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¶ 6 (App. 2001) (remanding for evidentiary hearing where “trial record was silent on whether [prior] convictions were committed on the same occasion”).

Moreover, time incarcerated or on absconder is excluded from the calculation “regardless of whether that incarceration was for the particular prior conviction at issue or for some other crime.” ¶ 22 (App. 2001).

¶¶ 24-25 (App. 2001) (affirming sentence when the trial court miscalculated the number of historical priors, but the correct calculation left the defendant with two or more historical priors).

¶ 20 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 8 (App. 2001)).

In doing so, we first consider the language of the statute, State v. Derello , , ¶ 21, giving "every word and phrase its 'usual and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning,' " State v. Randles , , ¶ 8, (quoting Bilke v. State , , ¶ 11, ); see also Stat

Sufficiency of Evidence of Prior Convictions ¶12 “A trial court’s determination that a prior conviction constitutes an historical prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement involves a mixed question of law and fact.” ¶ 20 (App. 2007) ( ¶ 8 (App. 2001)).

It is the State’s burden to prove the existence of a defendant’s prior convictions by clear and convincing evidence, ¶ 15 (App. 2004), and we review de novo a trial court’s determination that a prior conviction constitutes an historical prior felony, ¶ 8 (App. 2001).

if the offense was committed within the preceding five years.”); -61, ¶¶ 8-11 , -48 (App.2010) (statute excluding time spent incarcerated from calculation of statutory period for a historical felony not limited to time spent as a result of a conviction of a crime, but also includes time spent in jail before sentencing); ¶ 22 , (plain meaning of phrase “any time spent incarcerated” indicates Legislature intended to exclude “all time that a defendant spent in prison, regardless of whether that inc

(appellate court reviews de novo whether offenses committed on same occasion); cf. United States v. Barbour, 750 F.3d 535, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2014) (“‘We 5 STATE v. FLORES Opinion of the Court She

¶6 P.3d 1234 (App. 2001), Rodriguez responded that the seventy-nine days he had spent in jail before his sentencing for the 1999 endangerment conviction should not be counted as excluded time under § 13-604(W)(2)(c) because it was not time spent incarcerated for a conviction.

Although Rasul failed to raise this issue below, and thus forfeited his right to appellate relief absent fundamental error, “[t]he improper use of two prior convictions rather than one for purposes of sentence enhancement constitutes fundamental error.”