State v. Lopez-Cubas

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOSE O. LOPEZ-CUBAS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0431
FILED 10-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-114271-001
The Honorable Kristin Culbertson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Anne Carmack
Counsel for Appellee

Jose O. Lopez-Cubas, Phoenix
Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

STATE v. LOPEZ-CUBAS
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Jose Lopez-Cubas appeals his convictions for unlawful
imprisonment, aggravated assault, and misdemeanor assault, all
committed upon his wife (“Wife”), whose name we omit to protect her
anonymity as a crime victim. Lopez-Cubas claims several issues
concerning the evidence at trial require reversal, the superior court
conducted jury selection improperly, and the superior court violated his
speedy trial rights through the grants of eleven continuances. Because he
fails to establish any error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 While reviewing a challenge like Lopez-Cubas’ to the
sufficiency of the evidence in a trial, we view that evidence “in the light
most favorable to the prosecution” to ask whether “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 16 (2011) (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)). We thus summarize the facts in that light.

A. Lopez-Cubas Attacks Wife.

¶3 In April 2023, Lopez-Cubas and Wife had recently moved in
together. During the afternoon of April 3, 2023, Wife was resting in bed.
While Wife was lying down, Lopez-Cubas came into the bedroom and
asked Wife about her being seen at the trailer park with another man –
information Lopez-Cubas’ friend had shared with him. Wife did not want
to engage in the conversation, and got up to check on her pet turtles.

¶4 Lopez-Cubas then grabbed Wife by her hair, threw her into
the kitchen, and began striking her. Wife pleaded with him to stop. But he
told her to “Shut the f*** up, f****** b****,” before throwing Wife against the
refrigerator and then the floor. Lopez-Cubas began kicking Wife “[a]ll
over” with his work boots, and then returned to hitting her.

¶5 The attacks continued intermittently over several hours, all
over the house. At one point, Lopez-Cubas struck Wife with her turtle cage.
Wife repeatedly tried to flee, but each time Lopez-Cubas prevented her
from doing so by grabbing her body or hair. Lopez-Cubas told Wife she
was going to die and that he would also kill himself.

¶6 Wife decided her best chance at escape would be when
contractors were to arrive that evening. When the contractors arrived,
Lopez-Cubas pushed Wife into their bedroom, telling her not to come out

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or call the police. Wife peeked out of the bedroom. When she saw the front
door was open, she escaped to her truck outside and called 911. Lopez-
Cubas came to the truck and banged on the driver’s side door and window.
But police soon arrived, took photographs of Wife’s injuries, and talked
with both parties. Later that day, Lopez-Cubas was arrested.

B. Lopez-Cubas’ Trial Is Put Off Predominantly Because of
Continuances He Seeks.

¶7 On April 13, 2023, a grand jury indicted Lopez-Cubas on one
count of kidnapping, one count of aggravated assault, and four counts of
misdemeanor assault. The superior court set his trial assignment date for
September 13, 2023.

¶8 Over the next 21 months, Lopez-Cubas moved for nine
continuances of his trial. The State once joined with Lopez-Cubas in
moving to continue because neither side was ready. On March 24, 2025, a
trial date was finally set for May 7, 2025. The State then moved for a
continuance because of an attorney’s upcoming surgery. Lopez-Cubas did
not object, and trial was set for July 21, 2025. Eighty-eight percent of the
duration of the continuances was attributable to Lopez-Cubas’ requests,
and he did not object to any continuance or assert his speedy trial rights.

C. The Court Seats a Jury to Which Lopez-Cubas Does Not
Object, Containing No Jurors to Whom He Objected.

¶9 Before empaneling a jury, the court heard for-cause objections
by Lopez-Cubas and the State to prospective jurors based on their
responses to pretrial questionnaires. Some prospective jurors allegedly
exhibited certain biases in domestic violence cases and against
undocumented immigrants, but the court excused them all at Lopez-Cubas’
urging or otherwise. All but one of the prospective jurors to whom Lopez-
Cubas objected were struck, either on bias grounds or otherwise. The only
other prospective juror to whom Lopez-Cubas objected wasn’t empaneled.
And Lopez-Cubas didn’t object to the jury that was empaneled.

