. 2015) (rejecting the defendant’s claim of duplicity after finding her “defenses are inextricably intertwined .

ions” after the prosecutor posed improper questions, and “[w]e assume the jurors followed those instructions”); ¶ 46 (2003) (noting the trial court issued a limiting instruction to cure improper testimony and, absent defense counsel’s request for “further guidance for the jury, we assume the jurors followed the court’s instruction”); -51 (1990) (concluding any prejudice caused by an expert witness’s testimony regarding the credibility of the victim was cured when the trial court sustained defens

To this end, “Arizona law requires that each separate offense be charged in a separate count, [and] an indictment which charges more than one crime within a single count may be dismissed as duplicitous.”

See Weinstein § 103.41[5]; -51 , -81 (App. 1990) (expert’s improper testimony regarding credibility of victim cured by court’s admonition and instruction to jury regarding its role in determining credibility).

To this end, “Arizona law requires that each separate offense be charged in a separate count, [and] an indictment which charges more than one crime within a single count may be dismissed as duplicitous.”

(where defense was acts of fondling did not occur, jury left with weighing credibility of defendant, and verdict implied jury rejected defense; thus, defendant not prejudiced by trial court’s failure to provide unanimity instruction or require election by state).

at ¶ 14, (Kleinschmidt, J., concurring).

-41, -14 (App. 1997); -51, -80 (App. 1990).

15 STATE v. WALLER Opinion of the Court found guilty.’” Klokic, 196 P.3d at 847, (Kleinschmidt, J., concurring).

¶7 P.2d 776 (App. 1990) is unavailing.

See e.g., Whitney, 159 Ariz. at 480, 768 P.2d at 642

Nevertheless, because this is the technical nomenclature our courts have adopted, we adhere to it “to be precise in this confusing area of the law.” (Kleinschmidt, J., concurring).