Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069.

78 citing documents.

  • State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • State v. Hernandez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
    The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is “to protect victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning any past sexual behavior.” -01, ¶ 15 (App. 2000), -66, ¶ 10 (2018).
  • In Re: Ms 2022-000001 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • In Re: Ms 2022-000001 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    during police questioning.” ¶¶ 36, 38 (App. 2000), ¶ 10 (2018).
  • State v. Vaughan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Vaughan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    ¶ 29 (App. 2000), –66, ¶ 10 (2018).
  • State v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Winston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    The introduction of otherwise inadmissible other-act evidence does not require reversal if the record discloses no reasonable probability the “evidence materially affected the outcome of the trial.” ¶ 38 (App. 2000); ¶ 32 (2000).
  • State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • State v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    ¶ 27 n.5 (App. 2000) (“Opinion and reputation evidence may be admitted to prove a person’s character for truthfulness if attacked, but specific past acts of untruthfulness may be excluded by the trial court if unrelated to the instant situation.”).
  • State v. Canales-Perez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Canales-Perez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Gilligan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • State v. Gilligan Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    The statute “protect[s] victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning any past sexual behavior.” –01, ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2000), –66, ¶¶ 10–13 (2018).
  • State v. Pogue Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • State v. Pogue Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    § 13-1421 is to protect victims “from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning any past sexual behavior.” –01, ¶ 15 (App. 2000), –66, ¶ 10 (2018).
  • State v. Gonzalez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Gonzalez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶ 62 (2013); ¶ 29 (App. 2000)
  • State v. Gipson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Gipson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    When the defense wishes to present evidence of prior false accusations, “the court has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.” ¶ 29 (2000) see A.R.S.
  • State v. King Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. King Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶¶ 35-36 (App. 2000) (overruled on other grounds).
  • State v. Tracey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Tracey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    ¶ 42 (App. 2013); ¶¶ 22–23 (App. 2000), ¶ 10 (2018).
  • State of Arizona v. Antajuan Stewart Carson Jr. 410 P.3d 1230 Ariz. 2018
  • State of Arizona v. Antajuan Stewart Carson Jr. 410 P.3d 1230 Ariz. 2018
    ds that a ‘defendant who disclaims any assaultive behavior on his part is not entitled to a self defense instruction.’” ()); ¶ 11 (App. 2005) (“A defendant who disclaims any assaultive behavior on his part is not entitled to a self defense instruction.”(quoting Miller, 129 Ariz. at 43)); ¶ 40 (App. 2000) (“Given that the defendant denied committing the act with which he was charged, it follows that he could not argue self-defense.”); (“It is evident that appellant had completely denied shooting
  • State v. Puente Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Puente Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Winegardner 397 P.3d 363 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Winegardner 397 P.3d 363 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    ¶ 20 “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” , quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S.Ct.
  • State v. Farr Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • State v. Farr Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    “[T]he [trial] court has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.”
  • State v. Carson 391 P.3d 1198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Carson 391 P.3d 1198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    In its oral ruling denying the instruction, , which had not been cited by the parties.
  • State v. Chandler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Chandler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Uriarte-Velazquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • State v. Uriarte-Velazquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    “Implicit within this assurance is the right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance in order to present to the jury the defendant’s as well as the prosecution’s version of the facts so that the jury may determine the truth.” ¶ 19 (App. 2000).
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla 364 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Okken 364 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla 364 P.3d 479 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Okken 364 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    “We will resolve all uncertainties in favor of constitutionality,” ¶ 17
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Doody Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Second, a trial court “has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.” ¶ 29
  • State v. Hon. padilla/simcox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Hon. padilla/simcox Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    § 13-1421(A)(5); ¶ 16, Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State v. Gollihar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Gollihar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Further, a trial court “has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.” ¶ 29
  • State v. Hayes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Hayes Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    Further, the court “has considerable discretion in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.” ¶ 29