D. The State and Lopez-Cubas Offer Starkly Different
Descriptions of the Events at Issue.

¶10 The State presented evidence that Lopez-Cubas violently
attacked Wife and kept her from fleeing. Wife testified he grabbed her by
her hair and threw her to the kitchen floor and then into the refrigerator.
She testified he repeatedly hit, punched, and kicked her “everywhere,”
including in her chest, back, and “all over in the face,” while wearing hard

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boots. Wife explained she tried to escape three times, but each time Lopez-
Cubas grabbed her to keep her from escaping. Wife testified that when
contractors showed up, Lopez-Cubas pushed Wife into their bedroom and
told her “don’t call the cops” and “don’t come out of the room.”

¶11 Others testified to Wife’s injuries. Both officers who
responded to Wife’s 911 call testified to the injuries they observed,
including a “golf ball sized lump” on her face and swelling on her left arm
and wrist. The officers’ body camera footage captured Wife’s injuries and
was shown at trial. During one officer’s testimony, the prosecution played
his body camera footage and asked him to identify and describe the
observable injuries on Wife. The State also presented photographic
evidence of Wife’s injuries on her face and chin, back, torso, and arms. A
doctor who treated Wife three days after the events at issue testified he saw
bruising on her face, arms, chest, back, and left hand. He also testified an
x-ray and CT scan revealed she then had three fractured ribs. He noted that
they were “relatively new” and consistent with a “high force mechanism.”

¶12 Lopez-Cubas testified in his own defense. He stated he came
home around 5:00 pm on the day in question and spent most of his time in
the backyard fixing a water pipe. He recounted short conversations with
Wife but no physical encounter. He testified Wife was moving freely in and
out of the house and not kept forcibly under his control.

¶13 Lopez-Cubas disputed aspects of the State’s evidence through
cross-examination. He noted the hospital records from Wife’s April 6, 2023
visit to the hospital reflected that Wife told hospital staff the assault took
place “yesterday” (April 5, 2023), not April 3, 2023. He argued Wife’s
hospital doctor was unable to give an exact age and cause of Wife’s injuries.
He further noted that the x-ray and CT scan purporting to show Wife’s
fractures were never admitted into evidence. And he highlighted that the
doctor could not say with perfect confidence that he reviewed the x-ray and
CT scan himself, as opposed to reading the report of a colleague who did.

E. Responding to a Juror Question, an Officer Testifies Lopez-
Cubas Invoked His Right to Silence, After Which the Court
Gives a Curative Instruction Instead of Declaring a Mistrial.

¶14 The police officer who took initial statements from Lopez-
Cubas testified as to their conversation. The prosecutor asked the officer
what Lopez-Cubas had said about the events at the residence. The officer
responded that Lopez-Cubas stated he “didn’t do anything.” Counsel for
Lopez-Cubas requested a sidebar because he was concerned the line of

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questioning was going to reach testimony about Lopez-Cubas’ silence after
he had been read his Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). The prosecutor agreed not to seek information after Lopez-Cubas
was warned. His only other question was about what Lopez-Cubas had
offered as the cause of Wife’s injuries. The officer responded that Lopez-
Cubas said that Wife had previously fallen.

¶15 While the prosecutor asked nothing that reached past the
moment Lopez-Cubas received his Miranda warnings, a juror did. The juror
asked whether Lopez-Cubas elaborated on his statement about Wife’s prior
fall. The officer said no, because Lopez-Cubas “invoked his Fifth
Amendment Right.” The court cut off the officer’s testimony and held a
sidebar. The court suggested – and the parties agreed – that a limiting
instruction would be proper. Lopez-Cubas also requested a mistrial, which
the court declined to grant. The court then struck the officer’s statement
and gave a curative instruction, directing the jury not to consider it.

¶16 After the State rested, Lopez-Cubas moved for a judgment of
acquittal on all charges under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”)
20. The court denied his motion. After closing arguments, the jury
deliberated for less than two hours. It found Lopez-Cubas guilty of one
count of aggravated assault and four counts of misdemeanor assault. The
jury also found him not guilty of kidnapping, but guilty of one count of the
lesser-included charge of unlawful imprisonment.

¶17 Lopez-Cubas timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶18 Lopez-Cubas identifies ten issues. He argues that: (1) for four
different reasons, insufficient evidence supported his convictions; (2) the
court erred by denying his motion for mistrial; (3) the trial violated his
speedy trial rights; (4) the court erred in how it conducted voir dire; (5) there
was prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal; (6) cumulative error
merits reversal; and (7) Lopez-Cubas had ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶19 The State responds that: (1) sufficient evidence supports
Lopez-Cubas’ convictions; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Lopez-Cubas’ motion for a mistrial; (3) Lopez-Cubas’ speedy trial
rights were not violated; (4) the court did not abuse its discretion in
conducting voir dire; (5) there was no prosecutorial misconduct; (6) this
Court cannot consider Lopez-Cubas’ cumulative error claim; and (7) Lopez-

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Cubas cannot raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this appeal.
We agree with the State, and affirm.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports Lopez-Cubas’ Convictions.

