Cited by

(“In the context of criminal law, an offender must be punished under the law in force when the offense was committed and is not exempted from punishment by a subsequent amendment to the applicable statutory provision.”).

¶ 70 (2003); n.6 (App. 1993).

(“[I]n the context of criminal law, an offender must be punished under the law in force when the offense was committed and is not exempted from punishment by a subsequent amendment to the applicable statutory provision.” ()).

And, other than the possibility that he could have presented an alibi defense for times he may have been out of town, Copeland does not specify what 8 STATE v. COPELAND Opinion of the Court defenses were unavailable to him.5 n.6 (App. 1993) (assertion that defendant was unable to present alibi defense, “because he could not reconstruct his life for a specific year, is a theoretical, not an actual, prejudice that could be asserted any time an offense was alleged to have occurred over a period of

“The motion or objection must state specific grounds in order to preserve the issue on appeal,” id., and “an objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”

STATE v. LARA Decision of the Court 408 (App. 1993) (“an objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”).

-35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) ().

-35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue [for appeal] on another ground.”) ().

However, Stephens did not object to any of this evidence for the reasons she presents on appeal, so we review only for fundamental error.4 (“An objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”).

¶16 “A party must make a specific and timely objection at trial to the admission of certain evidence in order to preserve that issue for appeal.” Ariz. R. Evid.

(“[A]n objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other 7 STATE v. PATRON Decision of the Court ground

(“A party must make a specific and timely objection at trial to the admission of certain evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal.”) Furthermore, an objection to an admission of evidence on one ground does not preserve issues relating to its admission on other grounds.

n.6 (App. 1993) (defendant’s assertion that he could not present alibi defense because he could not reconstruct his life for a specific year is a “theoretical, not an actual prejudice, that could be asserted any time an offense was alleged to have occurred over a period of time”).

¶ 19 (2005); -09 (App. 1993) (holding that an objection to evidence on one ground fails to preserve other issues on appeal).

erred by permitting the State to admit “impermissible character evidence.” Specifically, Stuart asserts that Cynthia “impermissibly testified concerning [his] ‘bad temperament’ near the time of the murder ostensibly to show [his] state of mind.” ¶9 To preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review, “[a] party must make a specific and timely objection at trial.” see generally Ariz. R. Evid.

¶ 19, (“[A]n objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”).

However, “[a] party must make a specific and timely objection at trial in order to preserve that issue for appeal.”

(“[A]n objection to the admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”); -69, ¶¶ 19-26, -09 (2005) (defining fundamental error as prejudicial e

could not have prejudiced [the defendant’s] defense” when “his sole defense was that [the victim] was lying”); (“[I]n order to prevail on an arguably duplicitous indictment, defendant must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced thereby.”).

Taylor, 160 Ariz. at 422 , 773 P.2d at 981 (eighty-five consecutive life sentences for a total of 2975 years for sexual exploitation and sexual conduct with minors); , (six consecutive twenty-five-year sentences for sexual assault); , (three consecutive twenty-year sentences for child molestation); , (twenty-five-year sentence for one count of sexual assault); , (forty-year sentence for child molestation).

See, , (holding that amendment to child molestation statute which reduced age requirement was not applicable to reduce offense for defendant who committed molestation before effective date of amendment, citing inter alia section 1-246)