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The defendant must show “a reasonable probability that except for his lawyer’s error he would not have waived his right to trial.” ¶ 21 (App. 1998).

To prove prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)).

determine whether a petitioner has a colorable claim of prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel after a plea agreement, a court should instead ask the following: If the defendant’s allegations are taken as true, do they show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pled] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial?” ¶ 19 (App. 1998).

¶ 25 (1998) (holding to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must allege “specific facts which would allow a court to meaningfully assess why that deficiency was material to the plea decision”).

¶ 19 (App. 1998) (holding that to satisfy the prejudice requirement of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (citation omitted)).

Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant establishes prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” ¶ 19 (App. 1998) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 58).

The showing of prejudice requires the defendant to allege “specific facts which would allow a court to meaningfully assess why [counsel’s] deficiency was material to the plea decision.” ¶ 25 (App. 1998).

¶ 19 (App. 1998) (The prejudice requirement “is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

¶7 An assertion that counsel’s incompetent performance caused the defendant to plead guilty “must be accompanied by an allegation of specific facts which would allow a court to meaningfully assess why [counsel’s] deficiency was material to the plea decision.” ¶ 25 (1998).

Nor does Alvarado meet his obligation to show prejudice, failing to demonstrate, or even allege, “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” ¶ 19 (1998).

P. 32.8(a); see also Amaral, 239 Ariz. at 220, ¶ 11 (holding that a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if “he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence”); ¶ 25 (App. 1998) (holding that a pleading defendant establishes a colorable claim of prejudice by presenting specific facts showing the defendant would not have pled guilty in the absence of counsel’s errors).

“An appellate court will reverse a trial court’s summary dismissal [of a petition for post-conviction relief] only if an abuse of discretion affirmatively appears.” ¶ 10 (App. 1998).

Additionally, the prejudice requirement is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” ¶ 19 (1998) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)); see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017).

Watton, 164 Ariz. at 325; ¶ 10 (App. 1998).

I. Standard for Obtaining an Evidentiary Hearing ¶8 “A trial court may summarily dismiss a [petition for post- conviction relief] only if it finds no ‘material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the defendant to relief.’” ¶ 10, (citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 ; ¶¶ 12-13 , Toro, 940 F.2d at 1067-68; Day, 969 F.2d at 42 ; Alvernaz, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 , 830 P.2d at 755 .