¶20 Lopez-Cubas challenges the sufficiency of evidence
supporting his convictions for: (1) unlawful imprisonment; (2) aggravated
assault; and (3) misdemeanor assault. “We review the sufficiency of
evidence presented at trial only to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the jury’s verdict.” State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357 ¶ 22 (2007).
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court does
not reweigh the evidence to decide if it would reach the same conclusion as
the trier of fact.” State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361 (App. 1994). Reversal is
appropriate only where there is “a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conviction.” State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996)
(quoting State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423, 424-25 (1976)).

¶21 Lopez-Cubas likewise challenges the denial of his motion for
acquittal under Rule 20, which presents the same question – whether the
evidence was sufficient in his case to support guilty verdicts. See State v.
West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶¶ 14-15 (2011) (reviewing a Rule 20 motion is a
“question of the sufficiency of the evidence”).

¶22 While resolving those challenges, we view the evidence
presented at trial “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” asking
whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 16
(quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)).

A. Unlawful Imprisonment

¶23 A conviction for unlawful imprisonment requires the State to
prove that the defendant, “knowingly restrained” the victim. A.R.S. § 13-
1303(A). A person restrains another when they “restrict a person’s
movements without consent, without legal authority, and in a manner
which interferes substantially with such person’s liberty, by either moving
such person from one place to another or by confining such person.” A.R.S.
§ 13-1301(2). Consent is absent where the restraint is accomplished through
physical force. A.R.S. § 13-1301(2)(a).

¶24 The State presented sufficient evidence at trial for a rational
juror to find Lopez-Cubas unlawfully imprisoned Wife. Wife testified to
multiple instances where Lopez-Cubas forcibly restricted her ability to
move, including several times when she was attempting to escape. First,

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Lopez-Cubas prevented Wife from going to check on her turtles when he
grabbed her by her hair and threw her into the kitchen. On at least two
other occasions, Lopez-Cubas grabbed Wife’s person or her hair as she tried
to leave. Lastly, when contractors arrived at the house in the evening,
Lopez-Cubas pushed Wife into their bedroom and told her not to call the
police. This evidence, taken together, would allow a rational juror to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez-Cubas knowingly restrained Wife.

¶25 Lopez-Cubas argues, however, that his conviction cannot
stand because evidence shows Wife at times “mov[ed] freely throughout
the residence” or was otherwise not under his control. But even taking that
as true does not defeat his conviction. The crime of unlawful imprisonment
is complete once a defendant knowingly restrains another, regardless of
how long that restraint is imposed. A.R.S. § 13-1303(A); see also Mejak v.
Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 559 ¶ 20 (2006) (“[C]ompleted crime . . . require[s]
that all the elements be present for the commission of the offense.”).

¶26 Similarly, that Lopez-Cubas denies restraining Wife doesn’t
mean there is insufficient evidence of unlawful imprisonment. See State v.
Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 313 ¶ 3 (App. 1999) (“[E]vidence is not insufficient
simply because the testimony is conflicting.”). The jury determines
credibility involving conflicting testimony, State v. Morales, 110 Ariz. 512,
513 (1974), and it was free to accept Wife’s version of events, as it did.

B. Aggravated Assault and Misdemeanor Assaults

¶27 Aggravated assault requires proving: (1) an assault; and (2)
an aggravating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-1204. One form of assault is
“[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to
another person.” A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1). And, as the State sought to prove
here, an assault can be aggravated if the defendant “commit[ed] the assault
by any means of force that cause[d] . . . a fracture.” A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(3).

¶28 The State proffered a substantial amount of evidence at trial
tending to show Lopez-Cubas assaulted Wife, fracturing three of her ribs.
Wife testified that Lopez-Cubas grabbed Wife by her hair and threw her
onto the kitchen floor and then against the refrigerator. Wife added that he
then hit, kicked, and punched her “everywhere.” Both responding officers
testified to the injuries they observed on Wife. The State showed the jury
body camera footage and photographic evidence of Wife’s visible injuries.

¶29 Substantial medical testimony also corroborated Wife’s
testimony. The hospital doctor who treated Wife three days after the events
at issue testified to the bruising on Wife’s face and body. Supporting the

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State’s proof on the aggravation factor, that physician also testified that a
CT scan and x-ray showed Wife to have three fractured ribs, likely caused
by a “highforce mechanism.” He also testified Wife’s wounds could not
have been self-inflicted and were not consistent with a fall.

¶30 Lopez-Cubas claims that the above evidence cannot support
a conviction for aggravated assault because of “substantial uncertainty
regarding injury timing, causation, and objective corroboration.” In
particular he points to: (1) hospital records showing Wife told nurses the
assault occurred “yesterday” (April 5, 2023), rather than on April 3, 2023, as
the prosecution alleges; (2) the hospital doctor could not say with certainty
how old the injuries were or who caused them; (3) the x-ray and CT scan
were not admitted into evidence; and (4) the doctor being unable to
definitively say if he personally reviewed the x-ray and CT scan or whether
he reviewed the findings and report of another hospital professional.

¶31 Lopez-Cubas’ challenge effectively asks us to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997)
(“When the evidence supporting a verdict is challenged on appeal, an
appellate court will not reweigh the evidence.”). The jury is the arbiter of
credibility and conflicting testimony. See State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357 ¶
27 (2007) (cleaned up). Given the amount of evidence that Lopez-Cubas
assaulted Wife on April 3, 2023, and fractured three of her ribs, there was
sufficient evidence to find Lopez-Cubas guilty of aggravated assault.

¶32 For the same reasons, we conclude sufficient evidence
supported Lopez-Cubas’ conviction on four counts of misdemeanor
assault. The State presented evidence of the locations where Wife was
injured. They were her: (1) face and chin; (2) back; (3) torso; and (4) arms.
That evidence, taken with the rest of the State’s case, could allow a rational
trier of fact to find Lopez-Cubas’ guilt on each count of misdemeanor
assault beyond a reasonable doubt. West, 226 Ariz. at 562 ¶ 16.

II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Issuing a Curative
Instruction and Denying Lopez-Cubas’ Motion for Mistrial.

¶33 Lopez-Cubas argues the court abused its discretion in not
granting his motion for a mistrial after an officer commented on Lopez-
Cubas’ invocation of his right to remain silent during trial. We review the
denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Dann, 205
Ariz. 557, 570 ¶ 43 (2003). We bear in mind that a mistrial is “the most
drastic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears

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that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial
granted.” Id. (quoting State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 (1983)).

¶34 A witness commenting on a defendant’s invocation of their
right to remain silent infringes on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.
See State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 406 ¶ 36 (App. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Carson, 243 Ariz. 463, 465-466 ¶¶ 10-13 (2018). But that
alone doesn’t mandate a mistrial. Instead, in considering whether that
infringement warrants a mistrial, the court should look to: “(1) whether the
jury has heard what it should not hear, and (2) the probability that what it
heard influenced them.” State v. Laird, 186 Ariz. 203, 207 (1996).

¶35 We see no likelihood the jury was improperly influenced by
the statement. Right after the officer’s statement that Lopez-Cubas had
invoked his Fifth Amendment right, the court paused the proceedings,
struck the improper testimony, and instructed the jury to disregard it. We
“presume that juries follow” curative instructions. Dann, 205 Ariz. at 571 ¶
48. They can thus reduce the probability of the jury being influenced by
improper testimony. State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439 (2003). The court
acted promptly and firmly here. We see no error in the court’s denial of a
mistrial given the court’s prompt and clear corrective action.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Deny Lopez-Cubas a Speedy Trial,
Because He Created Most of the Delay at Issue.

¶36 Lopez-Cubas argues his right to a speedy trial was violated
because the “matter extended approximately two years and five months
before resolution.” Because he failed to object below, as one must to bring
a challenge under Rule 8, we interpret his argument as raising a federal
constitutional challenge. See State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 138 (1997)
(“[O]nce a defendant has let a Rule 8 speedy trial limit pass without
objection, he cannot later claim a violation that requires reversal.”). And
because Lopez-Cubas did not raise his right to a speedy trial below, we
review his constitutional challenge for fundamental error. State v.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19 (2005). Fundamental error requires the
defendant to show: (1) error; (2) that was fundamental; and (3) prejudiced
the defendant. State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 548 ¶ 14 (2021) (citing State v.
Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142 ¶ 21 (2018)). We determine whether error
occurred by reviewing Lopez-Cubas’ constitutional speedy trial claim de
novo, while reviewing any accompanying factual determinations for abuse
of discretion. State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 233 ¶ 57 (2007).

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¶37 To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated, courts look to four factors: “[1] [l]ength of the
delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the defendant’s assertion of his right,
and [4] prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
There is no bright-line time limit, which, when exceeded, will trigger the
Barker analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 (determining whether the length
of the delay is sufficient to move to other Barker factors is “necessarily
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case”). A defendant’s
right to a speedy trial attaches at indictment, information, or formal arrest,
whichever comes first. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971).

¶38 Lopez-Cubas was arrested on April 3, 2023, and indicted ten
days later. Trial commenced on July 21, 2025, two years, three months, and
eight days from his date of arrest. As the State concedes, this warrants
consideration under the remaining three factors of the Barker test. See State
v. Soto, 117 Ariz. 345, 348 (1977) (holding that a nine-month delay was
“sufficient to trigger further examination of the other factors”).

¶39 The second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs heavily
against Lopez-Cubas. See Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (stating
that the inquiry is “whether the government or the criminal defendant is
more to blame for [the] delay”). While the time from arrest to trial in Lopez-
Cubas’ case was appreciable, responsibility for that delay is almost entirely
his own. Of the 11 continuances granted in this case, 9 were requested by
Lopez-Cubas alone. Of the remaining two continuances, one appears to
have been requested by both parties, and one was requested by the State
due to an attorney needing surgery. That makes Lopez-Cubas responsible
for over 88% of the continuances, measured by duration.

¶40 The third factor, the assertion of one’s speedy trial right, also
weighs against Lopez-Cubas because he failed to raise his right below. The
final factor, prejudice, “is the most important Barker factor.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 399 ¶ 16 (2013). Whether prejudice is present in a particular
case is determined by looking at the delay’s contribution to: “(1) oppressive
pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) the
possibility that the defense will be impaired by diminishing memories and
loss of exculpatory evidence.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Lopez-Cubas states that the delay “impaired
reliability and fairness,” but doesn’t explain how. We note Lopez-Cubas
was not incarcerated during the pendency of his case. Nothing in the record
indicates the delay impaired Lopez-Cubas’ ability to marshal a defense or
prejudiced him. In short, the delay didn’t violate his right to a speedy trial.

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IV. Lopez-Cubas’ Other Issues Lack Merit.

¶41 First, Lopez-Cubas raises no colorable issue about voir dire.
We review rulings on prospective jurors for abuse of discretion. State v.
Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 45 ¶ 36 (2005). But we see no issue to review: the court
struck every juror to whom Lopez-Cubas objected, but for one, who was
not empaneled, and Lopez-Cubas failed to object to the jury that was seated.

¶42 Second, Lopez-Cubas’ claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails.
He cites two pages of the trial transcript and says the prosecutor “implied
facts unsupported by direct evidence, including improper character
implications encouraging inference over proof.” But in the cited pages, the
prosecutor simply plays a responding officer’s bodycam footage while
asking the officer to point out the injuries he noticed on Wife. Asking the
officer to comment on what he observed, the prosecutor neither suggested
the answers nor made improper appeals to the jurors’ emotions. See State
v. Romero, 262 Ariz. 141, 147 ¶ 23 (2026) (“repeated use of leading questions
on direct examination” while asking officer about his bodycam footage
amounted to prosecutorial error); State v. Herrera, 174 Ariz. 387, 397 (1993)
(a prosecutor may not “improperly appeal to the jurors’ emotions, passions,
or prejudices by urging them to convict defendant ‘for reasons wholly
irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence’”). We see no prosecutorial
misconduct or error arising out of the prosecutor’s examination here.

¶43 Third, Lopez-Cubas improperly seeks to claim he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if he did, we don’t hear ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz.
1, 3 ¶ 9 (2002). They must instead be asserted later, in a petition for post-
conviction relief under Rule 32. Id.

¶44 Fourth, Lopez-Cubas’ claim of cumulative error fails. Arizona
does not recognize the cumulative error doctrine apart from the context of
prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 78-79 ¶ 25 (1998).
And as we just explained, Lopez-Cubas identifies no prosecutorial
misconduct in this case. See Paragraph 42, supra.

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CONCLUSION

¶45 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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